Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

477. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, October 17, 1957—5 p.m.

598. Department pass information CINCPAC. Last night Prime Minister mentioned to Embassy officer existence of proposed joint communiqué setting out general terms of PL settlement (reported Embtel 586² to Department only). In course interview with Prime Minister this morning I mentioned his conversation with Embassy official, whereupon Souvanna handed me his draft copy to examine. Text agrees with summary already transmitted; confirmation of previous agreements also refers specifically to holding supplementary elections, date unspecified. I told Souvanna I assumed draft would be submitted to entire Cabinet for approval and he agreed. I asked if this included Phoui (whom Souvanna now expects to arrive 21) and he said it did. I observed that draft seemed to include some remarkable concessions on part of PL, but that US position in respect coalition government was well-known and to my knowledge unchanged and that Ambassador and possibly Phoui would have heard most recent expression Department’s views this subject. Souvanna acknowledged this without comment. I then pointed out (as instructed Deptel 376³) that in our view agreement on integration of Pathet Lao troops must be considered in light of general political settlement and that our position re modalities integration troops and support we would give this operation stated in secret aide-mémoire of November 6, 1956. At this Souvanna’s cheerful humor returned and he said that military provisions had been drawn up with that paper distinctly in mind. He estimated that of 6,000 troops between 1,500 and 2,000 would apply for integration, less than 10% of existing ANL effectives, and said that RLG would control total accepted by exercising budgetary restrictions, so ultimately no more than 5% need ever be integrated. He felt confident application of military regulations would automatically result in substantial compliance Point 5 of aide-mémoire regarding placement and positioning Pathet Lao officers.

I asked if he knew of any reason why Souphanouvong had yielded on points which he had maintained firmly up till now. Souvanna replied with evident satisfaction that the Pathet Lao had grown “tired”, and that, after all, his brother was no communist. I asked whether the boundary commission team which has recently returned from Nonkhet and Hanoi had detected any like fatigue and willingness to compromise on part of Viet Minh. He replied that the team had found absolutely none and had come back completely discouraged; that the Viet Minh had even refused to consider his proposal that both sides withdraw troops and police from disputed areas and leave joint commission in possession for time being. I then asked whether he was sure Souphanouvong had authority to sign agreement or would have to refer question to Sam Neua. He replied that there would be no need to do that and that Souphanouvong would sign it today if he asked him to. To my inquiry on what Cabinet positions Souphanouvong laid claim, Prime Minister answered surprisingly that no specific posts had been requested. I asked him what posts he himself had in mind for the Pathet Lao and he replied he was thinking specifically of Ministry of Public Works and of one other, such as Justice or Religion.

I asked whether Interior, Defense or Foreign Affairs were possibilities and he said definitely not, and added that he had never contemplated more than two Cabinet posts for PL. I said PL would doubtless expect some appointments as Secretaries of State; he agreed but said that here again they would be limited to non-key ministries such as Justice, Religion or Information.

I asked whether he saw any physical difficulties in arranging transfer of civil and military authority, surrender of weapons, presentation of slate of altered Cabinet and Assembly vote in a single day. He saw none, indicating that preparations for transfer authority would have been made sufficiently in advance. Details would be worked out in immediate future. At this point he sent for and gave to me for our temporary use copies RLG proposals for submission to both military and political commissions (outline military proposal reported Embtel 558;⁴ full summaries both proposals being forwarded separate telegrams⁵). I said it seemed to me better to await results of the political and military commissions labors before making public announcement top-level agreement. He replied that issuance joint communiqué necessary in order guide work of commissions. I said Department would take greatest possible interest these developments and again observed that I knew of no change in its views already expressed to RLG.

Throughout conversation Souvanna appeared satisfied and confident, evidently feeling solution PL problem on his terms is within reach. He seems to think he has found a formula which will provide “simultaneity” as implied in his investiture speech August 9. Although conscious of our objection to coalition government he appears to believe that he has at last obtained all necessary concessions and guarantees (surrender of civil and military authority, surrender of arms) which must in form at least be carried into effect before such government is presented to Assembly for approval. Finally, Assembly approval is not and cannot be guaranteed by RLG, although Assembly approval May 29 of previous agreements suggests that it would hesitate to block, under these circumstances, what would appear to be final settlement.

In the Mixed Commissions the PL has not yet displayed same readiness to settle shown by Souphanouvong. According to Thane, head of PL political delegation, PL have asked for two ministries (unspecified), Secretary of State in Interior, and creation new position of Deputy Commander-Chief of ANL. On other hand some recent defections from PL armed forces of which Embassy learned today suggest that PL morale has been considerably undermined. These defectors (who are currently under interrogation) reportedly include Battalion Commander of 609th Infantry Battalion; a company commander in same; commander of company charged with protecting security of PL Defense Ministry; and an individual said to be a personal secretary of Souphanouvong. Until results interrogation known, speculation on their motives is idle; but even in case of military defectors, whether they are attempting gain confidence of ANL by jumping gun or are fearful of being detained by Viet Minh, all must realize their action tends to weaken PL bargaining position Vientiane.

Bacon

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1757. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. Dated October 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–457)
4. See footnote 4, supra.
5. Telegrams 604 and 607 from Vientiane, October 18 and 19, neither printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1857 and 751J.00/10–1957, respectively)