Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

368. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, August 6, 1956—6 p.m.

168. Department pass CINCPAC. At Prime Minister’s invitation I called on him morning August 6 with Blancke for meeting lasting an hour. Souvanna said he wanted fill us in on recent events, preliminary agreement with PL having been reached. I mentioned I had just got Washington views on problem of reintegration and would wish discuss them before he left. Prime Minister suggested we do this first and I outlined preliminary position given as five points Deptel 120² (Ottawa, Delhi, Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC unnumbered) Souvanna’s reactions follow:

1. Stay within 25,000 limit: That was his firm position and always had been. (It would seem according what he said later there must be some temporary excess over 25,000 but he claimed excess would be eliminated at once.)

2. Apply rigid standards: This definitely planned, as one excellent way keep down numbers.

3. 1,000 troops too many to control: Prime Minister said ultimate integration should total far less. First step was call for volunteers to ascertain who in PL wanted continue army career. At this stage might get one to two thousand. These would be placed under royal authority, after which elimination could proceed without interference. Many would be weeded out by severity of selections standards. Third stage was in camps for indoctrination, training, et cetera, with further screening and elimination.

4. No direct integration: See above.

5. Watch remainder: I did not take this up as a point but worked it into subsequent warnings re subversion.

In terminating this topic I reiterated importance his promise not commit US resources.

Souvanna appeared satisfied his position coincided with our views and with measures being planned, and reverted to communiqué, composition of which had been whole activity of August 5 meetings. Copy showed us, which slightly smoother version than Embtel 166,³ was his own unofficial French translation of agreed Lao text; secretariat was now working on careful official translation which might appear August 7 but possibly later. Prime Minister stressed this was communiqué, not agreement as latter would imply PL sovereign government instead dissident national group.

Going over his text, I queried him on passage alluding establishment contact with neighbors, did this for example include DRV? Prime Minister said, not till they had shown bona fides by pulling out of North Laos, eventually, yes. Re military pacts and bases, Souvanna says this had been a principal worry of PL, who had idea RLG had military alliance with US. He was able reassure them on this; Seno and Vientiane bases (latter is French garrison) were of course provided for at Geneva. Laos remained free create own military bases.

Re coalition government, still under discussion at time of drafting, PL had met several times with representatives of Assembly in effort get agreement to new general elections. Assembly had held firm and PL were now agreeable to taking what they could get in supplementary elections (Embtel 157, 1 c⁴). If final capitulation on this point obtained today, might be included in communiqué, if not, would be subject subsequent communiqué. Added he doubted supplementary elections would take place before 1957.

As we read paragraph on integration Souvanna remarked most important step was as stated therein: Get civil and army under RLG authority. Once they were in, RLG could deal legally with them, and would find many ways to cut them to size. In army, important step was to disarm PL and get “volunteers” under ANL authority. If mixed committees got into hassle and referred back to two brothers, he Souvanna would have upper hand.

Prime Minister said with importance of police to control subversion now increasing, he planned request more funds for them. No PL would be allowed in police. With armed PL issue settled, army could be reduced to 15 battalions, one for each province and three general purpose, mission principally guard frontiers.

Prime Minister was most anxious I make clear to Washington that he was not ceding to Communists and would be most vigilant against penetration, would not change attitude toward old friends; must however face realities confronting landlocked Laos which must live with powerful neighbors. Did not refer directly to question definition neutrality as opposed neutralism as discussed with Soulie (Embtel 167⁵) so I did not force occasion to introduce it. He did at one time, however, refer to necessity for his small country be buffer state.

On subject of neighbors I brought up Peking visit in connection US public opinion. I understood implications of PL-RLG communiqué and congratulated him on his work to bring peace and unity, but was obliged point out US press might seize on it as an accommodation with Commies, and American opinion might so view it. If on top of that he forthwith announced he going Peking, effect would be doubly unfortunate. We in no way sought interfere Lao internal affairs, but since question involved US Congress and voting of funds for aid, we must stress importance of first impressions however ill-founded these might be. In that connection I pointed out strength US feelings re Communist China and reasons therefor. Souvanna said he understood and was indeed counting heavily on continued US aid, but we must understand he has to go to Peking; he told Chou En-lai he would do so after PL problem settled. Assured us this purely courtesy visit to neighbor, with no commitments whatsoever to be made, and he would stress this in announcing visit. Before replying to Chou he had consulted US Government and been told no objection (as he later reported to Thai enroute Singapore). Blancke interposed we had not said there was no objection, but rather that if RLG found invitation impossible to refuse, it should not go until PL issue settled; I added we had not at any time approved of trip, reiterated on contrary we believed it not necessary and dangerous. Blancke asked if he now considered PL issue solved, or would that be after commissions finished work. Souvanna became slightly nettled but again assured us, and asked us make clear to Washington, that this was purely courtesy visit with no commitments. Before dropping matter I again alluded to US opinion. Fact visit was courtesy would not make US headlines, whereas fact of trip would. For this reason we felt obliged point to probable cumulative effect of announcement visit on top of foreign policy statements in communiqué. I again recognized value of his success with his brother Souphanouvang. Received renewed assurances of RLG vigilance and friendship.

Parsons

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751j.00/8–656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, London, Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. Supra.
3. Telegram 166 from Vientiane, August 6, summarized the August 5 joint declaration of the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao delegations. By the terms of the declaration the two sides agreed that Laos should follow a foreign policy of neutrality, friendly contact with neighboring countries, no adherence to military pacts, and no establishment of military bases in Laos except in accordance with the Geneva Agreements. The two parties declared a cease-fire and set up military and political joint commissions to work out the terms of the cease-fire, administration of the two northern provinces, and integration of the Pathet Lao into the Royal Army. The question of elections and formulation of a coalition government was left for further discussion. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–656)
4. Not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/8–456)
5. Telegram 167, August 6, reported Souvanna Phouma’s request to French Chargé Soulie to act as an “honest broker” in explaining to the United States Lao policy of “armed and watchful neutrality” as opposed to neutralism. (Ibid., 651J.00/8–656)