Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

188. Telegram From the Embassy in the Netherlands to the Department of State¹

The Hague, October 30, 1956—6 p.m.

676. For Murphy. Having just received Deptel 768² repeating Djakarta’s 1020 October 27,³ I wish once again recall to your attention my comments re timing our approach Indonesians re increased aid. My recommendation on broad political considerations, not simply on aggravation increased aid will cause already unhappy United States-Dutch relations.

All major factors bearing on this problem are political:

(1) Sukarno’s statements during visits USSR and Red China, particularly re capitalist war-mongers and liberation Formosa, raise highly significant political questions.

(2) Sukarno’s latest and disturbing statement made, according press reports here, on October 29 in Djakarta. After expressing view government made mistake in 1945 in encouraging establishment political parties, and after warning dissension among parties dangerous, Sukarno reportedly made appeal to “bury all political parties.”⁴

(3) Indonesian repudiation RTC agreements including debts to Dutch was political act just as Nasser’s “nationalization” Suez—though on much more important scale—was politically motivated treaty violation.

(4) Our aid Indonesia designed as political gesture.

We are thus faced with decision which I believe must take into account these important political considerations. As I have previously stated, I believe we must not place ourselves in contradictory position of rewarding Sukarno’s lawlessness while continuing condemn equally lawless action Nasser. Furthermore, I believe it should not, by increasing our aid now, give impression we are condoning or ignoring Sukarno’s statements. Nor should we appear by our actions to be supporting him against his critics at time when he is being subjected to severe and wholesome criticism by political parties in Indonesia itself for statements we ourselves deplore.

Accordingly, it remains my strong conviction and recommendation we continue delay any approach to Indonesians re aid.

Matthews

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5–MSP/10–3056. Secret; Niact; Limit Distribution.
2. Dated October 29, not printed. (Ibid., 756D.5–MSP/10–2756)
3. Telegram 1020 reported that Cumming had learned that Djuanda intended to raise the subject of U.S. economic aid with him in Ali’s presence at a dinner on November 1 and requested the Department’s guidance. (Ibid.)
4. Reference is to a speech made by Sukarno on October 28 at a meeting of delegates from youth organizations.