Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

504. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 15, 1957—4 p.m.

811. Department pass CINCPAC for POLAD. Reference: Embtel 797.² Following is Embassy’s evaluation of good and bad features political agreement:

1) Preamble reconfirms December 28 declaration and all other RLG–PL agreements previously reached. Hence foreign policy favoring neutrality, relations with and acceptance aid from neighboring countries is endorsed by reference. Agreement however does not include by reference Souvanna’s August 9 investiture speech. No limitations on conduct foreign policy in body of agreement.

2) Chapter 1. There remains objectionable rigid requirement that one-half public service jobs in two provinces, including Chao Khouengs, Chao Muongs³ and their staffs, be allocated to PL. This leaves too heavy a concentration of PL in entrenched positions. Mixed special commission will moreover determine branch of service to which PL functionaries will be assigned (Article 3), although actual assignment to specific jobs will be made by RLG on commission proposal (Article 2). Lists submitted by PL will presumably be drawn up in such way as to ensure assignment of greatest number of PL to branches and positions useful to it. PL who have once served under RLG must be assigned to either original or present branch, depending on their qualifications, of which RLG will apparently be judge (Article 4). Generally speaking, all other PL functionaries will remain in place for 3 months (Article 5); however, there is no longer any undertaking by RLG to re-employ all former PL. RLG is in fact free to apply standards of personnel strength in use elsewhere in Kingdom, and even to raise or lower them as it sees fit (Articles 2 and 4). A down-grading of PL functionaries without RLG service on basis of RLG civil service standards could be used to remove some number of them from responsible positions. Danger that 2,000 PL school teachers might have to be employed by RLG apparently removed, particularly since Ministry Education obliged to close 560 schools this year for lack of funds. Some of course might “volunteer” to teach for nothing.

Chapter 2. It is officially recognized that PL may be succeeded by legal political party Neo Lao Hak Xat (Article 9). This organization already functions in clandestinity in many parts of Laos. New party will be shorn of its original claim of leading all other parties. Its legal recognition will depend on decision of RLG and its continued existence will be subject to same restrictions as apply to other parties. We assume that its overt activities will be paralleled by underground apparatus for subversive purposes, as at present. Existence of legal superstructure throughout Laos will facilitate logistic and other support for illegal activities.

Transfer of authority (Article 8) remains symbolic prior to formation coalition government.

Appointment of functionaries and surrender of archives (Articles 10 and 11) will evidently take place only after considerable delay, considering need to appoint commissions, deliberations of latter, and final action.

Article 12 will probably give rise to much popular dissatisfaction. Old provision for restoration of collectivized property to private owners has been replaced by provision for indemnification only which is likely to be extremely slow at best. Furthermore, it would appear that RLG henceforth must either perpetuate collectivization or become area’s principal landlord.

As PL have never been reported to have issued own currency, no question of conversion arises. A problem will evidently arise on disposition of Viet Minh currency now in hands of population.

General comment: Agreement bears too many evidences of having been rewritten in part by various hands and of hasty assemblage without adequate coordination. For example, the number, kind and responsibilities of subcommissions is not entirely clear, nor is it clear that the agreement takes effect “when signed” or only when the symbolic transfer of authority [takes place?] (Articles 1 and 8). Actual entry of RLG functionaries on duty will take considerable time, inasmuch as appointment to various positions in two provinces must await PL submission of lists of PL functionaries, selection of mixed commissions, deliberations of latter, and appointive action by RLG. If PL should adopt delaying tactics, there will be little RLG can do until ANL is in complete control of provinces. After three months, RLG should be in full control of civil administration.

Failure to restore private property (assuming French version accurately represents meaning of Lao original) will doubtless be great disappointment to inhabitants and will have considerable effect in dissipating initial goodwill toward RLG administration. Same may be true of failure to provide for conversion Viet Minh currency; population certain to feel cheated unless it can dispose of piastres either in North Vietnam or to RLG at fair price.

As in case military agreement, value of accord seems now depend primarily on energy and intelligence with which it is carried out by RLG. On the one hand, RLG will as time passes become more and more the sole authority responsible for its execution, on other hand, PL will still be in possession many key administrative posts; it will be represented by legal political party and equipped with underground organization; and it will have Cabinet spokesmen. The elections foreseen after three months at the village level will probably result in the removal of few head men, unless civic action, operation brotherhood, and other agencies can produce remarkable results in this short time. General supplementary elections to the Assembly after four months will be the ultimate test. Whether or not they take place will probably depend on the RLG’s view of the situation at the time. It is then that Katay if physically fit may again appear in role consonant with US interests.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–1557. Secret. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Telegram 797, November 13, contained a brief preliminary analysis by the Embassy of the political agreement. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–1357)
3. Translate as “governors” and “county chiefs,” respectively.