240. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson1
SUBJECT
- Plans and Operations to Reverse Cambodian Neutralism
Discussion
1. Since my return from Southeast Asia, including a two-day visit in Phnom Penh, I have been mulling over possible ways and means of improving the deteriorating position of the United States in Cambodia and reversing the leftward, excessive neutralist trend. The whole issue boils down to whether or not we continue to form our policy around Sihanouk’s power position, with such modifications of policy and operations as may be required. …
4. I have just discussed this problem at some length with Col. Lansdale who has been in Washington for a day or two after having made a trip to Phnom Penh. His analysis is as follows:
- (a)
- We should operate on the hypothesis of Sihanouk’s power with a view to bringing him back to a more balanced position, which Lansdale and others think is possible. We should deploy our assets to woo and win Sihanouk back to a pro-American viewpoint, for example, by visits of prominent Americans to Cambodia. The Cambodian armed forces may become a useful political instrument or element to be taken into account.
- (b)
- ….
Recommendations
5. Accordingly, I put up for your consideration the following courses of action for Cambodia and the neighboring area:
- (a)
- A small-scale crash program designed immediately to invigorate present programs. U.S. staff in Cambodia should be reviewed to obtain the best qualified personnel. We should greatly simplify, accelerate, and improve our aid procedures along the lines of the Sessions Report. State and ICA should quickly put the general principles of this study into effect. We should get a new Ambassador selected, appointed and located in Phnom Penh just as soon as possible and [Page 528] before the return of Sihanouk, if feasible. The appropriate agencies should go all out to bring several Cambodian leaders to the U.S. for short visits. By the same token, the Exchange of Persons program with Cambodia should be expanded and accelerated. There are now only two Cambodian students in the U.S. Additional efforts should be made to develop U.S. training of Cambodian armed forces for they could be an important stabilizing factor in Cambodia, as CINCPAC has recognized in his 191143Z.2 This is only the sketch of what a small crash program can be. In any event I believe that it will require the initiative of this Bureau either with the Secretary or Under Secretary, or through the OCB, with the operating agencies.
- (c)
- The stand-by plans for selective reduction in U.S. aid to Cambodia if any or all of the above plans and operations fail. Aspects of this matter are now being studied in State and ICA in response to a Country Team message from Cambodia on May 31. Such steps also involve the Sessions recommendations.
- (d)
- Cambodia cannot be divorced from Southeast Asia. For the area of neighboring Cambodia, a little Chiefs of Mission meeting should be held in August or September so that the common problems could be discussed by our Ambassadors in Burma, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam, with Durbrow and Wright3 from Singapore and Malaya participating. By that time Satterthwaite4 and Parsons will have arrived at their posts and our Ambassadors in Southeast Asia will be present and accounted for. I would suggest that you, Mr. Sebald or Mr. Jones attend such a meeting which could be held in Baguio or Hong Kong. In the case of the latter spot, I understand that Mr. Drumright has just returned from a tour of Southeast Asia which he took as his vacation on a personal basis. His quarters in Hong Kong would adequately serve for such a meeting and might be less conspicuous than holding such a meeting within the area itself.
- (e)
- The establishment of some kind of a small staff in Southeast Asia … on behalf of the joint benefit of all U.S. missions in the area…. If we had a political adviser with CINCPAC in Honolulu, such a staff might be physically located there and operate under his supervision in Southeast Asia according to the urgency and priority of our problems in each country. Admittedly, this is an unbaked suggestion needing study and refinement to find the best administrative and operational formula, if it is sound in principle. My several trips to Southeast Asia have convinced me that U.S. missions there operate much too separately from each other and lack effective intercommunications and interrelations. Instead, their lines go vertically back to Washington but not horizontally to each other. With the Russian-Chinese thrust into Southeast Asia, the U.S. should tighten its organization. It should also greatly improve the quality of its personnel in all of these countries.