Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

332. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State¹

Vientiane, December 31, 1955—7 p.m.

822. While Lao elections turned out more or less as expected² and on the whole satisfactorily, there were shifts in relative strength of major political elements which will cause friction and agitation until necessary adjustments have been made.

1. Position of Katay is considerably strengthened by:

(a) Increase number Progressive Party seats;

(b) Elimination all but two or three Souvanna supporters within party;

(c) His personal victory in Pakse;

(d) Relative weakening of Independents, second major party;

(e) Enhanced power to attract non-affiliated deputies and minor parties.

2. Position of Phoui is considerably weakened by:

(a) His failure to obtain first place in Vientiane;

(b) Probable decline in number Independent Party seats and shakiness some of his supporters;

(c) Probability Voravongs and Bong Souvannouvong will seize occasion opening new Assembly to revive campaign against Phoui for alleged responsibility Kou Voravong assassination.

3. While it was anticipated Bong would win one of four Vientiane seats, it was not expected he would lead the field. Though most observers consider him merely disgruntled and ambitious opportunist, who would behave if adequately rewarded, he has circulated violently anti-American propaganda along PL lines and Hanoi radios already hailing his victory as “heavy anti-American vote.” He will have only one other doubtful member his party in Assembly but common hostility to Phoui may enable him form working alliance with Voravongs whose Democratic Party also slightly strengthened in elections.

Views differ how these developments will affect composition new government. Phoui is bitter and fears Katay may throw him overboard and form government with Voravongs and Bong. (He blames Bong victory on Army vote which he claims manipulated by Bong, working through some agents responsible for Chinaimo coup of June 1954, and by Colonel Phoumi of Voravong clan.) Crown Prince considers Katay will not wish subject his government to vicious Bong–Voravong attacks and hence will exclude Phoui but will be able to obtain necessary two-thirds majority solely from Progressive Party and several non-affiliated Deputies. On other hand Nhouy considers maintenance Katay–Phoui coalition would provide strongest most responsible government and will advise Katay in this sense. Katay, who just returned yesterday from Pakse and whom I saw this morning, is not committing himself. He did however indicate that (1) there are enough Progressive and “friendly” Deputies to provide two-thirds majority and (2) Phoui’s present position is weakened.

Comment: As Department knows, we have never been enthusiastic about Katay and consider him shifty and lacking in principle. For this reason it is unfortunate that restraining influence heretofore exercised by Phoui and Souvanna, and through them by Crown Prince, will be substantially weakened. On other hand it has been clear for past year that popular support of Souvanna and Phoui was evaporating rapidly, due to their long tenure of power and association with French, and that Katay is only leader presently able hold disparate elements together and provide effective government. We have backed him for this reason. He fully recognizes essentiality to Laos of American aid and, if handled discreetly, will follow generally pro-Western line as long as aid is forthcoming. His expanding business interests will incline him toward maintenance status quo. His attitude towards Viets and PL is firm, though he would probably make deal, as recommended by ICC, if he felt terms were favorable.

We should like to see Phoui retained in government but realize this might provoke bitter rehash Kou Voravong affair³ which could fatally divide nationalist parties at critical time. Insofar as we can influence Katay we believe our objectives should be:

(1) To encourage government as broadly based as possible (including important members Phoui’s party if not Phoui himself); and

(2) To reduce role of Bong to smallest possible proportions. Re latter, Katay has in past and again today assured me that Bong is not dangerous and that he, Katay, can control him. We do not intend to count on this.

Yost

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751J.00/12–3155. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.
2. The results of the election were as follows: National Progressive Party (Katay) 19 seats (17 in previous Assembly); Independent Party (Phoui) 10 (11 in previous Assembly); Democrats (Voravongs) 4 (3 in previous Assembly); National Union (Bong Souvannavong) 2 (3 in previous Assembly); and nonaffiliated 4 (none in previous Assembly). More information and analysis of the election is in despatch 98 from Vientiane, January 19, 1956, not printed. (Ibid., 751J.00/1–1956)
3. Apparent reference to Kou Voravong assassination; see footnote 2, Document *