76. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) to the Secretary of State1
SUBJECT
- Background against which SEATO Ministerial Meeting will be held in March
Mr. Secretary: I have tried to put down on paper in this memorandum the serious situation we face in South and Southeast Asia as it relates to our general policy in that area, with particular reference to SEATO. The purpose of this memorandum is to focus on the problem with a view to having a meeting with you some time next week, and I am sending copies of this memo to Messrs. Murphy, Robertson, Allen, Merchant, Bowie, and Prochnow. I have, for convenience, divided the memo into two parts.
The first part deals with the fundamental situation we face there in light of the Soviets’ new initiatives in this area, which change radically the situation as it was when we signed the Treaty at Manila.
The second part of the memorandum relates to certain fundamental deficiencies, both at Bangkok and in backstopping arrangements of the Foreign Offices of the member countries. Organizational arrangements in themselves solve no problems, and the recommendations for strengthening the fundamental organizational arrangements are designed to get the governments of the member countries to face up to the problems of the area in effectively backstopping their representatives in Bangkok.
I. Political and Psychological Situation in the Area as a Result of Recent Developments
The situation which we now face with respect to the future of SEATO is infinitely more serious in certain respects than when the Manila Pact was signed. At that time, the major danger was from the activities of the Chinese Communists, particularly in Vietnam and Laos, but also in the rest of the area, notably Malaya. The new element which has been injected is the opening up by the Soviet Union of a major theater of operations in the Middle East and South-Southeast Asia which has been pointed up by the Arab arms deals and the recent visit of Bulganin and Khrushchev to India, Burma, and Afghanistan.
The Soviet tactics in Southeast Asia seem aimed in the first instance at spreading the concept of neutralism, and in this they have powerful if unwitting allies in India and Burma. By stressing the peaceful purposes of the Soviet Union and creating an impression of a relaxation of tensions; by attacking Western-inspired “military blocs” as likely to lead to war (which none of the Asians wish); and by stressing that military blocs are responsible for frittering away of resources which could be used to effect immediate economic progress with a consequent rise in living standards, the Soviets make a powerful appeal in these under-developed countries. Particularly effective is their reiteration that the Soviet Union wishes to assist the Asian countries in their economic development with no strings attached [Page 160] and no military, political or other commitments being a pre-requisite for such aid.
The Soviet objectives are not obscure. They doubtless feel that if they can successfully spread the concept of neutralism, they will in the first instance detach the Southeast Asian countries from their associations with the West, and thus isolate them. At the same time, present Soviet tactics (particularly the visits of Bulganin and Khrushchev) will strengthen the moral position of the Communist Parties in the Asian countries and will give them a respectability which they have heretofore lacked. This will substantially increase their ability to bore from within and to penetrate the governments and parliaments so that eventually a peaceful Communist take-over would be possible through “legal” as opposed to insurrectionary methods. This has a great advantage, because friendly and allied countries can give support to a government which is resisting an open insurrection, whereas if the country goes Communist by “legal” processes, the question of friendly aid or assistance doesn’t arise.
The problem which we face is not one where the Southeast Asian countries will go by the boards in the next year or so, but one where if we do not immediately undertake effective counter-measures, we may see these countries drift first into neutralization and then into Communist hands in the period of the next five or six years.
In the light of the present situation, we must take effective steps to counter the feeling of discouragement of our Asian partners in SEATO, not only because of the effect on them but because of the effect on neighboring Asian countries, some of which such as Ceylon are well disposed and might later join SEATO if they believe it is making an effective contribution to the area. If SEATO bogs down and becomes meaningless, the Asians may be prone to take the view that they tried to cooperate with the West in a collective security arrangement; that the experiment was a failure; and that, therefore, they must turn elsewhere and adopt a different concept (neutralism) if they are to find solutions to their problem.
The importance of the March meeting is simply that if we do not breathe new life into SEATO, the process of disintegration will probably be accentuated, even though it will not be immediately visible. While the original emphasis on the military aspects of SEATO was in keeping with the situation obtaining at that time and the military threat of further advances by the Vietminh and the Chinese Communists, this emphasis by itself no longer corresponds to the problem we now face, particularly in light of the new Soviet activities in the area.
To give a new lift to SEATO, it seems essential to develop greater economic cooperation under Article III of the Treaty. At the [Page 161] present time, our activities in the economic field (at United States insistence) are limited to studies of economic problems which are directly related to the military burdens which the Asian members of SEATO are shouldering as a result of SEATO membership. It seems essential to develop economic cooperation in fields which can be directly related to the economic welfare of the countries and not simply to their military stance.
From the United States viewpoint it is all the more important, because we have reliable reports that the Asian members blame the United States entirely for failure to implement Article III of the Treaty. There are projects which the United States is planning to finance such as the Mekong River survey which, I believe, could usefully be undertaken as SEATO projects. We should immediately make a thorough survey to see where projects are possible which might be undertaken as SEATO operations. In the next year or so, such projects would not require any tremendous expenditures of money, and might well be financed from the President’s special fund for the area. Furthermore, they could be undertaken without interfering with or replacing the Colombo Plan organization, with which we could also cooperate.
If we take the initiative in giving leadership to the development of Article III, we could give a great lift to our Asian partners. Furthermore, such action would serve to diminish the effectiveness of neutralist propaganda and would tend to make non-Asian countries more sympathetic to SEATO. Such action, more than anything else, would provide a new lift and spirit in SEATO, and without it it is difficult to see what we can do or say at the March meeting which will not be a repetition of past statements and policies which are not adequate to meet the new situation. The “Spirit of Geneva” and the less bellicose and more peaceful posing of the Chinese Communists have created a general impression in the area that the danger of hostilities, which was great a year ago, has vastly diminished, and that the really important thing now is economic progress. However, I do not of course mean that we should not press ahead with our SEATO military planning and support, because this is important. But, we must balance what we do in the military field with activity and initiative in the economic field to establish the fact that SEATO is not only important to the countries concerned in terms of military security, but also in terms of economic development and well-being.
II. Organizational Defects of SEATO
Since the successful first meeting of the SEATO Ministerial Council last February in Bangkok, there have been progressive indications that our Asian partners feel that SEATO has bogged down and that it is not, and never was, the intention of the Western members [Page 162] to make it an effective organization. This feeling is in part due to the great inexperience of our Asian partners in collective security arrangements, and the consequent belief that once the Manila Treaty was signed it would immediately solve all their problems, military and economic, without a period, which is necessary, to develop any international organization of this character.
On the other hand, there is some justification for the Asian sense of disillusionment, particularly in the organizational field. The present situation at Bangkok is unsatisfactory. The Pakistan Permanent Representative to SEATO is their Ambassador to Burma, and the only Pakistan official in Bangkok is responsible for administrative work, visas, consular functions, and other work; New Zealand has no representation at Bangkok; the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand members of the Council Representatives are their High Commissioners in Singapore, and while all very able men, they can only visit Bangkok to discuss SEATO matters about once every six weeks. This in itself would be manageable if each country had a permanent representative at Bangkok (which all have except New Zealand) supported by at least one member of his staff who could devote full time to SEATO matters. At present, of the eight powers the United States is the only diplomatic mission which has an able man subordinate to the Ambassador giving full time to SEATO matters. The fact that the Baghdad Pact organization, which has just come into being, has already created a permanent secretariat and military machinery, and that the METO Ministers themselves will meet again in April, will inevitably cause our Southeast Asian allies to believe that while their Western allies are interested in the Middle East they are engaging in only window-dressing in Southeast Asia.
But, even more important is the fact that from what we have been able to gather, none of the respective Foreign Offices of the SEATO members, with the exception of the United States, has really an organizational set-up within the Foreign Office to give continuing and serious consideration to SEATO and to give prompt and effective guidance to their representatives in Bangkok. We have the impression from our discussions with representatives of the other members that SEATO matters are handled on a haphazard basis in the Foreign Offices when time permits, but that officials for the most part are so involved in current problems that adequate time and attention are not devoted to the development of SEATO. We have discussed this matter frankly with the British and French representatives in Washington,2 and have urged that their Bangkok staffs be strengthened and that their Foreign Offices develop an effective system of backstopping their representatives. We have also urged [Page 163] them to use their influence with other members to achieve the same results.
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Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5./12–255. Secret. Attached to the following handwritten note by MacArthur: “Mr. Secretary—I would hope you might have a chance to read the attached memo relating to Southeast Asia. The situation has changed drastically since we signed the Manila Pact with the entry of the Soviets into the area on an active basis. I would also hope we could have a meeting next week with you as I think this is a subject which you should talk to Macmillan about in Paris.”
The memorandum bears the handwritten notation by Macomber: “Sec saw WM”. No record has been found in Department of State files of any meeting held as suggested by MacArthur, or of a discussion concerning Southeast Asia by Dulles and Macmillan during the Secretary’s visit to Paris in December.
↩ - See telegram 1764, supra.↩
- Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.↩