Office of the Historian

433. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1

Washington, May 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

  • Discussions with Thai re Laos

I am attaching for your approval a telegram2 in response to Bangkok’s 3233, April 26,3 in which Ambassador Bishop suggests the desirability of frankly discussing developments in Laos with Prime Minister Phibun because of the “apparently recent deterioration of the military and political situation in Laos”.

This recommendation seems to me to raise two questions: First, what is the situation in Laos, and second, whether further discussions with the Thai on this subject would be profitable. With respect to the political assessment, I do not believe that the word “deterioration” [Page 911] fits the situation over the past four months. We all recognize the Lao problem as continuingly critical, but at the same time it cannot be denied that Embassy Vientiane, backstopped by Washington, has been successful in staving off the unfavorable and possibly disastrous decision on coalition with the Communists which appeared inevitable last January. I consider that, to arm Ambassador Bishop in future contacts with the Thai, he should be given our evaluation of the Lao situation as of this moment, an objective which the attached telegram attempts briefly to fulfill.

The second question is perhaps more difficult. We have always considered the Thai rather a special instrument in Southeast Asia, an anti-Communist country by virtue of being Asian could do certain things in the area which the United States could not. Consequently, we have over the past two years given the Thai our thinking on Laos in the hope that they would be stimulated to action which would supplement our own effort to preserve Lao independence. Unfortunately, almost nothing tangible has transpired, and I have come to regard these contacts as wasted effort or at least of dubious value. Despite the patent importance of Laos to Thai security and the obvious logic, owing to cultural, ethnic, and geographic ties, of Thai assistance to Laos, the Thai have not picked up the ball and have made no sacrifice whatsoever in their own interest.

Ambassador Parsons in his 1819,4 commenting on Bangkok’s 3233, also manifests doubt on the utility of continuing the discussions unless the Thai are prepared to take action in some of the fields he enumerates. He concludes with the statement that “as seen from here, the burden is on the Thai to create an atmosphere in which cooperation beneficial to the Laos situation would take place.”

We do not wish summarily to terminate the effort to stimulate Thai interest and activity in Laos, but rather merely to set forth the problem with a request for possible remedial measures. The attached telegram describes our disappointment with the results thus far and asks the field to suggest galvanizing action if the effort with the Thai is to be pursued.

Recommendation

That you approve the attached telegram to Bangkok and Vientiane. (Tab A)

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2657. Secret. Drafted by Byrne and cleared by SEA.↩
  2. Sent as telegram 3713 to Bangkok, Document 435.↩
  3. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/4–2657)↩
  4. Dated April 29, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/4–2957)↩