215. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
2214. Reference Deptel 13722 and mytel 2206.3 I had 30-minute farewell audience with President Sukarno noon today. After amenities [Page 360] including presentation of autographed album of his collection of paintings Sukarno plunged into business by asking me my reaction to recent events. I said that I welcomed his question as I was under instructions to give him with the friendliest objective and with no implication of injecting directly into Indonesian internal affairs an expression of our concern, based on experiences in many parts of the world, over the consequences to Indonesia of admission of Communists into Cabinet and inner circles of government.
I said that speaking as his brother and as an American Ambassador with most friendly feelings toward him personally and the Indonesian people, I could not reconcile in my own mind his life-long struggle to free Indonesia of foreign control with his advocacy of admission of PKI to the Cabinet. I said that all other Indonesian political parties were basically national indigenous parties but that the Communist Party, despite professions of its leaders to the contrary, must take orders directly or indirectly from foreign government. I said that it was a well known tactic of Communist parties to try to identify themselves with whatever political movement happened to be dominant in a country, that that in my opinion was why the PKI has seized on his concept almost as if it were their own and were making every attempt to identify themselves with the nationalist movement. Sukarno said he appreciated my frankness but he felt that it was possible for him by bringing the PKI to the Indonesian family table to convince them in the long run that they must be Indonesians first and break any connection they might have with Moscow and Peking. He referred to Tito and Mao Tse-tung the latter of whom he considers to be operating free of Moscow influence and to Aidit’s public statement day before yesterday that Comintern had been abolished and that the PKI sought nationalism in its purpose and aim.
Continuing Sukarno said that I might assure President Eisenhower that he gave me his solemn oath that he was not a Communist, that no action or policy of his would be hostile to the US and that if at any time the PKI departed from their Indonesian nationalism he would crush them as he did at Madiun. He repeated this two or three times in slightly different versions.
I said I was glad to hear his emphatic statement but again speaking as a brother I must earnestly ask him not to be deluded by what Communists say and to keep close watch through his security service to see that Communist actions conform to their professions of independence of Moscow. He said that whenever he had evidence at hand that Indonesian Communists were taking orders from Moscow or working Soviet and Chinese rather than Indonesian interests, he would “crush them”. He then said he had evidence that some Islamic leaders had direct connections with the Darul Islam which was in his [Page 361] opinion as much a foreign controlled movement as I had said was the Communist.
Repeating that no action of his should be hostile to the US he said that he was very anxious to expedite as much as possible the matter of obtaining arms and military equipment from the US. I explained that the delay had been largely due to the Indonesian side and that only this morning I thought that Subandrio and I had straightened out the last technical detail which would permit our examination of Indonesian requirements to see what the possibilities were (mytels 2204, 22054). He expressed pleasure and repeated that this was a matter he wished given highest priority.
At the conclusion of the conversation he brought in his son Guntur to say goodbye and told me that he was still planning to send Guntur to the US to complete his education when he was old enough to be on his own.
Comment: Foregoing conversation reveals very clearly the blind spots in Sukarno’s thinking but is not entirely discouraging. Bearing in mind that he is Javanese and therefore almost always open to compromise, nothing in what he said definitely excludes the possibility of his agreeing as hoped by Subandrio in my conversation with him this morning (mytel 2206) to “acquiescing in the will of the people” to some formula which would keep PKI out of Cabinet if not out of Advisory Council. His remarks also obviously suggest the advisability of careful study of methods by which we can get to Sukarno personally, although some risks may be involved, concrete evidence of direct connections between Moscow–Peking and PKI party and individual leaders.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.00/3–257. Secret; Priority.↩
- Telegram 1372 to Djakarta, February 25, instructed Cumming to speak to Sukarno and “review in detail Communist tactics of disruption and disastrous consequences Czechoslovakia and other European countries. Agree desirable point up clear relationship between Communist activities last few days Djakarta and similar activities directed from Moscow in European countries. You may also refer to incidents anti-foreignism.” (Ibid., 756D.00/2–2557)↩
- Telegram 2206 from Djakarta, March 2, summarized a conversation between Cumming and Subandrio during which Cumming “expressed concern over unhappy consequences to Indonesia of admission Communists to participation in Indonesian Government affairs and recorded with him orally fact that this was made under instructions.” (Ibid., 756D.00/3–257)↩
- Telegrams 2204 and 2205 from Djakarta, March 2, related to continuing negotiations concerning the final form of the Indonesian assurances necessary to meet U.S. legal requirements for the purchase of U.S. military equipment (see telegram 1863, Document 206). Telegram 2205 reported Indonesian concern to avoid “premature revelation text of note and exacting nature of assurances given which might have serious political consequences here.” (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/3–257)↩