Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

435. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, May 9, 1957—8:07 p.m.

3713. Bangkok 3233 repeated Vientiane 556;² Vientiane 1819 repeated Bangkok 84 pouched other addressees.³ Bangkok’s 3233 raises two questions: 1) U.S. estimate Lao situation and 2) desirability further consultation with Thai re Laos.

Re 1), we do not feel there has been “recent deterioration military and political situation Laos” if statement applies (as we assume) period since last discussion Laos with Phibun January 7. At that time Lao Assembly acceptance coalition government including Pathet Lao based December 28 communiqué appeared virtually certain and we foresaw necessity early reappraisal U.S. political and economic policies toward Laos.

At present, while political situation still critical and will require utmost vigilance, so far as we know no unfavorable decisions yet taken. Assembly adjournment March 15 means coalition proposal in abeyance at least until next regular session May 11. RLG has insisted three additional guarantees from Pathet Lao (dissolution PL movement, submission PL troops to authority Lao National Army, and restoration RLG administration two disputed provinces simultaneously with PL entry into Cabinet) to which PL have given no response whatsoever. Moreover RLG has rejected PL condition of acceptance Chinese Communist aid as extraneous to problem at hand.

Entire issue coalition will probably be revived within matter weeks, but there ground hope RLG may then assume somewhat tougher policy toward PL. Negotiations have apparently produced increasing RLG awareness PL unreliable and not free agents, an education process to which PL contributed greatly by injecting acceptance Chinese Communist aid condition into negotiations. Souvanna Phouma himself seemingly at least partially disillusioned, and some public blaming of PL for lack settlement has taken place.

It consequently appears fair to say already bad situation has not deteriorated last four months and Embassy Vientiane has been successful in holding operation. Problem not satisfactorily resolved however but we hope PL may not have it so easy next round. Further concern now is Petsarath, still unknown quantity.⁴ His intelligence, stature, and strong personality indicate he will exercise significant influence Lao politics, so that his as yet uncertain attitudes key questions will be important to execution U.S. policy.

With respect military situation see Vientiane 1805 repeated Paris 400 London 360 pouched other addressees.⁵ There appears be no basic change but merely PL return to isolated attacks ANL outposts as form military pressure induce RLG make political concessions to PL. Such attacks had been for most part suspended when PL considered their aims would be achieved in political negotiations. Since Vientiane assessment indicates general PL offensive unlikely we do not believe Lao military situation warrants SEATO consideration this time.

Re 2), foregoing tentative evaluation for Bangkok’s information only. We have doubts re utility discussion Lao political situation with Thai present time. Over past two years Thai have enjoyed special status by being given in confidence U.S. thinking re Laos in Ambassadors’ conversations with Phibun, personal messages from Secretary, and discussions between Thai and Department officials. Thus far these contacts have proven disappointingly unproductive in tangible Thai assistance to Laos even though strategic considerations would argue importance Laos to Thai security. Phibun himself has flatly stated Thai have little or no influence Lao Government (Bangkok’s 1974 repeated Vientiane 333⁶). We are puzzled by Thai failure take initiative re Laos despite geographic ethnic cultural links.

Unless more visible results than heretofore are forthcoming, we question point of periodic discussions Thai re Laos. Further consideration is increasing rather than diminishing suspicion between Thai and Lao which we note from field reports and Department contacts. We recognize exchange with Thai would be valuable if they made concrete contribution in any of five fields suggested Vientiane 1819, but are much less enthusiastic re mere briefing session.

We regret Thai Government has been unresponsive U.S. policy promoting increased Thai interest and activity Laos to supplement our efforts there. We should appreciate Vientiane comments on further stimulation Thai interest with respect Laos.⁷ Request Bangkok’s full assessment current Thai attitudes toward Laos and recommendations possible U.S. measures bring about concrete Thai assistance to neighbor if such assistance appears desirable and feasible.⁸

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2657. Secret. Drafted by Young and Byrne, cleared by SEA and FE, and approved by Robertson. Sent also to Vientiane and repeated to Saigon, Phnom Penh, Paris, and London.
2. See footnote 3, Document 433.
3. See footnote 4, Document 433.
4. According to telegram 1584 from Vientiane, March 22, Prince Petsarath arrived in Vientiane on that day. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.11/3–2257)
5. The military situation as analyzed in telegram 1805 from Vientiane, April 24, is summarized in this paragraph. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2457)
6. Dated January 8, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–857)
7. The Embassy responded in telegram 1934 from Vientiane, May 17, with a brief observation that the deterioration of Thai-Lao relations was in part a product of worsening Franco-Thai relations. Otherwise, the Embassy believed the burden was on Thailand to create an atmosphere of cooperation with Laos. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–1757)
8. In telegram 3481 from Bangkok, May 22, the Embassy expressed doubts about the progress of Thai-Lao military planning until the danger of Pathet Lao integration in Laos passed and until events in Laos became more stable. (Ibid., 751J.00/5–2257)