Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

171. United States Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department of State, Washington, October 4, 1957, 10:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m. and 2:15–4:15 p.m.¹

ACM MC–1

Washington, October 4, 1957, 10:30 a.m.–12:45 p.m. and 2:15–4:15 p.m.

[Here follows a list of participants (26) at the meeting. The three delegations were led by Casey, Macdonald, and Dulles.]

The Secretary welcomed the delegations of Australia and New Zealand stating that it was a pleasure to join with them in another ANZUS meeting. He said that these meetings have proved useful in the past and that he was certain that it would prove useful to review at this time events in the world which concern the three nations, with special reference to the Far East. Continuing, the Secretary said that since there was no formal agenda he would if agreeable make a statement as at previous meetings giving his estimate of some of the situations in the world. The Secretary then proceeded as follows:

[Here follow the Secretary’s estimate of, and the Council’s discussion of, the situation in the Middle East.]

Japan. (Secret)—The Secretary stated that we had had a very useful visit to this country by Kishi,² who, in his opinion, is the strongest and most competent Prime Minister the Japanese have had since the war. The Prime Minister is making good-will with the United States the cardinal aspect of his foreign policy. The U.S. has worked out a number of matters with him designed to help him with his public relations as far as the United States is concerned. The U.S. is withdrawing all its ground combat troops within the next year. Although the Japanese wanted this to be done now that the U.S. is prepared to do it some are not happy about the decision. The Secretary believes that on balance, however, it will help.

The U.S. has also agreed to implement the Security Treaty with Japan so that it will be more balanced in fact. The Treaty is in effect a unilateral one, since it gives the U.S. the right to stay anywhere in Japan, to have bases anywhere and to remain as long as it desires. The U.S. did not undertake to defend Japan; Japan got nothing out of it. There has been some talk of replacing the treaty with a more normal security type treaty. Kishi, however, very wisely did not press for this because it would be very difficult for the United States to accede in view of Japan’s constitutional limitations to acceptance of any military obligations.

The U.S. and Japan have set up a joint committee in Tokyo with a view to discussing what actions are to be taken or should be taken under the treaty, thus giving the Japanese a feeling that the Treaty is not entirely unilateral and that they are voluntarily participating in its implementation. Two meetings have been held to date. This is an ingenious method for implementing the treaty thought of by Kishi.

On some matters the Japanese have pressed the U.S. very hard. They wanted additional authority on Okinawa. The U.S. thought it could not give in on that without starting a chain of events that would make its stay there precarious, possibly creating another Cyprus situation. The Secretary recalled the interests of the Governments of Australia and New Zealand in the Okinawa situation at the time of the negotiations of the Japanese Peace Treaty. He said the Japanese want to fly their flag in Okinawa and to participate in the civil administration of the island. The U.S. can see trouble looming there. The island is crowded. The civil authorities need more agricultural land and the military want more areas for landing fields. It cannot be said that the situation has stabilized but there is hope that it can be kept under control.

Another problem concerns the Bonin Islands which have been placed under U.S. trusteeship. Some of the Japanese who were moved from the islands by the Japanese themselves are now pressing to return. The U.S. cannot allow them to go back in view of its high security requirements in the islands. An effort is being made to work out a solution involving some form of compensation. Approximately 2600 Japanese are involved.

Minister Macdonald asked about the possibilities of the Japanese adopting a neutralist attitude. The Secretary commented that this is not likely unless the Socialists come to power. He said he had recently received some Japanese Socialist parliamentarians who indicated Japan would probably go neutralist if they came to power. In the Secretary’s opinion, however this would not necessarily follow. The Secretary said he had pointed out to the Socialists who called on him that United States policies toward Japan are such that any government coming into power would want to collaborate with the United States. The Secretary said he thought that if Japan were in economic difficulty and not able to trade they might as an act of desperation become neutralist but short of that there is little likelihood of that happening.

Ambassador Spender commented that in his opinion if a general war broke out Japan would stand aside to see which way things were going before determining its position.

Communist China. (Confidential)—The Secretary stated that the situation in Communist China indicates an appreciable amount of unrest there, although at the moment it does not appear to threaten the existence of the government. China, however, is a big country, and the possibility of outbreaks in some of the areas should not be overruled. Should such occur, the U.S. would seek to take advantage of them. (The Secretary referred to his June speech in San Francisco on “Our Policies Toward Communism in China”, a major policy statement approved by the President, and expressed the hope that the Foreign Ministers of Australia and New Zealand would read it, if they had not already done so.)

Republic of China. The Secretary said that the situation on Taiwan is satisfactory notwithstanding the recent riots about an incident involving a U.S. soldier. The riots are not thought to reflect any basic antagonism to the presence of U.S. forces there but are believed to have been related entirely to the incident itself. The Chinese Army is being built up more and more with Taiwanese, who constitute about a third of the present army. The relations between the Taiwanese and Mainlanders on the island are good, and the economy is good, with the gross national product having increased 72 percent since 1951. There is some concern as to what will happen when Chiang Kai-shek passes out of the picture. Mr. Herter and Mr. Richards were out there recently and Mr. Richards, who at the Secretary’s request made a special study of conditions on the island, feels there will be a peaceful transfer of power upon Chiang’s death, probably to the Vice President although there is a possibility that power may pass to Chiang’s son. The judgment of the Department at the moment, however, is that the present Vice President will succeed Chiang.

Minister Macdonald asked whether the Mainlanders on Taiwan have as high morale as they had in China or as that of those now on the Mainland. The Secretary said that the Mainlanders on Taiwan are being integrated very effectively. The Chinese Army today consists of about one-third Taiwanese and about two-thirds Mainlanders. The Taiwanese are not as eager to move to the Mainland as the Mainlanders, but they do form part of a well-disciplined force that will do whatever it is ordered to do.

Southeast Asia. (Secret)—The Secretary said that conditions have improved in Burma, Cambodia and Laos. There are growing signs that Burma is becoming more aware of the dangers of communism and is shifting to the West. In Cambodia also there is a growing awareness of this danger. The Secretary referred to a recent editorial in a leading Cambodian newspaper attacking the Soviet Government. In Laos the danger of an unacceptable compromise with the Pathet Laos has diminished. The Secretary said he was seeing the Foreign Minister of Laos on Sunday.³ There is hope for that situation.

In Viet Nam the situation is moving along in a normal way. In the economic field the fictitious exchange rates in Viet Nam and in Laos give rise to a situation favoring some individuals. The U.S. has been pressing Diem very hard to accept reevaluation of the currency. This situation makes it very difficult for the U.S. to maintain the necessary level of aid there. In the case of Korea a similar situation has improved to a considerable extent.

As to Thailand recent events show a degree of political instability. The new government does not appear to be anti-Western although it may be slightly more neutralist. The Prime Minister⁴ is strongly pro-Western but is probably no more than just a figurehead. He is not likely to continue in power after the elections. With that in mind the SEATO post is being kept open for him.

Indonesia. (Top Secret)—The Secretary stated that he would like to discuss Indonesia while Mr. Allen Dulles was present, and with the concurrence of the others, asked that he comment on conditions there.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that we felt that since Sukarno’s visit to Peking and Moscow⁵ he was coming increasingly under Soviet influence. It is not that he is a communist but that he apparently believes that he can use the communists. Since the elections in 1955 Indonesians have had a troubled political life primarily because no single party has a majority in parliament. That has created difficult governmental situations. Sukarno has felt that he could not make the system work and has devised what he terms “guided democracy”, which has played into the hands of the communists. He has established a National Council which has taken some of the powers of the cabinet and of parliament. As a result some Moslem elements, especially in the outer islands, have been dissatisfied. The situation has also developed to a point where some military leaders in Sumatra are not following the direction of the central government. They do come to Djakarta from time to time for discussions, as they recently did to attend the national conference. The national conference in Djakarta had no real results. We were afraid Sukarno might pull a trick and arrest the dissident leaders while they were in Djakarta but he did not. In the meantime the situation has somewhat worsened. The position of Hatta⁶ also has been weakened by his signing a declaration with Sukarno. Information we have received … is that Simbolon, Sumual and Hussein⁷ cannot tolerate a communist regime and are still in revolt. Sukarno evidently feels that he can let these revolting elements die on the vine. That is the situation as it stands today. The thinking here is that the break-up of Indonesia is not something to be sought but only to be accepted if part of Indonesia goes communist.

In reply to a question by Minister Casey as to whether decentralization should be encouraged, Mr. Allen Dulles said he thought not, but that the dissident leaders should be encouraged to maintain their position. There are still some strong points outside Java, such as Medan, under control of the central government. Also Simbolon and Hussein are finding it difficult to get arms for their forces. In the recent elections on Java, in which Sukarno abandoned the PNI, the strength of the PRI increased substantially. The communists are working closely with Sukarno.

Minister Casey asked whether the overall increase of communists in Java would not indicate that similar increases are possible in the elections in 1959, adding that the figures tend to upset the Australians.

Minister Macdonald asked whether it would be correct to say that the present situation in the outer islands has developed to some extent because of the smuggling undertaken in many cases by some of the army people, and whether Indonesia would not eventually have to come to some form of federation.

Mr. Allen Dulles replied in the affirmative, pointing out that it should be kept in mind, however, that Java is not economically viable.

Ambassador Spender asked whether Sukarno is still a key figure with the masses, and Mr. Allen Dulles replied that he has the greatest appeal to the population as a whole, although there are some indications that he is losing some of that appeal, especially among the Moslem elements. Ambassador Spender commented that the election figures suggest increasing political efficiency in the communist organization, with the chance that they will increase their position on Java. He asked if there were any internal forces which might tend to arrest this trend, and if so a) is there anything that the western world, especially the United States can do to help arrest it, and b) if not, had any thought been given to any action which might be taken, such as assisting the political organizations of the other parties. The greatest danger, he thought, was the weakness of the other parties.

Mr. Allen Dulles commented that if we consider Indonesia as a whole there is a chance to arrest the situation. If Java is considered alone, however, there seems to be nothing to stop Sukarno and the PKI from taking over.

Minister Casey, noting that the Masjumi and the NU are poorly organized—apparently for lack of personnel, funds and so on—asked if there is any way in which those parties might be helped by the United States, Australia or anybody else. Mr. Allen Dulles said something had been tried at the time of the elections of 1955 but that the Masjumi had not had, contrary to expectations, an organization at the grassroots level. He did not know if there is anything that can be done very quickly.

Minister Casey asked whether there is any fear that Indonesia will go communist by constitutional means. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that such is not the situation today. He said that some consideration has been given to extending some support to the outer island elements and unless something can be done for these elements they might wither on the vine as Sukarno wants them to.

Minister Casey stated that Subandrio⁸ had told an Australian officer at Kuala Lumpur that Indonesians don’t fear communism as we do and that they regard the continued existence of the Communist Party as a safeguard against Indonesia becoming smothered like Thailand. The Minister said his Government is very much disturbed as to what can be done about the situation in Indonesia apart from what can be done by the United States.

Mr. Robertson said that one factor not to be overlooked is that the animosity of the army officers toward Sukarno is not personal but political, it is in opposition to his taking communists into the government. The national conference attended by some of the dissident elements was in itself indicative that these elements want to keep the country together. …

Ambassador Spender asked if there is any machinery presently in existence, or which might be set up, to consider what can be done to arrest this situation. Mr. Allen Dulles stated that the matter has been under recent consideration by the highest levels of the United States Government.

Minister Macdonald asked the bearing on the situation of the technical assistance programs being extended bilaterally or under the Colombo Plan. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that these programs are very helpful, but their influence is very slow in being felt.

Minister Casey stated that the net effect of all this is very disturbing. The Australian Ambassador in Djakarta recently told him that if Sukarno would come out against communism it would wither away. He asked if there is any direction in which Australia can work to improve the situation.

The Secretary said that no conclusion had as yet been reached on whether the growth of communist influence on Java is so great that hope should be banked on the revolutionary elements. The time is fast approaching, however, when this decision will have to be made. The people in the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta feel that the situation has not reached the point where Sukarno would be unable to reverse his position. …

Minister Casey asked if Australia should concentrate its aid to Indonesia in the outer islands. Mr. Allen Dulles commented that the U.S. is considering such a course of action since while using the assistance on Java in an effort to turn Sukarno it is also important to keep the dissident elements alive and operating.

Mr. Robertson stated that Indonesians had often expressed to him their high appreciation for all the efforts of the Australian Government in Indonesia, which in many ways they appreciate more than the efforts of the United States. Minister Macdonald suggested that a word be added concerning the work being done in Indonesia by the Australian Christian Student Movement, in which New Zealand was planning to join. Minister Casey said that this is a small movement in which the students volunteer to go to Indonesia and live under Indonesian conditions, in Indonesian homes, and receive Indonesian salaries while teaching English and doing other work. All the Australian Government gives them is the fare and a bicycle. There are not many students but they have been well received.

Minister Casey asked General Wells what plans the Military Planners might have undertaken regarding Indonesia. General Wells said that the Military Planners had undertaken studies involving Indonesia covering four aspects: a) detailed study of communist personalities and sympathizers; b) detailed study of anti-communist personalities and sympathizers; c) safe areas; and d) up-to-date terrain studies. He said that papers (a) and (d) have been circulated in draft form and that paper (b) is about ready and will be circulated shortly.

Malaya. (Secret)—Minister Casey said he had received the definite impression in Kuala Lumpur that it would be unwise to seek publicly the admission of Malaya to SEATO at this time. He saw no reason, however, why private and confidential talks should not be undertaken with the Prime Minister and the Malayan Ambassador in Washington prior to the elections. He thought that in the meantime one runs the risk of the neutralists nibbling away trying to get Malaya into their camp. He said a start has already been made, and cited a speech made by the representative of Ceylon in Kuala Lumpur. In his opinion there is not much chance of Malaya joining SEATO before the elections but there is no reason why discussions should not be undertaken with Ismail⁹ in Washington and without loss of time.

Minister Macdonald said he supported what Mr. Casey had said and that he too thought it premature to bring public pressure to bear on Malaya at this time. It was his opinion, however, that in view of the experience the Malayans have had with the terrorists over the last several years they are not likely to join the neutralists. Ambassador Spender thought Malayan membership in SEATO was a matter of now or never.

West New Guinea. (Secret)—Minister Casey stated that this is the fourth time this subject has come before the United Nations and each time there is an increase in the membership of the Afro-Asian group. There is some talk in New York of Indonesia trying to get this subject considered as matter of “no great importance” thereby requiring only a majority vote to pass a resolution. He did not know what type of resolution Indonesia will introduce but thought it would probably be one requesting the good offices of the United Nations. The Dutch and Australian Governments are trying to get everybody lined up but are not sure they can prevent a two-thirds vote, but they have hopes. Minister Casey was of the opinion that the Dutch are not bluffing and that if the UN adopts a resolution they will defy it, perhaps along the line the South Africans have followed. It should be taken into account that if Indonesia wins and a resolution is adopted there will be consequences. He fears this might consolidate Sukarno’s position. He said he understood the reasons motivating the United States position but wondered whether the U.S. might not be willing to take the risk involved in using its influence behind the scenes to influence the vote of some countries. He said that if anything is done it must be done within the next three weeks since most countries will probably be consolidating their position within that period.

Ambassador Spender said that some of the Asians who still support the Indonesian position have told him personally that they are sick of the Indonesians themselves, but that in view of the Bandung resolution they must vote with them. If a resolution is passed, he said, 1) the Dutch will refuse to accept any resolution which creates an international issue of greater significance and 2) by attrition the area will eventually be turned over by the Dutch to the Indonesians. He thought that if the Indonesians gain a vote in this session they will keep it up until as a result of attrition the area falls into their hands. Ambassador Spender felt very definitely the United States did not want New Guinea to go to the Indonesians for both legal and security reasons. He hoped there were ways by which the United States could make known that, although abstaining, it would not be unhappy to see others oppose any resolution. He asked if it might not be possible to point out to selected countries the gravity of the Indonesian situation and by inference let it be known that an increase in the area of Indonesia might be more grievous. Minister Casey reiterated the foregoing points.

Minister Macdonald said he had learned from some Indonesian cabinet ministers when he was in Indonesia some time ago that Sukarno uses the subject to stir up popular opinion.

The Secretary said that the United States feels very definitely that for the present and as far as we can see in the future it would be contrary to the security interests of the United States for West New Guinea to come under Indonesian rule, especially if the threat of communist Indonesian control was present. It would bring Indonesia closer to Australia and be a breach in the off shore island chain. Also there could be some advantage if it were realized in some quarters in Indonesia that as they move to the left any gain in support from the United States would be in doubt. The matter has been studied again very carefully this year, including the fact that if they gain a two-thirds vote it will make the problem more difficult. The Secretary said that it was not felt so far that it would be advisable to change our position. Those who are trying to keep Indonesia from going communist or to present some alternatives would lose such alternatives if we were to change our position. If it were only a matter of the Sukarno Government it might be salutary to show them that flirting with communists involves paying a price. Our people are concerned with the reaction in the outer islands, upon which we might wish to fall back in case of communist take-over in Java. They feel if we change our position it might militate against our ability to work with those elements in the outer islands. The Secretary asked Mr. Allen Dulles to comment on this.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that although the decision is a political decision, he agrees that a change in our position would weaken our chances of working with the anti-communist elements. The elements in the outer islands feel as strongly about the matter as Sukarno and any change would impair our chances of working with the anti-communist elements on those islands.

The Secretary commented that the form of the resolution was not known. Ambassador Spender said he thought it would be very much as that presented last year. Minister Casey said it might be easier to beat a strong resolution than a mild one.

The Secretary said there was probably nothing else which we could usefully say about this at this time.

Military Planning. (Secret)—The Secretary gave the Military Advisors an opportunity to submit any report or make any comment they wished to make.

Admiral Stump, referring to the earlier discussion on Thailand, said he was unable to evaluate the effect of the change in government in Thailand. He said that Sarit¹⁰ had made a positive statement that there would be no change in Thai support of SEATO, but he was not in a position to evaluate it. He said that as to the military planning, the planners have gone as far and as fast as possible and have reached a stage where there is enough mutual understanding, standardization and equipment built up so that SEATO can act if necessary.

The Secretary asked if there were any plans for any SEATO exercises this winter, adding that he had seen no details of any. Admiral Stump stated that there are plans, but he did not have any of the details with him. He stated that Phiblink¹¹ is not a SEATO exercise but rather a bilateral one involving the United States and the Philippines. Mr. Robertson said that we are worried about any exercises in the Philippines before the elections, scheduled for November 12, and that it might be the better part of caution not to have these exercises until after the election.

Admiral Stump said he had talked about these exercises to Ambassador Bohlen and General Arellano and that neither had raised any objection, nor had they discussed the election factor. He said there are no exercises scheduled for Japan, although some of the ships and Marines who will participate in Phiblink will be coming from Japan, and at the end will exercise in Okinawa. The Admiral said he would also check with the Council of Representatives about invitations to observers to this exercise.

Minister Macdonald asked if these exercises were not given the SEATO label automatically. Admiral Stump said that in the past such exercises have been held without the SEATO label and that although there are advantages to giving such exercises a SEATO label this is never done unless approved by the Council.

General Wells said that planning under SEATO has been accelerated by the recent establishment of the Planning Group. The Planning Group, he said, is still having its organizational troubles but as a result of the review recently undertaken it will shortly be making recommendations to improve its operations. One of the difficulties is that not all members of the Planning Staff are skilled planners and must therefore be trained. At the present time there is better skill and direction in the group.

Regarding Thailand General Wells said that the question arises of what reliance can be placed on Thailand in the SEATO setup. Plans would have to be greatly readjusted should Thailand prove not to be reliable and become neutralist or even go communist. He said he was unable to resolve this doubt. Plans are being made on the assumption that the status quo will continue unless the Council advises the planners that Thailand is no longer dependable as an ally.

The Secretary said that as things stand today it would be a great mistake for the Thais to know that there are any doubts regarding the situation; that the best way to keep them tied in is just to assume that they will remain tied in.

General Weir said he was unable to offer any appraisal of the situation in Thailand but that he felt it was absolutely vital that Thailand be held as a SEATO ally. In his opinion the meeting in Bangkok was one of the easiest meetings held.

Minister Casey said that his Government on the political side was not frightfully impressed with the speed of SEATO progress. There were three phases to the problem: military planning, anti-subversion and economic planning. Regarding military planning he said he assumed that if the Communist Chinese came into the situation by overt aggression, it would mean all-out war. He believed, therefore, that the Chinese would avoid such a situation and that any action by them in Southeast Asia would be short of that and would involve highly mobile, heavily armed forces, free from any ponderous train or wheeled vehicles. He said he hoped this had been taken into consideration by the military planners as one of the contingencies in that part of the world and that in response we would plan to use similar forces, the same weapons and indigenous troops. He said he was also very skeptical as to the fighting ability of the armed forces of Thailand.

On the anti-subversion side he thought advance had been slow. Mr. Allen Dulles pointed out that security considerations prevented a frank discussion with the other members of SEATO on this subject.

Minister Casey said that on the economic side it had been suggested that the SEATO label be put on some of the economic aid going into the area. Australia, he said, has sent some weapons to Pakistan, the Philippines, Thailand and some to Viet-Nam. He said Australia would like to see a greater speed-up of SEATO aid and asked if the United States has done any more thinking on putting the SEATO label on military aid to those countries.

Admiral Stump said he shared Minister Casey’s concern about the effectiveness of the Thai army and navy, although the air force is somewhat better. As to the type of attack that might occur, the United States plans to take that into consideration. The SEATO plans are limited, primarily by security considerations. The Admiral felt it necessary to include atomic weapons which can be used in such cases in any plans to resist aggression. Both Chiang Kai-shek and Diem had indicated to him the hope that the United States would come to their aid as soon as possible with everything it has, including atomic weapons. The Admiral did not believe we would lose by winning local wars nor that a general war would follow and favored the immediate use of everything available. In his opinion if the communists were not ready for total war they will not start it. He said there is a great deal of doubt in Asia about whether we will act and act fast enough. Rhee doubts that President Eisenhower will act fast enough if anything happens. The same doubt exists in Thailand. They are watching everything to see what are our intentions. That is the reason, he said, why he is opposed to any reduction in forces unless accompanied by an increase in weapon capability.

Ambassador Spender said that in Europe a declaration has been made that in case of war everything will be brought into play and asked why such a declaration cannot be made in Asia. Admiral Stump replied that he saw no difference except that most of the planners are close to NATO and have not had Asian experience and do not realize the importance of Asia. Communist infiltration and action cannot be effectively resisted with conventional weapons. In all his discussions with the leaders in Asia he has informed them of what Secretary Dulles has often stated, that we are now stronger in the Pacific than at the close of the last war. It is necessary, however, that we make up our minds now that we would act immediately if necessary and use all our weapons to win. In SEATO planning nothing is said about the type of weapons which will be used. SEATO planning goes only to the extent of troops, etc.

Ambassador Spender asked if what is needed in SEATO planning is a decision to act when necessary and with everything available. Admiral Stump said that what is needed is not a decision to use atomic weapons, but for the people who will make the decision to make up their minds now that they will use the weapons if necessary. Minister Casey made the point that subjects can be discussed in ANZUS which cannot be discussed in SEATO. Admiral Stump said he thought the greatest value of ANZUS is that frank discussions can be held on subjects like this which is not possible in SEATO.

Minister Casey said that in the early days of ANZUS there were more frequent meetings of the military advisors but recently that appears not to have been the case, and asked why. Admiral Stump said that meetings are as frequent as before. Minister Casey asked if there were any need for an ANZUS military planning meeting in the near future. Admiral Stump did not think so on the basis of information available.

Ambassador Spender asked where the planning is being done on the contingencies mentioned by Mr. Casey. Admiral Stump replied that forces are not being built in Thailand to resist aggression but only to maintain internal order. CINCPAC had plans which are purely U.S. plans for retaliatory action in South China in case of a Chinese attack against Thailand. There is no reason for bringing such plans out into the open. But there are also no reasons why such plans cannot be discussed with Australia and New Zealand.

Minister Casey said that there appears to be a need for greater indigenous guerrilla forces in these countries. Admiral Stump commented that the chief of MAAG is putting in just that kind of training in Viet Nam, teaching them to get out into the hills. This training has been going on for about one year. It is being undertaken to a very limited extent also in Thailand but there are certain difficulties such as a requirement for additional pay if the troops get beyond a certain distance from Bangkok. Mr. Allen Dulles added that a large number of border police have been trained in Thailand primarily to prevent border smuggling. Sarit may look upon them as an instrument in the hands of Phao¹² and therefore not with favor. The problem now is whether Sarit will permit them to keep going.

Ambassador Spender commented that the absence of a policy decision regarding the use of atomic weapons did not seem to affect the planning. Admiral Stump concurred, adding that the necessary measures have been taken to use the weapons if necessary.

The Secretary said he was not aware of any distinction as to the use of atomic weapons in Europe or Asia and that the same criteria would be applied in both cases. Minister Casey asked whether the Chinese knew that. The Secretary said they assume that. Mr. Robertson stated that the language of the declaration of the 16 powers on Korea¹³ also carries a strong implication on this. The Secretary added that in the past when the danger was greater he had on several occasions discussed publicly the use of atomic weapons from Taiwan.

Mr. Sprague asked if there has been any ANZUS planning regarding Indonesia and whether such would be desirable. Admiral Stump said that he and Generals Wells and Weir agree such should be done but that it takes time. General Wells said he agreed with that but that some progress had been made as he had outlined earlier.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that the counter subversion committee of SEATO has a definite function to perform but doubts that it can get into detailed study of the subversive activities of the Soviets in each country. There is a broad field that can be given dissemination, however, such as Soviet techniques, apparatus, etc., much of which is already known to those countries, and a great deal of information in these fields that can be given to these countries which would be helpful to them.

Minister Casey asked whether the anti-subversive conference to be held in Manila in November will be largely a public relations exercise. Mr. Reinhardt said it would be wrong to label it purely as a public relations exercise since one of the purposes of the meeting will be to educate some of the officials in Asia in that field.

Minister Casey asked if there is likely to be any extension of SEATO economic aid programs or if the attitude of the United States is the same as before. The Secretary said that the U.S. attitude is the same. The U.S. has no objection to putting the SEATO label on any economic aid if that is all that it involves. However, if it means additional administrative burden and the setting up of SEATO machinery to handle it, the U.S. does not favor it. Minister Casey asked if there had been any pressure from some of the countries, such as in the past there had been from Pakistan, to the effect that they are not receiving as much benefit from SEATO as they would expect. Minister Macdonald commented that if the SEATO label is used there is the danger that the nations not members of SEATO may feel that they are being deprived of help because they are not members of the organization and thus increase their opposition to SEATO. The Secretary said that since his statement in Canberra¹⁴ no one has asked for the SEATO label. One reason for this he thought is that these nations would rather advertise their connections with the United States than with SEATO.

Review by Minister Casey. (Confidential)—Australia has no different position than in past years concerning recognition of Red China or its seating in the United Nations. As to trade, Australia has been one of the countries that has held out, and they hope to continue to hold out but can give no assurance that they will be able to. Australia has taken a middle-of-the-road attitude about travel in China, neither encouraging nor discouraging it. At least half a dozen groups of six to eight people each have gone there, but none of these, to the best of his knowledge, had been communist although some leftists were included. He did not see that any damage has come as a result or that China has received any greater support in Australia. He wished to make this statement because of some criticism which has been made in the United States concerning these trips.

The Secretary said that the United States position in these matters is governed more by the harm the example might serve rather than the harm it might do to ourselves. The impact upon the vast, strong, non-communist society in the United States would not be significant, but we do think it important for some nations to maintain barriers in order to assist those countries not in a position to do so.

Minister Macdonald said that some groups from New Zealand have also gone. He would like to point out that in New Zealand there is a Federation of Labor headed by strong anti-communists which has recently put out a pamphlet pointing out the dangers from such visits since communists do not undertake these for nothing. New Zealand’s trade with Red China is very small.

Minister Casey continued that as to Japan the Australian Government continues its efforts to establish normal relations. In the field of trade Australia has a favorable balance; it has recently included [concluded] a trade treaty which is a good treaty from Australia’s viewpoint; it has released all Japanese war criminals. The only outstanding problem is that of the pearl fisheries in the north of Australia which has been referred to the International Court of Justice. Kishi is visiting Australia in November; Menzies has visited Japan recently; and parliamentary delegations will be exchanged within the next few months.

Australia appreciates the firm stand taken by the United States in Okinawa. The Minister said he did not know just how the United States considers the island strategic and that maybe something could be said on this.

As to the Philippines, there is nothing new except that the Australian Ambassador speaks in the highest terms of Ambassador Bohlen’s performance.

As to Viet Nam, Diem visited Australia recently. Australia also plans to exchange parliamentary delegations with Viet Nam. Minister Casey stated that although it was not the place for Diem to have stated it, one thing he did say while in Australia and which he wanted to pass along only as a matter of interest, was that he hoped the U.S. would not reduce or cut out its aid to Laos.

As to Singapore, Lim Yew Hock has been very sturdy in his anti-communist activities. The elections will be held soon after which a Governor General will be appointed. The gentleman being proposed is half Chinese. The future of the naval base and dockyard hangs in balance. The Australians would like to see the dockyard retained and Mr. Casey had urged this on Minister Sandys when he visited them last August. Mr. Casey felt the UK would not be able to maintain both the Chatham and Singapore yards. Mr. Casey said he had urged Admiral Burke¹⁵ to consider putting some business into it to help maintain it.

Australian relations with Malaya are good. Australia is doing a great deal for them under the Colombo Plan. They are also helping train some of their diplomatic personnel, taking six individuals at a time.

Admiral Stump said that there are three main reasons which make Okinawa important to us: a) the Philippine concern over its loss or its becoming communist, b) a similar concern on the part of Taiwan, c) its importance as an advance base and the effect this has on Asian thinking concerning our ability to defend them.

As to the Singapore dockyard, the preliminary opinion of the CNO is that work cannot be done cheaper in Singapore than in the UK. CINCPAC is anxious to have the UK keep the dockyard but does not know whether any business can be put there.

Minister Casey continued that in a few months Australia hopes to complete the take-over of Christmas Island in the Indian Ocean, which is important as a) a source of fertilizer, b) an air field site, c) a staging point for fighters between Australia and New Zealand. (General Wells stated he thought that it was no longer necessary for point c.) The take-over has been made easier since there has been no outcry from Singapore.

Australia has made an offer to the UK to repair and overhaul aircraft in Australia.

Australia is about to make an approach through a third party to Egypt concerning sequestered property, maintenance of Australian war graves and memorials, and resumption of Qantas flights, etc. Egypt shows signs of wanting to get Qantas back which is the only bargaining lever Australia has. Egypt has no frozen funds in Australia. Minister Macdonald added that New Zealand has not been “thrown out” of Egypt like Australia only because they had had no representative there in the first place.

Antarctica. (Secret)—Minister Casey said Australia welcomes the talks on this subject scheduled to begin in Washington on Monday.¹⁶ They are afraid the Russians may wish to remain in the Antarctic after conclusion of the IGY. A party of Australians visited the Russian station last week and were impressed with the high quality of the facilities. Details of the visit can be made available if desired.

He has no definite ideas as to what should be done. To internationalize the area without demilitarizing it would not advance the problem very much. He said he did not want to pre-judge the discussions but that if the only interest is to neutralize the Russians he does not see how it can be done short of demilitarization except by getting them out.

Minister Macdonald said he too did not want to get ahead of the forthcoming discussions, but he hoped some way can be found to get the Russians out. Ambassador Spender commented that it is important that we find a common objective.

The Secretary stated that following the March SEATO meeting at Canberra, where the governments of Australia and New Zealand had expressed to him their concern, he had requested a review of the United States position which has always been a double negative. A decision was taken by the NSC to review the U.S. position, and responsibility was given to the State Department, and Ambassador Paul Daniels has been brought back for the job. The Secretary said he did not have a clear position to put forward because the best position would grow out of an exchange of views. He did want to set forth some of his preliminary views. The immediate objective is to get the Russians out or to minimize as much as possible their position in that area. The potential threat to the Southern Hemisphere from submarine and air bases is of the greatest importance. He thought that as a preliminary step to getting them out all those interested in obtaining this objective should get together rather than combat each other. He said that when we talk about internationalization we are thinking in terms of pooling claims and submerging our differences. Afterwards we could work out whether we would have a condominium or divide the area; the main effort should be to achieve a legal basis for excluding the Russians. The Secretary believed we could outmatch the Soviet position. One problem relates to Chile and Argentina, whose claimed areas are close to the Antarctic and whose national pride is involved, so that special handling of them may be required. The essence of our approach is to put first things first to get Russia out. The United States has taken no firm position, however, and our thinking on the matter is fluid.

Press Release. The attached press release was approved for release.¹⁷

Closing Remarks. Ministers Casey and Macdonald expressed their high appreciation for the opportunity of holding the meeting and of having such frank exchanges of views with the United States Government. The Secretary added comment in a similar vein.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 920. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Mein on October 5 and distributed as an attachment to a memorandum dated October 18 by Robert K. German of the Reports and Operations Staff.
2. Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi visited the United States June 19–22. Documentation on his visit is scheduled for publication in volume XXIII.
3. See Document 474.
4. Pote Sarasin became Prime Minister of Thailand following a coup September 16–17. For documentation, see vol. XXII, pp. 932 ff.
5. Sukarno was in Moscow in September 1956, and in Peking the following month, in the course of a trip to several Communist countries.
6. Dr. Mohammed Hatta, former Vice President of Indonesia.
7. Colonel Simbolon, Lieutenant Colonels Ventje Sumual, and Ahmed Hussein, all of the Indonesian Army, were associated with the dissident movement against the central government.
8. Dr. Subandrio, Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs.
9. Dr. Ismail bin Dato’ Abdul Rahman, Malayan Ambassador to the United States.
10. Field Marshal Sarit Thanarit, Chief of the Armed Forces of Thailand.
11. Operation Phiblink, a Philippine-U.S. training exercise held under SEATO auspices, took place November 1–December 11, 1957.
12. General Phao Sriyanon had been, until the September coup, Director of the Thai National Police.
13. For text of this declaration, signed at Washington July 27, 1953, see Department of State Bulletin, August 24, 1953, p. 247.
14. See Document 145.
15. Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.
16. For documentation on the talks which began October 7 among representatives of Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, see vol. XI, pp. 711 ff.
17. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, October 21, 1957, p. 646.