127. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State1
1452. Sudarsono, former Indonesian Ambassador to India presently Chief Planning Bureau Foreign Office, came see me this afternoon on personal instructions of Harahap in his capacity Prime Minister as well as Acting Foreign Minister and with approval of Vice President Hatta. Sudarsono said that Hatta and Harahap wish me present to my government an earnest plea that we re-examine our position on Irian to see if there were anything we could do “with the Dutch or with the Indonesians or with both” to help bring present Dutch-Indonesian negotiations to successful conclusion. Hatta and Harahap understand our position of neutrality which has been explained to them so often. They wish us to know, however, that they feel that regardless of our “neutrality” we are “associated with the [Page 215] Irian question”: first, because of our dominant position in Pacific and concern with existence of a stable non-Communist Southeast Asia; secondly, because we helped so much in bringing about Indonesian independence; and thirdly, because during 1949 Round Table Conference at The Hague an American, former Ambassador Cochran,2 was not only present as a mediator (in his capacity as U.S. Representative on UNCI) but participated in drafting of Irian formula incorporated in agreements. Going back to first point Sudarsono said that Hatta and Harahap wished me emphasize to my government “dangerous effect” upon future of Indonesia should Indonesian Delegate at Geneva return home without some tangible results. Spelling this out he said Hatta and Harahap wished stress misuse being made of our neutrality not only by Communists inside and outside Indonesia but also by non-Communist nationalists. (Here he interpolated remark: “I am sure you will understand the person to whom Hatta and Harahap are referring.” He could only have meant Sukarno.)
During conversation Sudarsono emphasized advantage Communists and “unscrupulous non-Communists” were gaining from present Air Force crisis in which Sukarno and Hatta were in direct conflict to degree which was not case in Army Chief of Staff crisis.
At one point Sudarsono said some success if [in?] Geneva negotiations was not only important to present government but would affect shape of successor government and strengthen moderate influences in country who are having difficult time in face of Communist and emotional nationalist agitation. Although I knew answer I asked Sudarsono for the record whether successful negotiations of economic and financial provisions of RTC would outweigh any disadvantage from inconclusive results on Irian. He replied that moderate elements considered economic and financial provisions to be more important but political realities made Irian element of predominant importance.
I confined myself to re-stating our position of neutrality, to questions designed to make clear message which he was conveying to me, and to saying I would of course report it to Washington.3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/12–2055. Confidential; Priority; Limited Distribution.↩
- H. Merle Cochran, Ambassador to Indonesia, December 1949–February 1953.↩
- A handwritten note on the source text by Haring indicates that Young discussed it with Robertson, who said to hold to strict neutrality.↩