Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

52. Telegram From the Office of the Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to the Department of State¹

Paris, May 11, 1955—8 p.m.

Polto 2279. From USDel.² Following summarizes Secretary’s statement on Far East upon resumption Plenary Working Session of Council this morning:

Secretary said he was happy that NATO had decided consider Far East questions. It is right Council should do so because of intrinsic importance these questions and their effect on European areas. Communists still adhere to principle originally laid down by Stalin and since reiterated many times that road to victory in West lies through revolution in Asia. In many ways Communist challenge in Far East much more dangerous than in West, with Chinese Communists adopting more belligerent attitude than Russian Communists. After October Revolution in Russia, period of calm and consolidation prevailed. Since then, Soviet moves while formidable, have not involved open use of force, with exceptions Finland and Poland. Chinese Revolution more intense and prolonged than Soviet October Revolution. Secretary then traced course of Chinese Communists belligerent action beginning with conquest of mainland, this followed by their efforts in North Korea to prevent unification, North Korean aggression and open Chinese intervention, culminating in forcing back United Nations forces charged with responsibility of resisting aggression. This followed by conquest of Tibet and intervention in Indo-China through Viet-Nam, culminating in victory in Dien Bien Phu. After Indo-China armistice, Communists stepped up their activities in Formosa Straits by bombardment, occupation off-shore islands, and belligerent propaganda. Emphasized first fact which characterizes Chinese behavior and differentiates it to degree from Soviet behavior is greater belligerent attitude of Chinese Communist regime.

Second important factor is size of Chinese population mass with cultural influence it has throughout Far East. This contrast with Russian barbarianism which has historically been rejected by Western Europe.

Thirdly, Chinese populations throughout Far Eastern countries represent Chinese Communist asset for boring from within which has no exact parallel in Europe, although Communist parties in Western Europe perform somewhat similar function.

Finally, free countries in Far East lack unity which Europe is striving to achieve. Political, economic, cultural, and religious differences tend to create disunity. Free Asian countries constitute thin, straggling line along periphery, incapable of achieving effective solidarity.

Secretary continued that under circumstances one might wonder whether area defensible at all or should not better be abandoned. This is thesis we cannot accept. Stakes are too high. All these countries have great potential value. Japan, for example, has immense industrial power comparable to that of Ruhr in Europe. If industrial capacity Japan united with Chinese and Soviet manpower on continent, combination would be formidable indeed. We all saw immensity of threat which Japan alone constituted in last war and can readily realize greater threat she would pose if her capabilities thus augmented. Moreover such countries as Indonesia and Malaya are vital from viewpoint raw materials. They are also of immense strategic importance from point of view control of channels of communications. Philippines represents symbol of what West can do in bringing dependent peoples towards self-government and independence. Australia and New Zealand of great political and strategic importance to West. We cannot afford to abandon these positions. Fortunately, most of them are island and peninsula positions where United States can maintain superiority of power of kind on which it is best able to concentrate. In providing this power, United States feels that it is responding to wishes of people of area themselves who wish to preserve their independence. Apparent that odds are formidable and stakes high, but prospects for success are not negligible.

United States purposes in Asia no different from what they are in Europe. United States believes in: (1) standing firm in face threatened aggression; (2) collective security and (3) eschewing aggression for itself and conducting its policies in such way as minimize possibility war.

Secretary then proceeded outline obstacles to collective security in Asia: (1) differences among countries as previously outlined; (2) other Western countries with capacity and resources to make contribution to collective defense do not have same Pacific Ocean stakes as United States. Therefore United States until recently forced rely mainly on bilateral arrangements with R.O.K.,³ Japan,⁴ Nationalist China,⁵ Philippines,⁶ and in ANZUS. Also United States special position in Okinawa. Recently, however, as first multilateral pact in area eight powers signed with United Kingdom and France, as well as United States, participation for defense Southeast Asia, [sic] This is beginning of collective security in area, but would be wrong assume that fact of pact represents any consolidation of strength and resources comparable to what has been built up in NATO.

Two principal danger points exist today, Formosa and Viet-Nam. In Formosa, United States has concluded treaty of mutual assistance for two essential reasons: (1) Republic of China is staunch ally which in last war fought against our enemies before we did. We feel that loyalty to an ally is not demerit, even though that ally may have fallen on hard times. Recalled this happened once before when Chinese Nationalists moved capital to Chungking. (2) Formosa occupies vital position in chain of offshore islands and peninsula positions which extend from Aleutians to Australia and New Zealand. Loss of Formosa would almost certainly result in loss of other essential links in chain, not only because of strategic consideration involved but also because psychological effect on peoples of area would be such that they would be tempted to make their accommodations in face formidable forces.

Treaty with Nationalist China limited to defense of Formosa and Pescadores. These islands had not been Chinese since 1895 and before that time were held only tenuously. They were detached from Japan at end of last war because United States had will and power to do so. United States felt bound by obligations incurred Cairo Conference,⁷ so, under Japanese armistice⁸ terms turned over Formosa to Republic of China.

Secretary recognized legal formalities remained.

Adjacent to mainland are islands which have been held by Republic of China for long time except for temporary Japanese occupation. Two of them—Quemoy and Matsu—recently attracting much attention. United States not legally or morally committed to defense of these islands and there is no question of United States acting in their defense except under circumstances in which Chinese Communists attack them in combination with attack against Formosa. In these circumstances United States would not sit idly by and permit islands be taken. Chinese Communists have never made any distinction between their claims to these islands and to Formosa and Pescadores. Their emphasis has always been on taking entire position. Various Western nations have, with good intentions, tried to find out in Peking whether Chinese Communists would be willing renounce use of force against Formosa and Pescadores if offshore islands were abandoned to them. These proposals have been rejected by Peking and are of doubtful acceptability by Chinese Nationalists.

Situation in this area may have been temporarily improved as result Bandung Conference; there had been some concern in United States as to whether conference might approve use of force by Chinese Communists to assimilate these areas. Fact that conference did not do so was one of its greatest achievements and may help check series of aggressive Chinese Communist moves. Possible that situation may result in stalemate in which each side maintains its claims, but in which neither side tries to achieve them by violence. United States earnestly hopes this will be case. In reply Chinese Communist suggestion that negotiations be undertaken, United States has responded favorably. For moment atmosphere less threatening, but Chinese Communists air buildup in hinterland, particularly in Fukien area with emphasis on airfield construction and POL storage, is particularly worrying. This buildup obviously designed for operations against Formosa itself with immediate purpose of establishing air control over Formosa area. United States under pressure from Chinese Nationalists to use their air power, but thus far resisted this pressure in effort not to start chain of mounting attack and counterattack. In adopting this policy, United States accepting risks since balance of local air power is shifting. However, United States prepared take risks as contribution to cause of peace and hope in retrospection, that this policy will not represent cause of war.

Secretary went on to express awareness of concern in Europe regarding United States policy toward Asia. He assured ministers they could be confident United States does not have double personality, pursuing one policy in Europe and different one in Asia. It is true United States is Pacific power to much greater degree than any other member of NATO. United States population center moving toward Pacific. Chief Justice, Vice President, and Republican leader of Senate are all Californians. Europeans cannot expect us to have an Atlantic policy but no Pacific policy under these circumstances. Both are of equal importance but despite fact we face in both directions, we do not have dual personality. Europeans know what United States hopes to achieve and stands for in Europe. We do not want war. Present administration inherited Korean war and its first action was to terminate it. United States has had its war in Asia and stopped it; this was not easy. We want peace in Pacific as we want it in Atlantic. But we know that we shall achieve this only through same tactics of strength and determination. United States will refrain from provocative action in Asia as it has in Europe. If ministers are confident of United States policy in Europe, they can have equal confidence in United States policies in Asia. United States would be glad to have any European country share its responsibilities in Pacific, by contributing manpower, prestige, etc. Perhaps greater share of responsibility would result in greater understanding of complexities, much more knowledge and wisdom is required than that which derives from study of map which fails disclose fears, ambitions, etc. of peoples concerned. Study of map might show Scandinavia indefensible, but we all know overriding considerations which make it necessary to defend this area. Those who think problem can be solved by putting more water between Chinese Communists and ourselves do not understand complexities of problem. If thesis that 100 miles of water would be better than five miles, then 5,000 miles would be better than 100 miles. Logic of this is that United States would revert to isolationism and Secretary did not think any ministers present wanted this to come about. Task of maintaining morale of peoples and forces of these areas one of most formidable we have. We approach everything we do in Asia with same effort to implement our policies intelligently and loyally as we do in case of Europe. In doing so, we hope to be able to check Communism in East as in West.

Perkins

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/5–1155. Secret; Priority. Repeated to the capitals of all other NATO members.
2. Reference is to the U.S. Delegation to the Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council, May 9–11.
3. For text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea, signed at Washington on October 1, 1953, see 5 UST (pt. 3) 2368.
4. For text of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, signed at San Francisco on September 8, 1951, see 3 UST (pt. 3) 3329.
5. For text of the Mutual Defense Treaty and accompanying notes between the United States and the Republic of China, signed at Washington on December 2, 1954, see 6 UST 433.
6. Text of the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Philippines, signed at Washington on August 30, 1951, is printed in 3 UST (pt. 3) 3947.
7. For text of the communiqué of the Cairo Conference, released to the press in Washington on December 1, 1943, see Department of State Bulletin, December 4, 1943, p. 409. For documentation on the conference, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943.
8. In the Instrument of Surrender, signed aboard the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on September 2, 1945, Japan accepted the terms of the Proclamation by the Heads of Government of the United States, China, and the United Kingdom (issued at Berlin (Potsdam) on July 26, 1945), calling on it to renounce territories which included Taiwan. For the Instrument, see Department of State Bulletin, September 9, 1945, p. 364. Text of the Proclamation is printed in Foreign Relations, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference), 1945, vol. II, pp. 1474–1476.