Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

163. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, June 30, 1956—2 p.m.

3327. Our basic target in inviting Sukarno for US visit was impressed on mind President, who perhaps more than any other single individual has power effect general orientation Indonesian politics and policy, integrity, continuity and purpose of US world policy (Embassy telegram 2804²). Result for better or worse can only be judged in preliminary way at present: Own belief, gathered from him and members his party during 17 day trip is that we have succeeded. Ambassador Merchant reported (Ottawa’s telegram 448 to Department³) that Sukarno’s preconceived ideas on materialism US culture and militaristic overtones underwent substantial revision as result visit. Likewise Subandrio’s statement (Embassy telegram 3275⁴) based on reports presumably from Abdulgani further evidence favorable effects have been produced. But even with these reports it still too early make definite judgment. President has yet return to Djakarta; we may get some indication his thinking from speeches which he will make between early July and his departure some weeks later for USSR–China trip.⁵ But I am inclined believe he will confine his remarks to platitudes emphasizing what he told west and claiming greater understanding for Indonesia in particular and Asia in general at least in those countries in which he paid official calls. What is vitally important is what he does and how he acts in long run.

There are certain ancillary effects which visit produced: Its effect on members presidential party and its impact on articulate political opinion here. Until we have had chance talk with returning members official and unofficial parties we can assume that most if not all members party are coming back to Indonesia with greater understanding and presumably appreciation of US than they possessed when they departed. Size of party President insisted on bringing may have resulted in some bent noses from lack of attention and may detract slightly from general beneficial effect but still leaving large plus value.

Second plus value acquired was publicity which local press gave President and incidentally US by extensive coverage his trip. As reported in almost daily telegrams, presidential US reception and activities dominated all papers for more than three weeks and heavy (coverage) still continuing although now confined mostly to pictures. USIS whose output accounted for vast bulk of coverage also uncovered some new techniques which hitherto have not been available. Further benefit can be expected from exhibition of trip movies which will be running for probably next year here giving tremendous audience first hand view of US in more accurate version than is usually given movie-goers this country. However, there has been certain unhappiness noted in Masjumi leaders that trip with PNI President and PNI Foreign Minister gave us false impression of importance that party and concomitantly an underestimation of place Masjumi which both Natsir and Hanifah chidingly told us “after all are true friends”. I believe that treatment accorded Sukiman later report [reported?] to party on his return will do much straighten out matter. Even if Masjumi does continue rancor a little if our primary purpose accomplished they will come recognize benefit they derived from trip.

US invitation Sukarno logical development last year’s elections which revealed PNI as powerful political force, gave NU strategic pivotal position to exploit and showed Masjumi not majority party while PSI reduced to Parliamentary impotence. My conversations with various members Presidential party including President and Foreign Minister as well as Sukiman indicated almost pathological hatred Socialists. Given present dispensation Parliament as reflective balance current political forces country I believe we should, therefore, continue shift weight Embassy focus from contacts with Socialists and Masjumi toward NU and PNI although relations with latter group developing reasonably satisfactorily. In making this recommendation I do not wish imply that we should abandon PSI or contract out of our relations with Masjumi rather we must now balance our relationships with all parties with exception PKI so that we are able exert our influence regardless what shifts power may take place within non-Communist grouping. Final or even semi-permanent form Indonesian political life has not yet emerged. As previously reported I regard elections as simply providing clarification Indonesian political situation as election results indicated number possibilities of political manipulation and change. We should proceed with approach which will not greatly inhibit our maneuverability. Such procedure illustrated by fact that PNI and NU youth groups proceeding US August prior departure similar Masjumi group later in year. To insure implementation new emphasis, I have established committee senior officers examine principles selection grantees whose recommendations should be forthcoming near future.

While this provides for intermediate future, I am concerned regarding how best take advantage situation between time President’s return July 3 and his departure Eastern junket now tentatively set for late summer. I hope have opportunity raise both Fulbright and FCN agreements with Foreign Minister as soon as he is available. This may not be immediately after return as series problems such as appointments Mission Chiefs (Embassy telegram 3163⁶) apparently awaiting his personal attention. Presumably he will accompany President on next trip and in interim will have treat problems arising from Saudi Arabian and Madame Sun visits.⁷ I am reporting separately regarding economic aid.⁸

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/6–3056. Secret.
2. Telegram 2804 from Djakarta, May 8, stressed Sukarno’s importance in Indonesian politics and declared, “If we impress him favorably and convince him that one of our basic objectives is a democratic, economically viable, politically stable Indonesia whose independent active foreign policy we respect and can live with, we can materially increase chances of attainment of US policy objectives in Indonesia.” (Ibid., 756D.11/5–856)
3. Telegram 448 from Ottawa, June 6, not printed. (Ibid., 756D.11/6–656) Sukarno visited Canada and Western Europe after his tour of the United States.
4. Telegram 3275 from Djakarta, June 26, reported that Subandrio told Cumming that Sukarno had been concerned that while in the United States he would be subjected to pressure because of his policy of neutrality and that he had been surprised and favorably influenced by the fact that this had not happened. Cumming reported that Subandrio said this was of great importance “not only to furtherance of good United States-Indo relationships but also towards eventual enlistment Sukarno’s powerful influence on side Indonesia non and anti-Communist forces.” (Ibid., 756D.11/6–2656)
5. Sukarno visited the Soviet Union, the People’s Republic of China, and several Eastern European countries between late August and mid-October 1956.
6. Dated June 13, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 601.56D00/6–1356)
7. Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Ch’ing-ling), widow of Chinese revolutionary leader Sun Yat-sen and a vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in the People’s Republic of China, visited Indonesia in August 1956. The visit of King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia, also scheduled for August, was postponed.
8. See telegram 3325, supra.