101. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Philippine and Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
SUBJECT
- Indonesian Army Commanders’ refusal to accept Cabinet appointed Chief of Staff; No-Confidence Motion against PNI–Ali Cabinet re Defense Minister Iwa
A most confused situation has developed in Indonesia since June 27 when Territorial Commanders and General Staff refused to accept the designation of Utoyo2 (a former Territorial Commander) as Chief of Staff.
The Embassy’s principal evaluation of the situation appears in tel. 2588 (attached):3 the elements appear simpler than we might have supposed—although there is no certainty as to what is going on. The demands of the Army to remain out of politics and to improve their professional integrity were agreed to by President Sukarno and other high officials at Jogjakarta in February; the appointment of Utoyo was not in line with that agreement. The Embassy credits Lubis, the Acting Chief of Staff, who has asserted a degree of leadership for the Territorial Commanders, with making his decision in terms of the Jogja Conference. …
President Sukarno according to Ambassador Cumming was led to forcing the Utoyo appointment because he misjudged the strength of Army feeling and solidarity about the Jogjakarta Conference. We have no indication as to why Sukarno felt it necessary to deviate from the agreement of the Conference and can only interpolate that [Page 173] he and Iwa intended to demonstrate strength and try to increase their civilian control over the military and possibly hoped to increase the stature of the PNI–Ali Cabinet.
A motion of no-confidence has been introduced in the Parliament and the three sponsors are individuals who voted with the Ali Government in the last no-confidence motion. Whether they will carry enough support with them (and other opposition forces remain intact) to bring down the Cabinet is problematical and we have no estimates as yet.
Public and particularly Masjumi rumblings suggest that a Presidential or caretaker Cabinet may be in the offing. This appears to be the only reasonable solution in view of the apparent intention of the Cabinet to stand with Iwa and not permit the vote to be one of censure against him alone. Sukarno may have had such notions in mind a short time ago when he publicly offered to leave the palace if the people did not want him; these tactics usually invite staunch endorsement. However, there has been no significant public reaction and not even a government press plea that he remain. As the Ambassador observes, Sukarno remains a singular figure as far as leadership is concerned and there is no evidence that he is about to leave.
Summaries suggest that the Masjumi would prefer to see a Presidential Cabinet in the interim, rather than to share responsibilities by any form of coalition which would weaken their condemnation of the handling of the government, going into elections.
PSA analyzes the possibilities as: (a) the Ali Cabinet for the sake of retaining power may agree to drop Iwa for the price of Masjumi involvement in the interim government and may find a compromise Chief of Staff placating the military while dropping both Utoyo and Lubis; or (b) dismissal of the Ali Cabinet, naming a Presidential Cabinet for the interim until the election results are known. Membership in a Presidential Cabinet would seem to require concession to the congealed opposition against leftist-influence such as Iwa’s, while solution under (a) would be based on dropping Iwa. It may be overly-optimistic at this stage to expect but it seems that of the most likely developments both assure some diminution of the leftist and pro-Communist influences in the Indonesian government.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 756D.551/7–155. Secret.↩
- Major General Bambang Utojo was installed as Chief of Staff of the Army on June 27, but Acting Chief of Staff Lubis had refused to turn over the duties of the office to him.↩
- Not attached to the source text and not printed. Telegram 2588 from Djakarta, June 30, concluded that the army was the “most powerful non-Communist or anti-Communist force” in Indonesia. (Department of State, Central Files, 756D.5/6–3055)↩