186. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 14, 19551
SUBJECT
- Military Assistance and Training in Cambodia
PARTICIPANTS
- The Secretary
- Couve de Murville, French Ambassador
- Mr. Livingston T. Merchant
- Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr.
The French Ambassador came in to inform the Secretary today regarding French views on the above subject, before the Secretary left for Bangkok2 because the French would speak to him about it there. In answer to the Secretary’s question, Couve de Murville said [Page 425] he did not know who would represent France at Bangkok but was sure that it would be the Foreign Minister, perhaps Edgar Faure.
The Secretary said that at one time it had been planned to have a discussion about this and other matters in Bangkok with Sir Anthony Eden and the French representative. He asked the French Ambassador what exactly was the French point of view on this question of training in Cambodia.
The Ambassador replied that the only difficult question was whether France or the US would have the responsibility for conducting training in Cambodia. He said that it was very disturbing to have this issue raised because Indochina is an important part of Southeast Asia. The French understood that the US proposal was patterned on the arrangements agreed to in Viet-Nam. However, the French do not believe Cambodia is the same as Viet-Nam. The French still feel that they should keep the French training mission there and are prepared to pay its costs. They do not believe that a US training mission is desirable. It would not be completely in keeping with the spirit of the Geneva Accords. It would raise political difficulties for France in Cambodia and elsewhere.
As to costs, the Ambassador made clear that he was not speaking of the costs for maintaining Cambodian forces. In answer to his inquiry on this point, Mr. Young stated that the estimate for maintaining Cambodian forces, not including costs of initial equipment was in the range of $40 to $60 million depending on how much the Cambodian Government itself dispersed. The equipment could be provided from stocks of American MDAP arms now in Viet-Nam and to be declared surplus. Including equipment, the cost of maintaining Cambodian forces could run between $100 and $200 million.
The Secretary stated that the US had to have some voice in the handling of US funds and equipment. How this could be worked out was not certain at this time. In any event the US was not seeking the total replacement of the French in Cambodia. He pointed to the language problem for the US there. On the other hand the Secretary pointed out, as these countries develop their sovereignty and independence and as US aid is given directly, the US must exercise controls for providing its aid on the same basis as with other sovereign independent countries. Some new formula has to be worked out in the case of Cambodia because it is not possible to go on as in the past when France was a sort of “overlord” of the area. During the period of hostilities there were various US-French arrangements for the support and development of indigenous armed forces. Those arrangements have all been blown up and fresh ones are necessary. The US must have a voice in the military policies it is to support. Otherwise it might not be possible to get the funds from Congress. Some compromise position is necessary. The Secretary emphasized [Page 426] that in this whole area of the Associated States France and the US must work together. He referred to the suggestion of Mendes-France last November that the United States should have primary responsibility there. The Secretary said he had rejected this concept and told Mendes-France that we do not wish to supplant France and that we must find ways to work together, for in some fields we must depend on the French. The Secretary cited the fine example of cooperation between Generals Ely and Collins.
The Secretary said he had no concrete proposal to suggest today but was sure that something could be worked out. While we have no desire for reasons of pride to substitute the United States for France, we are active in the three Associated States and do have a responsibility for producing satisfactory results. The Secretary said he would talk with the Defense Department regarding some compromise solution before departing for Bangkok.
The Ambassador assured the Secretary he did not wish to leave the impression that the French wish to get the United States out of the picture. On the contrary they would like to have the US there, but the difficulty is Cambodia is not the same as Viet-Nam. The King is commander-in-chief in Cambodia, not Ely. If the US takes over and directs the training in Cambodia then the French will be squeezed out. This will create real political difficulties.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751H.5–MSP/2–1455. Secret. Drafted by Young.↩
- Secretary Dulles was to attend the first session of the SEATO Council meetings at Bangkok, February 23–25. See Documents 16 ff.↩