367. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos1
120. Joint State-Defense-ICA message. Vientiane 131,2 and 1343 passed CINCPAC. As indicated various messages re terms Lao Government [Page 782] –PL settlement (CA-2829 October 10, 1955;4 Department’s 310, October 20, 1955 to Vientiane repeated Ottawa 134 London 2161 New Delhi 943 pouched other addressees;5 Department’s 1225 to Vientiane pouched other addressees6), we have considered integration PL not as separate problem but as sensitive element total political settlement in which restoration full Government control two provinces essential point.
In giving our tentative position to Canadians British (Department’s 310 October 20, 1955) we pointed to problem Congressional and public opinion if we should pay for Communist forces but felt solution could be found on condition political settlement satisfactory. So far as Lao Government itself concerned, we never threatened terminate aid or refused finance PL troops, but warned of dangers PL integration on large-scale or without adequate safeguards and frequently cautioned against making concessions engaging U.S. or obliging U.S. reconsider policy toward Laos.
Fully agree allusions to difficulties using U.S. resources pay ex-Communist troops in your effort pull irresolute Souvanna up short. However we would not wish tie our position re PL integration to U.S. funds but rather to kind of over-all settlement achieved by Lao Government and degree its control over integrated PL troops. Integration accompanied for example by coalition government would force U.S. reappraise policy toward Laos; limited troop integration along with political settlement consonant Lao independence and with adequate checks integrees might be acceptable. You should continue therefore strongly warn Lao on need prior consultation on commitments involving U.S.
Though we unable give definitive position on integration, we have following preliminary comments:
1) Any integrated PL would have be included 25,000 force basis. Since even if RLG paid such integrees from own funds as additional force U.S. money would in fact be used, we prefer greater measure control afforded by containing PL within framework 25,000 force level financed by U.S.
2) ANL should apply rigid standards professional qualifications and health in order limit number integrees (possibly two to three hundred), just as we assume Lao will apply strict criteria to rehabilitated civil servants.
3) Lao Government figure 1,000 appears far beyond its capacity control.
4) Fully agree direct integration would be dangerous and unacceptable. Those PL selected for integration and perhaps substantial additional numbers PL should be isolated and reindoctrinated for [Page 783] suitable period, thus at same time permitting further screening. Lao Government should begin preparing site staff and materials (perhaps SSPP could expand activities this line).
5) Remainder PL would be demobilized and assisted as refugees if unable find employment. Since hard-core Communists would undoubtedly attempt enter Army or civil service we would not anticipate undue difficulty absorption rest into economy (cf. vastly greater numbers Vietnamese troops absorbed into Vietnamese economy after Geneva almost without ripple). Lao Government must nevertheless do all necessary prevent these PL from becoming source agitation and discontent.
Until terms settlement take shape believe you should continue general line such as need give PL no better treatment than required by Geneva Accords and effect that rash concessions would have upon relations with U.S.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.51J/8–156. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Byrne and cleared in draft by SEA, ICA, and Defense. Repeated to CINCPAC, Ottawa, New Delhi, Paris, London, Saigon, Phnom Penh, and Bangkok.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 365.↩
- Document 365.↩
- Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/10–1055)↩
- See footnote 4, Document 355.↩
- Document 355.↩