Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

436. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, May 10, 1957—6 p.m.

1888. Reference: Embtel 1880.² With approach Assembly opening, situation here again warming up with conflicting and shifting currents of opinion flowing about two key issues (1) government crisis and (2) PL problem. Into this complex have been injected additional elements of (1) ICC flurry over tripartite notes and (2) Petsarath.

1. While Petsarath has been canny and cautious about committing himself publicly, (except for initial press conference) and while I am convinced from his own statements and all other evidence that he does not wish to come into power before visiting all of Laos, his views on PL problem are decidedly disturbing.… have learned that Petsarath considers December 28 agreement approved by Cabinet as honorable commitment which should be implemented in order permit RLG to man its northern borders, determine if there is really Communist interference from outside and to make problem of units purely internal one which RLG could handle. … Petsarath accepted recommendation of Pheng Phongsavan, President National Assembly, that he, Petsarath, tell Souphanouvong that both sides should drop demands for guarantees which had complicated situation since December 28 and proceed on basis agreement of that date. Souphanouvong readily agreed drop Chinese aid and Petsarath who opposes Chinese aid anyway, thought he had achieved success and proceeded tell Souvanna, at same time urging him go ahead once more on basis December 28 agreement. Souvanna, so Petsarath said, was now considering matter.

2. Katay … held caucus May 9 of 13 members of Nationalist Party which agreed in principle support Pheng Phongsavan for President of National Assembly. Other candidate would be Quinim. Possibly Phoui, but Quinim could surely be defeated. Katay also now favors continuance Souvanna in office for time being and avoidance crisis. As interim tactic for dealing with PL problem, he favors RLG sending letter to ICC asking whether PL have right to inject external matters (diplomatic relations with Communist bloc) and to require acceptance Chinese aid as part of negotiation PL problem. Copies of such a letter would be sent to Geneva co-presidents. Presumably he expects negative reply but should response be vague, he would favor reference to UN. In any event, Katay is more adamant than before that PL must be dissolved before any of its present members enter government and two provinces must be effectively under RLG authority beforehand.

3. Souvanna has been extremely reticent of late and such remarks as he has made (Embtel 1886³) somewhat disturbing because of fear that he may again misrepresent US position on coalition. I am seeing Crown Prince 11th reaffirm our views so that in consultations he may have privately over next several weeks with Ministers and Deputies, he will know our position unchanged. In this connection, I plan show him excellent summary just received of Young’s conversation with two Lao Deputies April 21.⁴ We are also taking steps make sure Phoui and Katay thoroughly briefed. I hope in my next conversation with Souvanna to have opportunity remind him our attitude on coalition unchanged.

Although in Laos pendulum can swing suddenly and violently, I do not believe that RLG and Assembly likely be stampeded by any Petsarath–Souvanna–Souphanouvong move to go back to unvarnished December 28 agreement. We have had so much evidence from Ministers, Assembly members and key civil servants that Pathet Lao are now regarded as agents of Communist seeking take over Laos that it would be far more difficult now than it was last December to promote deal without guarantees. In this fundamental sense, situation here has improved although at very least, we may expect some anxious moments over next few weeks.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/5–1057. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Ottawa, New Delhi, Saigon, Bangkok, and Phnom Penh.
2. Dated May 10, not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Dated May 10, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1057)
4. Reference is to a telegraphic summary of a memorandum of conversation by Young, April 21, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2157)