Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Southeast Asia, Volume XXII

124. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, December 5, 1955—4 p.m.

1319. My telegram 1277.² Parliamentary elections appear to have re-confirmed Sukarno as single most powerful and influential Indonesian political personality and have re-established in good part but not completely his position which had been steadily weakening since late 1953.

For this reason and also because we do not think that Sukarno is irrevocably committed to leftist course which has attracted him during past 2 years, I believe time has come again to consider inviting him to United States particularly as he is only major non-Communist SEA leader who has not been to United States.

After his visit to Egypt and Saudi Arabia last summer Sukarno appeared noticeably affected and influenced by what he saw there. These influences apparently have been overwhelmed by the experience of first general election here. But nevertheless, exposure to foreign ideas and scenes have, we believe, beneficial effect on Sukarno.

In addition to opportunity of influencing the thoughts of figure who it seems almost inevitably will occupy most important place Indonesian politics, there is clear advantage for United States in having Sukarno absent from Indonesia for a period during forthcoming months when negotiations leading to formation next coalition will be intensified. It would be most desirable from this standpoint to have visit occur before April when present administration probably will end. Sukarno presumably will not wish to be absent when formateur of Cabinet to be based on new Parliament is actually named or when Constituent Assembly³ meets.

Another advantage in timing or at least arranging visit in near future would be that it will take place when government in power is a friendly one. Should next government be less friendly, prestige of Sukarno visit would at least not rub off on that government.

We recognize that visit to United States would tend strengthen Sukarno’s position here and may cause some resentment among circles which are opposed to President. However likelihood that Sukarno can be replaced as President is so small that we believe leaders Masjumi and other opponents Sukarno would appreciate our logic and would see advantages of visit for themselves.

I appreciate difficulties in Washington which would arise from state visit owing President’s recent illness. However I do not think it would be necessary for Sukarno to be White House guest and believe one interview with President Eisenhower would be sufficient. Important thing would be to have Sukarno exposed to as much of United States as possible, including Hawaii because of its blending of Western and Eastern strains, to enable Sukarno to form impressions of the size, power and prosperity of the United States. Sukarno will be interested in governmental institutions because of forthcoming Constituent Assembly here. This would provide opportunity for our extending American influence at critical and appropriate time.

Cumming

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.11/12–555. Confidential; Limited Distribution.
2. Telegram 1277 from Djakarta, November 29, reported that President Sukarno had expressed interest in visiting the United States. (Ibid., 033.1100–ZA/11–2955)
3. Elections were scheduled for December 15 for the Constituent Assembly, which was to prepare a permanent constitution to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950.