Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

329. Paper Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, December 21, 1955.

ANALYSIS OF INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN LAOS (PURSUANT TO NSC ACTION 1290–d²) AND RECOMMENDED ACTION

I. Nature of the Security Threat

1. One-fourth or 600 miles of Laos’ borders are contiguous with Communist territory (Red China and Viet Minh-controlled North Viet-Nam), placing this country in an exceedingly vulnerable position. While external aggression on the part of the Chinese Communists or the Viet Minh would presumably bring to bear the forces of the Manila Pact powers, the chief immediate threat, the Communist-sponsored Pathet Lao logistically supported by the Viet Minh, is an internal one and must be countered by means available to the Lao Government.

2. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos, the two northern provinces of Sam Neua and Phong Saly were designated as final areas of concentration for the Pathet Lao “fighting units,” pending the reintegration of the Pathet Lao into the national community. Interpreting the Agreement as giving them full control of the two provinces, the Pathet Lao have steadfastly refused to permit the restoration there of Royal Government administration.

3. Armed strength of the Pathet Lao is estimated at 6,000 troops, organized in four battalions in Phong Saly and nine in Sam Neua. Small Viet Minh cadres are stationed in all Pathet Lao units presumably for the purpose of training and advising the Pathet Lao and of assuring that high-level Viet Minh orders are strictly executed. Although reliable information is lacking it is estimated that there are somewhat under 1,000 Viet Minh scattered throughout Laos. It is further estimated that up to six regiments (18,000 troops), including the 335th Division could be quickly deployed to Laos from adjacent Viet Minh territory. The common border with Communist-held territory provides the Pathet Lao with a base of operations for training, sanctuary, and reinforcement.

4. In addition to their concentrated strength in the two northern provinces, the Pathet Lao possess a cellular organization and arms caches in preparation for the penetration of the free areas; the precise extent of this covert subversive capability is unknown. Because the Communists may legally enter the Lao Government through elections, the Pathet Lao possess the capability of overt political activity in the elections tentatively scheduled for August 1955, and may present a full slate of candidates throughout the country. Moreover, the Pathet Lao also possess the capability of exercising subversive influence through exploitation of the political susceptibilities and the often naive good-will of Lao leaders and politicians, many of whom consider the Pathet Lao as misguided brothers in the fight for independence.

5. Latent threats to the internal security of Laos are the “Thai Nationality Autonomous Area” in southwestern Red China and the newly formed “Thai-Meo Autonomous Region” in Viet Minh territory adjacent to the northeastern Lao border. Establishment of these groupings is a known Soviet technique for the infiltration of border areas outside Communist territory.

II. Existing Internal Security Forces and National Military Forces

6. Primary Internal Security Forces. Both Lao police organizations, the National Police and the Gendarmérie, are new and have had insufficient funds to meet minimum needs of personnel and equipment. Strength of the police is 478, of the Gendarmérie, 539. The recently completed FOA-sponsored Engle-Page survey of these services concluded that they are not now capable of discharging their responsibilities for public safety or of successfully combating concerted Communist efforts at infiltration or subversion.

7. National Military Forces. Current armed strength of the Lao National Army is 25,000 organized into 18 infantry battalions, one parachute battalion, two armed reconnaissance companies, and about 25 commando companies. In addition there is a National Guard of 39 companies with a strength of 4,000. Poorly trained, logistically weak, and inadequately led, the Lao Army does not have the capability of suppressing well-organized and supported insurrection without foreign aid and leadership.

8. At present Laos is totally dependent upon the United States for financial support of its armed forces; it is entirely dependent upon French officers for training, actual direction of Army administration, and for advice in operations. For a variety of reasons, including lowered morale, the French Military Mission has been ineffective but is slowly improving.

9. Under the terms of the Geneva Agreement, France is permitted to maintain a 1,500 man training mission and a garrison force of 3,500. Actual French strength is approximately 1,150 in the training mission and about 1,000 in the garrison at the Seno Base. The introduction of all other foreign military personnel is prohibited.

10. In connection with the negotiation of an exchange of notes on military assistance, the Lao Government has been informed that the United States considers a well-organized Army of 23,650 (exclusive of police and gendarmérie) adequate for the maintenance of the internal security of Laos. Although the Government accepts this figure in principle, political and administrative difficulties preclude an immediate reduction, so that the current strength will be retained for several months during calendar 1955.

11. Laos maintains no navy or air force.

III. Evaluation of Internal Security Situation

12. The Pathet Lao have the capability of maintaining their position in the two northern provinces and of gradually infiltrating the central Lao Government with the resultant danger of forcing it to shift from its present pro-Western policy to one of neutralism or cooperation with its Chinese and Viet Minh neighbors. The longer the Pathet Lao occupy this territorial base the greater their capability for clandestine political and subversive action against the rest of Laos.

13. It is estimated that, barring a radical change in relations of the Sino-Soviet and Western blocs, the Pathet Lao will not initiate the use of violence but will continue indefinitely their efforts to maintain their position in the two provinces and to gain control of Laos by peaceful means so long as this course, as at present, appears to offer a good chance of success.

14. While the Lao Army is capable of preventing any expansion by force of Pathet Lao territory as long as large-scale Viet Minh support is not given the Pathet Lao, it could not now regain control over the two northern provinces. Police-type forces, for their part, are now incapable of countering Pathet Lao subversion and infiltration.

IV. Inventory of Existing U.S. Programs Bearing on Internal Security

15. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff set forth the view, not to be considered a recommendation, that the mission of the Lao National Army in accordance with U.S. policy should be the maintenance of internal security in Laos, and since Lao Army officers have accepted this concept, both economic and military assistance programs undertaken by the United States bear on the problem of internal security.

16. Economic and Technical Assistance. Aside from a United States-sponsored para-military training program for 200 Lao police and Gendarmérie in Thailand, which is now getting under way, there is no current program for assisting police-type forces in Laos. The recently completed Engle-Page survey of internal security forces in Laos recommended:

(a) Immediately combining police and Gendarmérie into one service under one ministry and increasing combined strength over 2 years from 1,000 to 4,000.

(b) Training personnel in civil police duties and para-military techniques.

(c) Providing the service with greater mobility and a radio communications system.

(d) Providing necessary arms, ammunition, office and laboratory equipment and housing.

17. The report also recommended that the United States furnish Laos with technical and economic assistance for carrying out such a program, provided the Lao Government gives adequate assurance of full support for the project.

18. United States technicians are proposed in the following fields: police administration and para-military training, communications, and counter-intelligence, plus one secretary and one translator.

19. The initial cost of increasing police personnel strength to 4,000 is roughly estimated at $3 million and annual maintenance costs thereafter at $5 million. Laos now contributes $1 million for the police forces from its regular budget. Initial equipment required to get the project under way is estimated at $107,000. Approval of the police training program has been given in principle by both Washington and the field.

20. Military Assistance. Prior to January 1, 1955, the Lao military forces received assistance through the French under the direct forces support program for the Associated States of Indochina. Since January 1, all forms of United States aid are given directly to Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam. Under the FY 1955 program, it is estimated that Laos will be furnished $10 million for importation of commodities for direct consumption by its armed forces and $30 million in budgetary support for the military establishment. Similar support in FY 1956 is estimated at $42 million.

21. Equipment for both the gendarmérie, still part of the Army, and the regular armed forces was given to Laos as part of the over-all MDA program for Indochina until negotiation of the Geneva Accords. Necessary replacement and maintenance equipment and supplies will henceforth be furnished directly, in so far as possible, from surplus stocks in Viet-Nam.

V. Political Factors Bearing on Internal Security Programs and Feasibility of U.S. Assistance.

22. Although the Lao Government has only recently begun to recognize the problem of subversion as distinct from the military threat posed by the Pathet Lao, it is expected that the proposed full-scale police training program will be welcome. Pathet Lao intransigence, accompanied by armed attacks on National Army posts in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and reports of continued popular apprehension in other areas, particularly those formerly occupied by the Viet Minh, have begun to awaken the Royal Government to the internal security problem.

23. Seeing strength in numbers, the Lao Government, for such political reasons as the Pathet Lao control of two provinces and the elections tentatively scheduled for August 1955, wishes to delay reduction of its Army to the level deemed adequate by United States representatives for maintaining the internal security of Laos. The Legation at Vientiane has been instructed to urge the Government to reduce the Army while simultaneously building up the police services as suggested by the Engle-Page survey. The police program would have the advantage of permitting United States training if conducted by non-military personnel, whereas training the National Army is the prerogative of the French Military Mission. The Lao Government has accepted the police project in principle.

24. Sharply aware of its vulnerability to Communist aggression and of its inability to counter such aggression alone, the Lao Government strongly relies on regional security arrangements, particularly the Manila Pact. With reference to the police training program, Thailand would be involved in the para-military training phase. Since Thailand is a member of the Manila Pact, because the Lao government is aware of the magnitude of United States financial and technical support of Thailand, and owing to ethnic and linguistic ties between the two countries, it is anticipated that Laos would be highly receptive to a regional arrangement which would improve its internal security capability without detracting from its sovereignty.

25. In any discussion of foreign assistance to Laos, French sensitivity to possible charges of violation of the Geneva Accords or to any real or imagined threat to the French position must be considered. Assurance that the police program is strictly a civil undertaking should lay the Geneva spectre to rest. The threat to French “presence” is more serious, but it is possible that French objections to a large-scale internal security services program would be pro forma, inasmuch as the Geneva Agreement prohibition against the introduction of foreign military personnel other than a specified number of French eliminates the possibility of American training of the Lao National Army.

VI. Recommendations

26. In recognition of the urgency of the situation confronting the Kingdom of Laos and the importance of this territory to the relative security of Southeast Asia as a whole, it is recommended that the following measures be implemented on a priority basis by services or agencies concerned:

27. That the agreed recommendations contained in the ICA police survey be implemented. In connection with this program any para-military training to be provided police services should be limited to that appropriate to armed police, constabulary, or gendarmérie and not be so extensive as to lead police-type forces into duplicating the role of the armed forces.

Responsible Agency: ICA

Timing: Immediately

Cost: $4,000,000, of which $2,000,000 is presently programmed and $2,000,000, including hard goods, not presently programmed.

28. That the Army be reduced to the United States-recommended level, with a concomitant build-up of police services, and that military end-items be provided to police services as required.

Responsible Agencies: State, Defense, ICA

Timing: As soon as possible

Cost: As determined in regular programming process.

29. That the USIA program for Laos give appropriate emphasis to the development of public support for the internal security forces.

Responsible Agency: USIA

Timing: Continuing.

30. Recognizing that recovery of the two penetrated provinces through military action is unlikely: (1) Continue to exert moral and political pressure on the Communists through the ICC, the Indian Government, the signatories to the Geneva Agreements, and eventually the United Nations; (2) Encourage and support continued discreet reinforcement of Royal forces in the two provinces, with a view to holding these Government-occupied areas and possibly extending them.

Responsible Agency: State

Timing: Continuing.

31. While this study is designed to focus directly on increasing the effectiveness of internal security forces and to exclude related matters, it is believed that the following measures, under the present economic assistance program, may have a favorable effect on the internal security situation: (1) Relief to the needy, which is urgent; (2) Transportation and communications to assist in political control; (3) Village programs; (4) Agricultural aid.

Responsible Agency: ICA

Timing: As soon as possible.

32. Recognizing the potential of the tribal groups in northern Laos, influence the Lao government to establish friendlier relations with these elements. Concomitantly, influence the tribal elements to accept the authority of the Lao government. With the accomplishment of the above, furnish covert armed support to selected tribal elements and to other carefully selected local civilians in the two disputed provinces.

Responsible Agency: State

Timing: Continuing.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 61 D 385, Laos Documents. Top Secret. According to a cover sheet to this analysis, the Board concurred with the analysis and recommendations set forth below at its December 21 meeting, with the following procedures:

   “Noted that specific amounts of funds required will be subject to the normal programming and budgetary procedures.

   “Agreed that implementation of recommendations should be carried out in the same manner as the implementation of courses of action in Outline Plans of Operations.

   “Noted that while agency responsibilities for implementing specific recommendations are specified in the paper, the International Cooperation Administration will assume over-all leadership in the implementation of the program inasmuch as it has coordinating responsibility for the Mutual Security Program, and will make reports and recommendations to the Board from time to time as appropriate.”

   This analysis was sent to Ambassador Yost in Laos under cover of a letter from Hoover, January 13, 1956. (Department of State, Central Files, 751J.5/1–1356)

2. Regarding NSC Action No. 1290–d, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. II, Part 1, p. 844, footnote 10.