Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

422. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, February 13, 1957—5 p.m.

1311. Department pass USUN for Kenneth Young. Reference Embtel 1305.² Following are comments on line suggested by Crown Prince in reference telegram, taking account combined views Embassy … and USOM:

1. Express cleavage between military and economic aid is indeed creative concept offering approach which may prove useful, distinguishing as it does between military aid which usually given on specific anti-Communist premise and economic aid which more generally humanitarian. However, not so easy as Crown Prince maintained to avoid (a) direct unknown circumstances. Accordingly consider suggestion should not be utilized if it appears likely coalition be defeated any way. If this unclear (as is probable) should be employed if at all in less blunt, more subtle, fashion as preview of elements entering into re-evaluation. As suggested reference telegram, this could be tied into indication that March and subsequent funding ANL not yet provided for and dependent on whether or not certain criteria for military aid set.

2. Crown Prince’s concept nature military aid appears assume that immediately upon formation coalition government ANL ceases be anti-Communist element. This not necessarily so (even though we may assume Communists would in end succeed in dominating such government). In fact Savang himself asserts ANL would swing into action if government enlarged. Believe that after coalition need for ANL in fact initially greater either in event (a) there is sharp reaction anti-Communist elements or (b) PL show bad faith and RLG PL accord denounced. In fact Souvanna himself had often talked of so using ANL when PL problem becomes entirely internal one. Therefore formation coalition does not in our view necessarily avoid reasons for US support ANL.

3. If US should formally go on record that aid to ANL would be cut off in event coalition, it is conceivable Souvanna would turn to Communist Chinese (which thus far we believe he has not dared do). While this might precipitate “Civil War” which Savang foresees as consequence coalition, believe US should not take any action so drastic as to increase risk of ChiCom further complicating issue.

4. From USOM viewpoint idea distinguishing between economic and military aid acceptable, especially if considered as tactic which would assuredly defeat coalition. If not successful, we would have anticipated re-evaluation without full consideration of situation as it would appear in light actual Assembly acceptance coalition. Economic effects drastic curtailment or cut military aid would be extremely severe initially in view dislocation commercial import program, longer term effects less clear except for salutary elimination both consumption and currency inflation. From economist’s point of view, more gradual curtailment of military aid (as feasible on political grounds) would be preferable.

5. Conclusion we reach is proposal should not be accepted in form which would necessitate formal note or even specific oral statement to Souvanna. Furthermore, we doubt circumstances would arise which should lead us to formal action before re-evaluation process. Nevertheless, we believe there is need and opportunity at this time keep pressure on and leave no doubt US concerned consequences Assembly acceptance deal. Accordingly thesis of differing characteristics and motivations US military and economic aid is one which could usefully be thrown out in casual conversations. In particular, general line should reach key ANL officers whose reaction and influence on deputies should be salutary. We will not, however, take any action along this line … pending Washington reaction.

Comments on certain other statements of Crown Prince follow in separate telegram.³

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/2–1357. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Bangkok, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. In telegram 1305, February 11, Savang suggested to Parsons that the United States could insure defeat of the Royal Government–Pathet Lao deal without a direct threat and without irrevocably committing itself. Should the Royal Lao Government take decisions which in the view of the United States rendered it impossible for the Lao Government to use the Army for anti-Communist purposes, then aid to the Lao National Army would cease. At the same time, Savang thought the United States should continue technical and economic aid to Laos. The prospect of 25,000 Lao soldiers without funds and employment, according to Savang, would insure defeat of any plans for coalition with the Pathet Lao. (Ibid., 751J.00/2–157)
3. Infra.