369. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
170. 1. Over past few days Holliday, Bridle and I have met repeatedly pool ideas and information on RLG-PL negotiations including communiqué rough translation of which this Embassy had first …. As Prime Minister called me first we had opportunity discuss what they might take up in light my talk with Souvanna this morning. While they will repeat some of what I said I expect them make following additional points which Department may wish consider in connection with any instructions coming out of weekend developments here.
… In support this thesis I have no doubt on basis our talk today that Souvanna fully realizes stage being set for political contest between PL and any soft elements they can pick up on one hand and now dominant political elements on other hand. Moreover not only Souvanna but other sources have told us precautions being taken, i.e. no elections till ‘57 or “we are sure we’ll win” combining anti-communist forces behind one candidate in close contests, segregation of [Page 787] PL troops, school to train and screen PL functionaries, strengthening police, etc.
5. My own feeling at moment (I have been here just over week) is that:
- (a)
- On internal front at best we are in for new intensive campaign throughout country in which maximum objective is of course Communist victory and minimum active neutralist role. Political majority aware of danger, wants continued US help and advice, is determined keep country independent, has no trust or liking for Viet Minh and Chinese who have been enemies in past. New doubtful, maybe dangerous element will be presence of both Souvanna’s brothers in country before long.
- (b)
- On foreign front it is clear that for some time Laos has wanted move into neutral position and most elements here do not consider this much of a price to pay for end of PL strife and national enmity. There is no prospect that Laos under present or foreseeable government will enter SEATO. Suspension of Laos-Thai contingent planning would be highly significant; this can be used as one test of governments true intentions.
6. For moment effects of talk with Souvanna this a.m. should stave off diplomatic relations with Red China, North Vietnam or acceptance Chinese aid. It may postpone for a bit but not prevent Peking trip. This small country feels it must strike a balance between its neighbors and its more distant Western friends.
… This morning Souvanna indicated Laos role was as a buffer zone. Whether or not we accept this it appears from here that if settlement eventuates along lines of communiqué, US should concentrate even more on countering efforts of PL and Communists subvert, infiltrate and win whole country by non-military means. Regardless of what this may mean for US aid programs over longer period, at moment I believe that care should be taken not to make any move which would weaken confidence of RLG in our willingness and ability protect country. Any slackening of support or obvious US loss of confidence in future of country would only accelerate trend which set in some months ago.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/8–656. Secret; Priority. Repeated to London, Paris, Bangkok, Ottawa, New Delhi, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩