Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

236. Letter From the Ambassador in Cambodia (McClintock) to the Director of the Office of Southeast Asian Affairs (Young)¹

Phnom Penh, May 2, 1956.

Dear Ken: As indicated in my telegram 1473,² we are in general agreement with the thoughtful memorandum which you submitted to Walter Robertson on April 14³ outlining a series of courses of action which might be taken in seeking to redress our position in Cambodia.

I remain convinced that our policy toward Cambodia can be achieved by diplomacy. I have never varied in the belief that the U.S. must, and can, deny the lower basin of the Mekong occupied by Cambodia to Communist penetration. Likewise, my enunciation of our policy to achieve this end has never varied: namely to assist Cambodia by a judicious economic and military aid program to maintain its independence. It deserves to be emphasized that this policy is accepted by all recent and likely future Cambodian governments and by Prince Sihanouk himself.

On one other point I have also, thus far, been consistent. This has been to advocate strong support of Prince Sihanouk on the ground that he has been the one man controlling Cambodia and is himself anti-Communist as far as his own country is concerned….

It is quite true that Prince Sihanouk has an almost universal popular appeal in Cambodia. However, this is very much like the reflection of the sunlight on water and depends to a great deal on the support of the thin veneer of the elite. One does not have to go very far out of Phnom Penh to see what the Cambodian people are made of. They are cheerful, easily impressed … people, whose only loyalties are to the Royal Family and to its local representation, the Mekum or village headman, and to the Buddhist church. Although they come out in multitudes to approve the Prince when he storms through their villages …, they do not really understand what he says in matters of high policy and approve simply because it is a centuries-old tradition to approve what the King says.

Summarizing, then, we have gone through the first course of action set out in your paper, and this has been successful. There is no need at present to embark upon the second course, at least not unless the Prince pipes up again to deprive us of the gains we have made recently. If that happens, I believe the second course you outlined should be resorted to immediately—preferably before the visit here of Chou En-lai in June and not afterward. If the efforts of the present government to improve relations with the U.S. are again sabotaged by the Prince, we should move quickly to obtain from the King and Queen an expression of Cambodian policy toward the U.S. and toward U.S. aid.

As regards the third course of action, while I would be happy to be recalled to Washington for consultation I think I should warn you that this would not necessarily be interpreted here as a demonstration of American firmness. It might more likely be interpreted as a disavowal of my person, and this impression could only be effaced if we were really prepared to get tough toward Cambodia. I am glad to note that even if we were to taper off economic aid in this contingency, you are not recommending a reduction of military aid. In this regard, I have already expressed my views to Admiral Stump (cf. Embtel 1268, March 30⁴).

Cheers,

ROB

1. Source: Department of State, FE–SEA Cambodia Files: Lot 59 D 630, Cambodian Correspondence, 1956–1957. Secret; Official–Informal.
2. Dated May 1, not printed. (Ibid., Central Files, 110.4–PSA/5–156)
3. Document 233.
4. Printed as Document 231.