Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

231. Telegram From the Embassy in Cambodia to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Stump)¹

Phnom Penh, March 30, 1956—3 p.m.

17. Personal for Admiral Stump from McClintock. I have taken liberty of repeating your message 280280Z to Department² as I know with what respect your views are held in Washington.

I fully share feeling exasperation which you so graphically express at recent antics Prince Sihanouk who until recently was “Mister Cambodia” …. It is tempting make example of him, particularly when neighboring countries of SEA ask why we continue aid such country as Cambodia when stauncher friends who have taken risks in international scene for mutual cause in defense free world receive relatively less aid than Cambodia.

There are however, certain considerations which convince me that if we hold steadfast and continue our present policies we will be acting in true strategic interests US. My policy in Cambodia since day I arrived here has been simple and concise. It is assist Cambodia remain independent. Our objective is deny this area of Mekong Basin to Communist penetration.

Despite antics and shrill impromptu speeches Sihanouk, Cambodia is still without Communist taint. Its simple peasants are devoted to monarchy, and no one in royal family, including Prince Sihanouk, doubts that royal house would last one day after Communists took over. Therefore all leaders of this country and their followers are basically anti-Communist.

If we should divert our aid other clients, average Cambodian peasant would be very little worse off than he is now. The reason Cambodians went serenely through Japanese occupation and eight subsequent years war was that bulk population lives on so low level that it did not even notice absence goods and services which would seem essential to more sophisticated society. In consequence, so far as bulk of nation is concerned we can stop economic aid tomorrow and amounts rice and fish placed in stomachs of Cambodian peasants will remain same. However sudden “let’s show them” stoppage of aid would have sweeping political repercussions both here and in Asia generally which might do us much more harm than good. For example, Chou En-lai and Mikoyan³ would be delighted if our aid programs stopped entirely.

Moreover, if we should stop military assistance we would find army of 35,000 vigorous and not highly principled young men with guns in their hands suddenly placed out of job. This army would then become objective either of local bandit chiefs vying for power, or more probably Viet Minh who have had long experience over variety clandestine lines communication in supplying arms and other logistical support various regions in Cambodia. I am convinced that, if we withdraw military aid this country, we would be handing Cambodian strategic area to Communists in short order. This would then confront us in SEA with important central portion Mekong Basin, controlling land routes between Thailand and South Vietnam and between South Vietnam and Laos in enemy hands. This, I submit, is not to our over-all strategic interest. It should likewise be borne in mind that although Cambodia is neutralist country, it is only neutralist nation on earth which has USMAAG and which is bound to US by MDAP agreement. This might be classified as political paradox or minor miracle, but I assure you anything is possible in Cambodia, including possibility retaining this country on side free world.

It seems to us that basic issue is not whether Cambodia is neutralist or more positively in Western bloc, but whether Cambodia can be denied to Communism. I am less concerned about Cambodia joining SEATO than that it maintain armed neutrality against Communist aggression with American aid.

It is possible, and even probable, in view Prince Sihanouk’s recent pronouncements and consequent reactions thereto in American press, that our Congress will wish take second look at our aid programs in Cambodia and that total our aid next year will not be as large as it is now. Washington has already anticipated this trend by appointing well-qualified study group to visit Cambodia next month for purpose re-examining our aid programs, both military and economic. In consequence, it is not for me to offer recommendations concerning these programs until this study group has commenced its survey.

However, I have no doubt at all, and in this country team concurs, that by wise management of both our economic and military assistance programs Cambodia can be effectively assisted remain independent and denied to Communism, which after all, is our ultimate policy goal in this country.

McClintock

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.11/3–3056. Secret. Repeated to the Department as telegram 1268, which is the source text.
2. Transmitted in telegram 1270 from Phnom Penh, supra.
3. Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, Deputy Premier of the Soviet Union and member of the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, was currently touring South and East Asia.