122. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia1

892. Hague telegrams sent Department 735, 748, 7492 Djakarta telegrams sent Department 1143, 1147.3 Core of Indo-Dutch problem over handling of New Guinea item and bilateral discussions appears be mutually exclusive fundamental objectives of two parties:

Since no change in Dutch position on basic sovereignty could be expected Indonesians wish avoid establishing precise relationship between substantive sovereignty issue re New Guinea and discussions UNGA action, so that out of resulting ambivalence some basis could be found for internal claim diplomatic “victory”.

Dutch wish make clear that sovereignty will not be discussed and that any UN resolution neither by letter nor implication recognizes UN competence in New Guinea question; while understanding Indonesian domestic political desire obtain some public triumph on sovereignty issue (The Hague’s 749 rptd Djakarta 31, Canberra 8) Luns has stated there is nothing Netherlands could or would be able to grant.

Despite desire both governments improve relations through bilateral discussions, despite agreement sufficient warrant Utoyo Ramelan’s [Page 209] trip to The Hague,4 and despite general air accommodation both sides in Djakarta, The Hague and New York, mutually exclusive objectives of two parties remain unresolved. While outcome New York talks still not known (Deptel 878 rptd The Hague 803, Canberra 1505), appears Indonesians cannot anticipate these talks or discussions The Hague will produce anything which could be represented as diplomatic “victory” or as progress toward solution dispute over New Guinea.

Request your estimate effect such defeat on (a) Harahap Government, (b) Opposition, (c) Constituent Assembly election outcome and (d) Public opinion in general.6

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 656.56D13/11–1155. Secret. Drafted in WE and PSA; approved in FE; and cleared with PSA, FE, and EUR. Repeated to Canberra and The Hague.
  2. Telegrams 735 and 748 from The Hague, November 16 and 19, reported the Netherlands position concerning proposed bilateral negotiations with Indonesia and the pending consideration of the New Guinea issue in the General Assembly. The Netherlands Government was opposed to any discussion of sovereignty over New Guinea and to any U.N. resolution implying U.N. competence to deal with that issue or linking the New Guinea question with the bilateral negotiations. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–1655 and 656.56D13/11–1955) Telegram 749 from The Hague, November 19, reported a conversation with Luns on these subjects. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–1955)
  3. Telegram 1143 from Djakarta, November 11, reported that the current Indonesian Government’s Irian policy was intended to ease tension by limiting public debate on the subject, thus paving the way for negotiations at some future time. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–1155) Telegram 1147 from Djakarta has not been found. Reference is apparently to telegram 1157 from Djakarta, November 12, which reported that Anak Agung had told Cumming that he was anxious to avoid a U.N. debate that would force both sides to make public statements that would freeze their positions and make subsequent negotiations impossible. (Ibid., 656.56D13/11–1255)
  4. Utoyo Ramelan was in The Hague as special Ambassador to the Netherlands for preliminary discussions on the place, date, and agenda for Ministerial-level negotiations between the Netherlands and Indonesia. A joint communiqué, issued December 7, is printed in Anak Agung, Twenty Years, p. 131.
  5. Telegram 878 to Djakarta, November 22, reported that the Netherlands Delegation at the United Nations had proposed to the Indonesian Delegation that a resolution be introduced stating that the General Assembly had decided not to debate the New Guinea item and that U.N. discussion of the item would not necessarily improve the chances for success of the projected bilateral negotiations. (Department of State, Central Files, 320/11–2255)
  6. The Embassy replied in telegram 1292 from Djakarta, December 1, that failure of the talks would have little or no effect on the Harahap government’s Parliamentary situation or on the elections for a Constituent Assembly, but that it would increase PNI and PKI attacks on Anak Agung’s foreign policy and increase public willingness to turn to more direct action. (Ibid., 656.56D13/12–155)