331. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
814. Department pass Defense and CINCPAC, Saigon pass CHMAAG. In conversation yesterday Crown Prince explained more fully what he now has in mind concerning military operations in north (reference Embtel 8062 repeated Bangkok 482, Saigon 225).
He believes that, after brief further preparation, Phongsaly will be ripe to fall into RG hands solely through auto-defense and commando operations. He claims takeover could already have been carried out by Colonel Ouan (Commander Luang Prabang Military District) but for timidity and non-cooperation Defense Minister and General Staff whom he accuses being under influence French advisers. On other hand, he considers political considerations (family connections) make inexpedient changes in General Staff at this time.
[Page 727]He therefore proposes for present to bypass them. He considers prolonged delay would cause painfully built-up auto-defense apparatus to wither on vine, as well as affording Lao-Viets opportunity to chew it up piecemeal. He therefore proposes advise Katay within next few days to instruct Ouan directly to go ahead and to provide him with necessary funds outside regular ANL budget. Ouan estimates needs at 2 million kip per month for six months. He also desires additional 2000 rifles (about 2000 already distributed). …
As to Samneua, he contemplates proceeding in more or less same manner but recognizes (1) preparations will require more time and (2) more intervention of regular ANL troops may be needed. In both provinces Savang does not believe auto-defense operations, if handled quickly and well, can be suppressed by Viet reenforcements except on scale which would constitute overt invasion. He considers Viets would be unlikely undertake such invasion to put down popular uprising.
I shall talk this situation over with Katay shortly.
Obviously, it would be preferable handle these matters through Defense Minister and General Staff but sympathize with Savang’s reluctance to allow French to exercise virtual veto, as they may be able to do through this channel. Souvanna will probably not remain in new government but, in view their connections with Sananikone and Voravong families respectively, General Sounthone and Colonel Phoumi are well entrenched. We are convinced, however, some way must be found to move this operation forward promptly and will submit recommendations in near future.