Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

258. Despatch From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Department of State¹

No. 221

Phnom Penh, January 17, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Year-End Examination of United States Policy Toward Cambodia [Here follows a table of contents.]

SUMMARY

The principal objective of United States policy toward Cambodia is the maintenance of Cambodia’s independence and its denial to the Communist bloc. Both the military and the economic aid programs were undertaken for the furtherance of this objective. The natural corollaries of this basic policy are, on the economic side, the fostering of Cambodia’s ability to support itself and, on the political side, the encouragement of pro-West attitudes and counteracting of pro-Communist tendencies.

Cambodia’s neutrality has in its practical application followed a tacking course, in order to avoid a too close association with either bloc. This tacking has been primarily determined, however, by the largely subjective reactions of Prince Sihanouk’s tacking to the left during 1956, as manifested in his tour of Communist capitals, laid the basis for all Sino-Soviet bloc activities in Cambodia during 1957.

During the past year the Communist bloc has exerted a sustained effort to follow up and consolidate the advantages gained during 1956. Diplomatic and economic aid missions have been established; a succession of top ranking Communist officials, cultural missions and sports delegations have visited Cambodia; economic aid and trade agreements have been promoted; and direct efforts at internal subversion have been initiated, especially in the press and education fields.

As a result of the bloc activities, the situation in Cambodia has clearly deteriorated, from an internal security point of view, during 1957. On the other hand, there has been evidence during the year of increasing awareness by the Cambodian leadership, notably by Prince Sihanouk, of the potential dangers of Communist activities, and there have been beginnings of measures to control subversion. There was substantially increased evidence of this greater awareness toward the end of the year and at the start of 1958.

In the short run, the situation in Cambodia is still not alarming; the population as a whole remains strongly Buddhist, loyal to the monarchy and united under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk, and it has not yet been heavily subjected to Communist influence. The subversive threat, however, has unquestionably increased during 1957 and has begun to have an effect. In the long run, the great danger is that the extension of Communist influence may outrun such countermeasures as the Cambodians may be prepared and able to take to meet the threat.

The continuation of United States military and economic assistance to Cambodia is still in the Embassy’s view the only means of achieving the United States objective of the maintenance of Cambodia’s independence. On the political side, efforts must be continued to stimulate Cambodian awareness of the dangers of Communist subversion; in the public affairs field, our activities should be focused during 1958 on the elite and on youth categories, with particular attention to the non-French-language press and student activities. In the aid field, our aid must be maintained on a preclusive basis in sensitive areas from which it is essential that Communist influence be excluded. In the less sensitive fields, however, present aid levels will be reduced automatically by the completion of major current projects, and any new projects in these fields should be on a smaller scale.

United States Policy and the United States Effort²

The principal aim of United States policy toward Cambodia is to assist it in the maintenance and consolidation of its independence. This policy was set forth succinctly in the Secretary’s letter of April 17, 1956, to the Cambodian Minister of Foreign Affairs,³ which stated in part:

“United States policy in Cambodia is based on a simple precept: that is, the United States through its military and economic aid programs seeks to assist the Cambodian Government in its endeavor to maintain the sovereign independence of the Kingdom …⁴ Although the United States believes that the free nations can most effectively meet the threat of Communist aggression through collective defense, nevertheless United States policy recognizes that certain countries, though determined to defend themselves against aggression or subversion of their independence, have preferred not to join regional security arrangements. That choice we respect.”

United States policy thus accepts Cambodia’s neutrality as a fact that is not likely to change in the foreseeable future, and is based on the assumption that the maintenance of a genuinely independent, genuinely neutral Cambodia is under the existing possibilities in the interest of the United States. Both the military aid program and the economic aid program, the major part of which is devoted to defense support, were undertaken in order to further this basic objective.

A corollary to our basic policy is the United States effort to foster the development of Cambodia’s ability to support itself, in line with Cambodia’s own aspirations, and thus ultimately to eliminate the need for foreign assistance. This aspect of United States policy is implemented by those parts of the economic aid program that are designed to create new and expanded sources of income and to bring about an improvement in the Cambodian Government’s administrative, budgetary, and fiscal methods in order to increase steadily the capability of the Government to finance its own budget.

A second corollary to the basic United States policy in Cambodia is to encourage any possible strengthening of pro-West attitudes and policies and to discourage pro-Soviet bloc tendencies. Cambodian “neutrality” is a fluctuating phenomenon; and in the effort to assume a “neutral” posture between the rival power blocs the Cambodian political leadership has in fact opened the country to influences from all sides. Since the beginning of 1956, the Sino-Soviet bloc has exerted a massive effort to take advantage of this situation, to establish its own influence and to give Cambodian neutrality a pro-Communist slant. Independent of its own decision the West is engaged in all-out competition with the Sino-Soviet bloc in all fields in a new country which is in an extremely exposed position and which has a thoroughly inexperienced political leadership and administration and a highly impressionable population, the majority of which is being exposed to literacy for the first time and is therefore not capable of adopting a critical attitude toward what it reads in the press.

[Here follow sections on Cambodian neutrality, the Communist Bloc effort in Cambodia, and the situation in 1957.]

Prospects

There is no likelihood of any change in the basic Cambodian policy of neutrality. The original motivations of the policy, the avoidance of the big power struggle, the removal of any justification for aggression by either bloc, the aversion to Thailand and to South Vietnam, and the desire for self-assertion and for a genuine national independence, are still valid from the Cambodian point of view. The policy seems to have more than paid off as it now appears to the Cambodians; foreign aid is being received from both sides and there is little feeling that such aid, since it is received “without strings,” presents any serious danger. Furthermore, Cambodia has by now become irrevocably committed to the policy of neutrality and has formalized it in Cambodian law;⁵ and it has been totally identified with Prince Sihanouk and played up as one of his greatest personal achievements.

In the practical application of neutrality, Cambodian official policy can probably be expected to settle down on a much more even course as compared to the extreme tacking toward the Communist bloc during 1956 and the tacking back during 1957. There will inevitably continue to be some amount of unpredictable and erratic veering of policy, since it cannot be expected that there will be any fundamental change in Sihanouk’s personality and modes of action. How significant such veering will be will depend in large part on the pressures to which Sihanouk believes that he is subject. Within the framework of neutrality, it is still highly possible that some actions may be taken which will further increase the existing Communist threat; foremost among these would be any moves toward formal recognition of Communist China or North Vietnam. The future development of relations with South Vietnam, which will in turn greatly effect Cambodia’s relations with other countries of the region in both camps, is at the end of 1957 one of the major questions outstanding; and the improvement of Cambodian-South Vietnamese relations will continue to be one of the major subsidiary objectives of United States policy in the area.

During 1957 a solid basis has been laid by the Communist bloc for the consolidation and strengthening of its position and for the increasing exertion of subversive influences. The non-military internal threat to Cambodian independence from the Communist bloc can be expected to increase steadily.

There has been a beginning during 1957 of awareness on the part of the Cambodian leaders of the magnitude of the Communist effort; and the meaning of the massive “cultural” efforts, of the polemics, particularly in the local Chinese papers, and most recently of the activities of the visiting North Vietnamese delegations has not been lost on the more alert of Cambodian officials. There is unquestionably, however, far too little awareness as yet of the subversive potential of the Communist forces. The steps taken so far to counteract Communist influence and to improve the mechanisms for combating subversion, although encouraging, are far from sufficient to meet the existing dangers. Furthermore, the Government’s general administrative ineffectiveness places an inherent limitation on the effectiveness of implementation of any positive actions that may be decided upon at a higher level.

For the short run the situation in Cambodia, while serious because of the above factors, is not yet alarming. It remains a fact that the population as a whole is thoroughly loyal to the Monarchy and that it has not yet been heavily subjected to direct Communist influence; that whatever the weaknesses of the political leadership and of the administration, the country is united behind Prince Sihanouk, with the exception of the minorities and parts of the elite and intelligentsia; and that there are few active sources of serious political discontent on the part of general population. However, this is true only in the short run. In the long run the prospects are in favor of a steady increase of Communist influences and subversive activities against which there has been only a beginning of countermeasures sufficient to meet the dangers. One of the major continuing objectives of American policy must be to alert the Cambodian leadership to a realization of these dangers and of the necessity to institute effective countermeasures. To do so without seeming to contravene the Cambodian policy of neutrality will be difficult.

Recommendations for United States Policy

There has been no fundamental change in the premises on which United States policy toward Cambodia was originally based. The primary objective of the United States continues to be the maintenance of Cambodia’s independence and its denial to the Communists. The alternatives for American policy remain approximately the same as they were at the time of the formation of SEATO.

The alternatives open to the United States for 1958 appear to be as follows:

1. To take a much stiffer line with the RKG, seeking to force it to assume a more strongly pro-Occidental position.

2. To withdraw or substantially to reduce our interest in Cambodia, on the ground that it is not avowedly in the anti-Communist camp.

3. To continue the present middle policy of assisting Cambodia in the maintenance of its independence.

As for the first alternative, the application of pressure on Cambodia to take a more strongly pro-Western position, the same factors are as valid today as at time SEATO was founded. Cambodia has chosen a policy of neutrality which it is determined to maintain. Even if the SEATO program were to be so evolved as to provide strong incentives of a non-military nature, it is virtually to be excluded that such incentives could ever outweigh Cambodia’s political antagonism to the organization as such or to any political association with its neighbors of the region. Even if much more effective action may in the future be taken in controlling the internal Communist threat, Cambodia’s foreign policy may be expected to continue to be based on maintaining the appearance of strict neutrality.

In these circumstances any pressure applied by the United States for a change in Cambodian policy could only be counterproductive, as the experience of 1955–56 proved clearly. The objective would not be achieved, and much would be lost in the process of attempting it. Thus, this alternative cannot be considered as a possible course of action.

The second alternative is to withdraw or substantially to reduce United States interest in Cambodia, on the ground that it has followed and will undoubtedly continue to follow a policy of strict neutrality and consequently makes no contribution to United States collective security objectives. This alternative would involve principally a withdrawal or sharp reduction of United States aid. Its adoption would imply our acceptance of the likelihood that Cambodia will drift into the control of the Communists.

The most recent proposals of this sort have been put forth in relation to the overall reduction in United States aid funds available for fiscal year 1958. It has been suggested that aid to Cambodia be cut proportionally more than that accorded to SEATO allies of the United States, both in order to warn Cambodia of the consequences of neutralism and to demonstrate to SEATO countries that there are material advantages to be gained from their participation in collective security arrangements. Such proposals in regard to Cambodia have been made both by Thai Prime Minister Pote Sarasin and by President Diem to the American Ambassadors in Bangkok and Saigon. (Bangkok telegrams 1641 to Department, repeated info Phnom Penh 115, December 3, 1957,⁶ and 1714 to Department, repeated info Phnom Penh 116, December 12, 1957;⁷ Saigon telegram 1212 to Department, December 7, 1957⁸).

All such proposals must be considered in the light of our basic objective of maintaining Cambodia independence, which is in turn vital to Thailand and South Vietnam. At the time the United States began to furnish aid to Cambodia, there was no real basis to expect a change in Cambodia’s foreign policy; Cambodian neutrality was accepted as one of the premises on which U.S. policy was based. Later, at the time of Cambodia’s acceptance of Chinese Communist aid, the question arose as to whether United States aid should be withdrawn or reduced correspondingly. The possibility was rejected, since it would have represented an automatic surrender to the objectives of the Communist bloc. It remains equally true today that any withdrawal or sharp reduction of aid would constitute a direct reversal of past policy and would automatically result in an increase in the force of the Communist threat and a correspondingly decreased ability to achieve United States objectives. This would in turn inure to the direct detriment of both South Vietnam and Thailand which might in the end find themselves outflanked.

In view of the well-demonstrated Cambodian sensitivity to the use of aid as a political weapon, a withdrawal or sharp reduction of aid could also be expected to have a seriously detrimental effect on responsible Cambodian opinion. At the worst, this could lead easily to an irrational general reaction against the United States and the development of even closer relations with the Communist bloc. Prince Sihanouk is determined, for example, to accord priority to the maintenance of the armed forces. (This determination was strongly emphasized by Sihanouk in his meeting with the Ambassador on May 11, 1957. See Despatch 373, May 21, 1957.⁹) Although the acceptance of Communist assistance for the armed forces would probably be viewed with strong misgivings, it might well be the only possible alternative, from the Cambodian point of view, if American aid were substantially reduced.

With regard to both the first and second alternatives, which contemplate a marked change in present policy, it should also be pointed out that our present policy is now showing signs of bringing results. The Prince’s outspoken speeches in Paris last fall and at the National Congress this January show an awakening on his part to the realities of Communism. These speeches have already begun to have their effect. They were, for example, followed by the first anti-Communist “demonstration” in Cambodia on January 10, 1958.

The third alternative is the continuation of the present policy with such modifications in implementation as current developments make desirable. This is in the Embassy’s view the only means of achieving United States objectives in Cambodia.

It is not necessary to explain or to defend herein the present policy, on the political side, of maintaining our efforts to check subversion and to make responsible Cambodians aware of the danger. In the political and public affairs fields our efforts during 1958 should be focused on the principal Cambodian target groups, the elite and youth (in the student, Buddhist, military and young Government official categories). In our own activities, we should find means of fostering a less Communist-dominated non-French-language press and of exerting our influence on Cambodian youth, especially in the schools. For the latter purpose we should, for example, increase our contacts with student groups, provide specially-designed Americana programs for them in our Information Centers, and perhaps even develop a different or expanded pattern for our English-teaching program. We should attempt also to get more American, French-speaking lecturers who can address student groups. Although these activities will require careful review in order to avoid working at cross purposes with French cultural and education activities, it is essential that the United States also play a more active role. In the long run, the degree of our success in the cultural and educational field will play a large part in determining the degree to which Western influence in Cambodia is preserved and strengthened and Communist influence neutralized.

On the aid side, in order to achieve our basic objectives our programs must be continued as indicated below, especially in sensitive areas from which it is essential that Communist influence be excluded, although in the less sensitive economic areas, substantial cuts are already contemplated.

Continuation of the aid programs is required, first of all, not only in order to supply to Cambodia the physical resources necessary for it to maintain its own independence, internal security, and economic stability, but also in order to enable us to maintain our own influence so that we can exert a continuing positive political effort to counteract the influence of the Communist bloc and to stimulate the Cambodian leadership to take effective measures to counteract its subversive efforts. The maintenance of the United States position in Cambodia depends to an important extent on the maintenance of American military and economic aid programs.

Secondly, there are certain sensitive areas such as the army, the police, public administration, education, information, and agricultural extension and cooperatives, from which Communist influence should be precluded. By sensitive areas we mean those in which infiltration by the Communists would result either in a serious internal security threat or an increased capability on the part of the Communists to influence large segments of the population. We should not attempt to exclude the Soviet bloc from all fields in which we are now furnishing economic aid, since such an attempt would be fruitless and since it would result in a tailoring of our own programs to fit the Communist efforts. (This must apply even in the education field, to those essentially non-sensitive projects contemplated in the Chinese aid program for the construction of schools and teacher housing.) In the sensitive areas, however, our aid must be maintained at such a level as to preserve the preclusive position of the West. Although our programs should still be accompanied by a continued effort to have the Cambodians themselves assume an increasingly greater share of the financial burden, this should not be pushed to a point where Communist intrusion would be invited.

In the military aid field, the pay and allowances programs for the years 1958–62 have been projected on the assumption that the Cambodian Government will progressively increase its military budget contribution by 10% annually, from a 1957 base of $10 million. This would of course result automatically in a progressive reduction in United States aid required for the maintenance of the Cambodian armed forces.

In the other economic fields, as indicated by the USOM five-year projection, we already contemplate substantial cuts in the scale of present programs. The overall level of economic aid will be lowered substantially after the virtual completion during fiscal year 1958 of the Kompong Som port highway and the Barai Occidental irrigation project. These projects, which now account for the major part of United States non-military aid to Cambodia, need not and should not be replaced by other major capital projects. No large industrialization program should be undertaken in the near future, but encouragement should be given to small industry and to some moderate-sized industrial projects.

The possibility should be reserved, at the same time, to propose such projects of a special political-impact nature (which also have economic development significance) as circumstances may warrant. One possible project of this sort would be the establishment of a technical high school, for which a total of approximately $5 million would be required over a period of five years. It is in the field of education that we are most clearly in agreement with the Cambodians, and any new, major project decided upon might therefore well be in this field.

In summary, the Embassy recommends the continuation of the present United States policy of providing military and economic assistance to Cambodia as the only means of achieving the United States objective of the maintenance of Cambodia’s independence and its denial to the Communists. On the political side, efforts to increase Cambodian awareness of the dangers of Communist subversion must be continued, and the principal political and public affairs effort during 1958 focused on the elite and youth categories, with particular attention to the non-French-language press and to student activities. In the aid field, aid must be maintained on a preclusive basis in the sensitive areas: the army, the police, public administration, education, information, and agricultural extension and cooperatives. In the less sensitive economic areas cuts will automatically result from the completion of current major projects and any new, political-impact projects that may be planned should be on a smaller scale.

This despatch is concurred in by the Country Team.

Carl W. Strom

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.51H/1–758. Secret. Drafted by Gordon G. Heiner, Second Secretary and Consul at Phnom Penh. A note at the end of the despatch requested the following distribution:

   “The Department is requested to send copies of this despatch to ICA/W, Defense and USIA; to the Embassies in Bangkok, Canberra, Djakarta, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Phnom Penh (10), Rangoon, Saigon, Seoul, Taipei, Tokyo, and Vientiane; to the Consulates General at Hong Kong, and Singapore; and to POLAD CINCPAC.”

2. U.S. objectives are summarized in OCB Outline Plan of Action with respect to Cambodia, April 10, 1957, Section I–B–1. [Footnote in the source text. The Outline Plan is printed as Document 254.]
3. The letter was transmitted in Document 235. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 30, 1956, pp. 727–728.
4. Ellipsis in the source text.
5. The Cambodian Neutrality Law of November 6, 1957.
6. Not printed. (Ibid., 611.51J/12357)
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 611.51J/12–1257)
8. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.11/12–757)
9. Not printed. (Ibid., 751H.5–MSP/5–2157)