Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

153. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, May 1, 1956—2 p.m.

2691. Deptel 1589.² I regret that during preparation for Secretary’s visit to Djakarta reference telegram was inexplicably misfiled and not brought to my attention or as far as can be ascertained to attention of any Embassy officer. It has only just come to light. However, my reply as of mid-March would have been that in view of then pending change of government it would be best to postpone reply until composition of new Cabinet was known and its political orientation could be assessed with some degree of accuracy.

This contemplated situation has now come about. New Cabinet now a reality and broadly based on non and anti-Communist parties; it has recently received unanimous approval of first Indonesian elected Parliament to go ahead with its program; and this approval apparently has backing of country as a whole since reports from many sources, including biased Dutch High Commissioners, indicate widespread feeling of calm confidence in and approval of Cabinet (notwithstanding continued security programs in chronically disaffected areas of Sbatjava, Atjeh and South Sulawesi). Price of gold has dropped in terms of rupiah which has appreciably hardened on free market. First Deputy Prime Minister Roem³ told me last week that Sumitro’s fiscal policies have support of NU and right-wing PNI (they already had Masjumi support) and will be continued at least for present. Moreover Prime Minister Ali so far has lived up to expectations and is proving to be different man than the Ali of the Ali–Arifin Cabinet. Evidence of this can be found, inter alia, in his remarkably friendly overtures to me personally and to United States generally as evidenced by his address to American Association (mytel 2674⁴). All of foregoing must be read against background of fine impression made on President Sukarno and Ali by Secretary Dulles; by reactions in limited circles with which he came in contact to Admiral Burke’s visit⁵ (mytel 2641 re conversations with Foreign Minister⁶); and above all by ponderable and imponderable reactions in broad Indonesian political circles to President Sukarno’s forthcoming visit to United States.

To sum up present Cabinet appears to be here to stay at least for a longer rather than a shorter period and within framework of “active independent foreign policy” apparently will not lean so heavily away from United States as did Ali–Arifin Cabinet but will even try to warm up relationship with us.

I therefore still favor giving sympathetic attention to Indonesian requests for military equipment if made. However, I do not believe Indonesians prepared give us assurances required under Section 106 MSA even though they may be unilateral. Department will remember that in connection with Indo effort purchase sonar equipment purchase fell through because Indo unwillingness make unilateral declaration although no mention made MSA (Embassy despatch 230 October 12,⁷ Department’s A–83 October 24⁸). I believe therefore that consideration should be given seek presidential determination for funds under Section 401 MSA. Considerations last paragraph mytel 1312 still apply.⁹

Despite foregoing paragraph I feel that I must enter one caveat: Overtures on which mytel 1312 were based were made during previous Cabinet’s tenure. … It is quite possible that this has been due to failure to receive any positive reaction from outside. On other hand, original plans may either have run into one of political road blocks so usual in these matters in Indonesia, or may have been put on ice pending formation present Cabinet; they may even have been postponed to have been brought up in some way in connection with Sukarno’s visit United States.

There are at least three ways in which we could take sounding to determine whether plans are still alive and at least tacit support present Cabinet or its inner circle.

1. We could send back through channels through which approaches first made a guarded expression of interest together with request for information re present status, i.e. amounts involved, etc.

2. I could pick up abortive conversations which I had with Ali in 1954¹⁰ with a view to eliciting his present views on acceptance of United States military assistance without strings.

3. We could follow up Indonesian Military Attaché’s approach re Nasution going to United States with Sukarno (Deptel 1762¹¹) extending an invitation to Nasution to visit United States some time after Sukarno visit. Perhaps this last course of action would best be preceded by prompt action along lines my first suggestion above. …

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5/5–156. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution.
2. Document 142.
3. Mohammad Roem.
4. Reference is presumably to telegram 2669 from Djakarta, April 27, which reported that Ali had been the guest of honor at a dinner of the American Association. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.56D/4–2756) Telegram 2674 from Djakarta, April 28, concerns an unrelated matter. (Ibid., 756D.00/4–2856)
5. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of U.S. Naval Operations, visited Indonesia April 26–27.
6. Telegram 2641 from Djakarta, April 26, transmitted a press report of Admiral Burke’s visit, which stated that Burke, together with Cumming, had called on Foreign Minister Roeslan Abdulgani.
7. Despatch 230 from Djakarta, October 12, 1955, reported that the Chief of Staff for Operations of the Indonesian Navy had told the U.S. Naval Attaché that the Indonesian Government would be unable to buy U.S. sonar equipment because it was unwilling to sign an agreement giving assurances as required by the Mutual Security Act. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.56/10–1255)
8. Airgram 83 to Djakarta, October 24, 1955, pointed out to the Embassy that Indonesian purchase of the sonar equipment would not require the signature of an agreement, but only a unilateral declaration by Indonesia of the assurances embodied in Section 106 of the Mutual Security Act. (Ibid., 756D.56/10–1255)
9. See footnote 5, Document 130.
10. In a conversation with Cumming on April 6, 1954, Ali had expressed interest in Indonesian employment of U.S. military instructors; see Galbraith’s memorandum to Bonsai, April 8, 1954, Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. XII, Part 2, p. 416.
11. Telegram 1762 to Djakarta, March 30, reported that the Indonesian Military Attaché in Washington had informed the Department of Defense that Nasution wanted to visit the United States either with Sukarno or separately and requested Cumming’s views as to the desirability and timing of such a visit. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5811/3–3056)