156. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, May 11, 19561
SUBJECT
- Netherlands-Indonesian Relations
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- The Netherlands Ambassador, Dr. J.H. van Roijen
- Baron S.G.M. van Voorst, Minister of the Netherlands Embassy
- WE—Mr. William R. Tyler
[Here follows a brief discussion relating to the Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council held in Paris May 4–5.]
Ambassador van Roijen broached the subject of Netherlands relations with Indonesia. He stressed the importance which his Government attaches to the establishment of good and normal relations. He said that this was of great importance not only to the Netherlands itself but also to the West in general, since he felt convinced that if Indonesia and the Netherlands were on bad terms, this would poison the general attitude of Indonesia toward the whole of the West. As a practical step toward the normalization of relations, the Netherlands Government had moved in the direction of the setting up of Embassies between the two countries. Moreover, it had done this at the suggestion of the Indonesian Government. Now, and apparently for no valid reason, the Indonesian Government had become evasive on this point and had rebuffed the Netherlands Government. However, the latter would continue to take every measure it could to create mutual understanding and confidence with Indonesia. Moreover, it fully understood and supported the Secretary’s efforts to create friendly feelings between Indonesia and the United States during his recent trip to Indonesia. The Ambassador said that the forthcoming visit to the United States of President Sukarno provided an opportunity to make further progress in this direction. The Netherlands Government hoped that the Secretary might find it possible to talk to Sukarno about the importance and desirability of improving and maintaining good relations with the Netherlands which was in turn anxious to reciprocate. The Ambassador said that there had recently been several moves by the Indonesian Government which were not conducive to the improvement of relations, such as the unilateral abrogation of the Union Treaty, the suspension of payments on various financial obligations assumed by the Indonesians at the Round Table Conference and of pensions for which they were also [Page 266] responsible. These moves, said the Ambassador, might be described as trial balloons by the Indonesian Government to see to what extent the West would be prepared to accept such measures without reacting. The Netherlands Government felt that if the Indonesian Government were able to get away with defaulting on its obligations, this lesson would not be lost on other governments in that general part of the world and that the effect of this would be felt by many other countries in the West.
The Secretary observed at this point that after the United States won its independence from the British there was considerable controversy on the subject of various states debts outstanding and owing to the British, and what should be done or not done by each state to redeem its debts. The Secretary recalled that many pronouncements had been made by American political leaders at the time, such as Washington, Franklin, and Jefferson, and that since President Sukarno often referred to names and facts of early American history, it would be useful to see what statements existed which might be relevant to the subject of integrity in financial matters.
The Ambassador went on to say that there was evidence that the present attitude of the Indonesian Government was largely the result of the personal influence of President Sukarno. Moreover, it seemed that he now wanted to go back to the date of August 17, 1945 as the moment when Indonesia became an independent country. The Ambassador said that while the first declaration of Indonesian independence had been made on that date, this was at a time when Indonesia and the Netherlands were practically in a state of war. Thus, not only would this be an inauspicious move psychologically for the improvement of relations with the Netherlands, but it might mean that Indonesia intended to renounce all obligations incurred with the Netherlands after that date.
The Ambassador ended by saying that he had not brought up the subject of Western New Guinea, because he was aware that the U.S. Government position was to maintain a strict neutrality, and that while the Netherlands Government wished that the United States could back it up, it nevertheless accepted the U.S. position.
The Secretary thanked the Netherlands Ambassador and said that we would do whatever we can in order to be helpful.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D/5–1156. Confidential. Drafted by Tyler.↩