Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

423. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 13, 1957—5 p.m.

1313. Department pass USUN for Kenneth Young. Reference Embtel 1311.² Following are comments on views expressed by Crown Prince Embtel 1305³ other than suggested line of attack, commented on in reference telegram:

1. There is some disagreement in Embassy … with Savang’s evaluation of temper of ANL, and especially with his broad statement civil war would follow “enlargement” of cabinet. Consider ANL ready accept inclusion two PL in cabinet provide integrity of ANL suitably guaranteed, including certainty Minister Defense (and probably also Interior) denied to PL. However, if once coalition tried and proved unsatisfactory, there are unspecific but nonetheless fairly firm indications army would move against PL units, including putting auto-defense to good use. We have had one report of ANLs tactical plans which may be related Crown Prince’s remarks, but report not clear as to when or in what circumstances plan would be activated.

2. Re Savang’s view of temper in home constituencies, opinion divided. Ngon Sananikone opined that feeling in villages would be for coalition to avoid further fratricide (Embtel 1278⁴). Bouasy, back from tour Vientiane province, reported astounded at extent PL have been able gain foothold there, and asserted belief more than half of deputies to be chosen in supplementary election Vientiane province would be PL if elections truly free. (This of course may be Bouasy’s way of laying groundwork for request for assistance to his candidates). In discussion with French adviser Parizot, close to Prime Minister Embassy Office gathered Parizot concluded not all Lao deputies share belief constituencies oppose coalition. On other hand, Pheng Phong Savang⁵ and Ourot agree with Crown Prince that home constituencies provide element of distrust to deal; Soulie also now shares this view. In any case, we have impression Crown Prince thinks as northerner and bases judgments largely on recent travels in north.

Meanwhile we have had one further credible report opposition to coalition gaining ground among Lao leaders. Question of successor to Souvanna is however worrisome factor. Soulie told me yesterday Kou Abhay, President King’s council, expresses great anxiety this score.

3. We learn Katay did not actually stay in town for February 9 cabinet meeting, leaving for Pakse early morning that day. He did however leave strong imprint on RLG leaders with categorical stand on three guarantees. Absence in part indicative his virtual assumption leading opposition role but also necessitated by preparations for religious ceremonies in south of Pakse which Crown Prince attending 14.

4. Savang’s estimate “ten days or so” (as of [February?] 10) before coalition question goes to Assembly is open to question.

… had on good authority that Prime Minister calling on Ministers be back in town 18; nothing to go to Assembly before Pheng, and cabinet session must be held before further action. It thus not impossible question might be aired by 20th, but might be considerably later especially if assembly follows stated plan thrash out electoral law first.

Meanwhile there is matter of Souphanouvong agreeing to three additional guarantees (Embtel 1304).⁶ We hear from three sources Souphanouvong signifying willingness subscribe on own responsibility to guarantees; last … source has it PL leader has assured Prime Minister latter will obtain satisfaction, but nothing in writing yet. Realize this may be simply tactic of Souphanouvong.⁷

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. See footnote 2, supra.
4. Dated February 7, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–757)
5. Pheng Phong Savang was President of the National Assembly.
6. These guarantees, according to telegram 1304, February 11, were dissolution of the Pathet Lao movement, submission of Pathet Lao forces to the National Army, and restoration of Royal Government civil administration in the two northern provinces. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1157)
7. The Department, in telegram 1021 to Vientiane, February 16, instructed the Embassy to inform Savang that Congress and U.S. public opinion would probably be unwilling to distinguish between economic and military aid. Furthermore, Savang’s plan would involve loss of flexibility. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–1557)