Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, November 21, 1956—5 p.m.

809. Re Embtel 802.² My recommendation on Souvanna’s plea for our support of his scheme for PL entry into Cabinet, in return for written agreement on restoration and integration, is negative for reasons set forth below. However, problem complicated by other aspects current crisis in Laos³ and we should in my view seek to act in such way as not aggravate crisis.

US position is by no means only reason for Souvanna’s malaise and we should decline accept responsibility for situation caused by his failure to face up to crux of PL problem before becoming so enmeshed. Other reasons for Souvanna’s threat to resign are:

(1) Genuine fatigue and depression;

(2) Friction with Crown Prince;

(3) Letter from King rejecting work of National Congress (Embtel 808⁴);

(4) His brother Petsarath’s attitude (Embtel 810⁵); and

(5) Differences with his ministers on PL issue particularly. In other words crisis is primarily internal.

On last point we now know from Nhouy and Ngon,⁶ two senior Cabinet members, plus other sources that last week Cabinet almost unanimously rejected immediate broadening or reshuffling to include PL representatives. Cabinet view and US objective this coincided and we should not now turn around and side with Souvanna on this issue merely because he now asserts he can get written commitment on key questions. If I had faith he could actually get detailed written agreement, I would advocate wait and see attitude but issues are complex and there is not enough evidence to create such confidence.

Another consideration is that if Souvanna were enabled to go back to Cabinet and allege he had US support, this plus his threat to resign (and throw them out of jobs) might well cause number members take different stand. Last week he put up almost hopeless proposition to Cabinet, with apparently little personal expectation of success, but its rejection did not result, as Souvanna probably hoped, in Souphanouvong’s ceasing pressures on him for coalition. Thus caught between two fires Souvanna is now evidently attempting converse maneuver to see if he can induce Cabinet and West cease opposition to coalition now.

If there were satisfactory alternative to Souvanna, if fall of government now could have constructive results, I would favor unequivocal negative response. But neither Crown Prince nor any one else has been able to come up with satisfactory replacement. Nhouy, who is close to Katay and Crown Prince and no adherent of Souvanna, told me he had begged Souvanna not to resign, that it would be end of Laos (Embtel 810). Even allowing for exaggeration it is clear Nhouy and others think he should stay on and I am impressed by their view. In choice between two unsatisfactory alternatives, least [garble] unsatisfactory, it seems to me, is to go along with opinion of responsible Lao who so far want Souvanna to stay.

This suggests we should in our reply to Prime Minister’s appeal temper negative response. We might repeat US considers first essential is full detailed unequivocal agreement on restoration and reintegration, and what happens after that would depend thereupon: Geneva agreement calls for restoration and reintegration, and if Cabinet and Assembly agree thereafter interpret reintegration to embrace inclusion PL in Cabinet, that would be primarily internal Lao affair, however regrettable from US viewpoint. I also favor repeating to Souvanna what I have already told him, that position we have taken pursuant Department telegram 546⁷ and before is not personal and that we would have made same representations in circumstances no matter who headed government. Going further we could say we thought best interests of Laos indicated avoidance of difficult crisis now and we hoped he could thus see way to stay on despite our non-support of coalition now in return for PL promissory note. Finally as affirmation of our belief he should stay in we could hold out hope see him informally in Washington and seriously discuss our mutual problems at such time situation permitted him leave Laos. This last would have tonic effect and would in meantime probably increase our influence with him. Believe it would also be useful to us.

In my view it would be desirable consult with British, French and Canadians on problems raised this and reference telegram and, as Holliday was most helpful to me earlier this week, I have acquainted him in general terms with Souvanna’s latest maneuver. Would appreciate Department’s instructions⁸ soonest as situation moving rapidly. Immediate preliminary reaction would be helpful as members of Canadian External Affairs due here tomorrow and Rob Scott from Singapore shortly thereafter.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–2156. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris, London, Saigon, Bangkok, Phnom Penh, New Delhi, and Ottawa.
2. Supra.
3. The crisis revolved around the work of the National Congress, called into session by Royal Order of June 9, 1956, to revise the Lao Constitution. Katay, the government reporter at the Congress, charged that the Congress had exceeded its authority in going beyond the draft provisions proposed by the government by commenting on nearly all points in the Lao constitution. (Telegram 855 from Vientiane, November 30; Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/11–3056)
4. According to telegram 808, November 21, the King declared that Congress had deviated from its mission and exceeded its authority by making general revisions to the constitution. (Ibid., 751J.00/11–2156)
5. According to telegram 810 from Vientiane, November 21, Petsarath refused to return to Laos until the questions of his salary, fringe benefits, housing, and title were settled. (Ibid.)
6. Nhouy Adhay, Minister of Interior, and Ngon Sananikone, Minister of Education.
7. Telegram 546, November 6, noted that there was no attempt to discourage Souvanna Phouma from visiting Washington, but rather to outline the practical difficulties so that he could make his own decision whether or not to come. (Ibid., 601.6151J/11–556)
8. See telegram 612, Infra.