Office of the Historian

170. Memorandum of a Conversation, U.S. Mission at the United Nations, New York, September 16, 1957, 1 p.m.1

TGA/MC/7
New York, September 16, 1957, 1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

  • United States
    • The Secretary
    • Mr. Rountree
    • Mr. Greene
  • United Kingdom
    • Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
    • Sir Harold Caccia
    • Mr. Harold Beeley
[Page 380]

SUBJECT

  • Malayan Membership in SEATO

The Secretary told Mr. Lloyd that he felt that unless Malaya joins SEATO quickly there is danger that they never will.2 As he believes it important to provide for the effective inclusion of Malaya under SEATO’s protection, he wondered whether it might be possible to take the line that the Malayan Government in effect succeeds to that part of the British membership in SEATO which covered Malaya.

Mr. Lloyd said that he sees two dangers in this connection. The Malayan Prime Minister, at this late stage of negotiations with the United Kingdom for a Defense Agreement, has now decided that he must submit the Agreement to the Malayan Parliament for approval. Moreover, he has declined to put into writing his assurance that until the Defense Agreement becomes effective he personally will insure that its spirit and its provisions will be observed. Mr. Lloyd thought that any approach to the Prime Minister about SEATO might jeopardize ratification of the Defense Agreement and this HMG does not want to risk. Mr. Lloyd continued that once the Defense Agreement is in force there is the danger that the issue of Malayan membership in SEATO might become involved in the next Malayan election campaign. In this eventuality the Prime Minister might be forced to take a strong position against joining SEATO. Accordingly, Mr. Lloyd thought that the best time to try to persuade the Malayan Government would be as soon as the Defense Agreement is effective and before the election campaign gets underway.3

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1857. Secret.↩
  2. Malaya celebrated its independence on August 31.↩
  3. During a conversation between the Secretary and Casey at New York, September 18, Casey “expressed the judgment that it will not be possible to obtain early entry of Malaya in the SEATO. His personal judgment led him to conclude that it could not take place before the elections in Malaya, which would be about two years in the future. He explained that the two main election issues would probably be SEATO and the presence of foreign troops on Malayan soil. He added that any reference to SEATO particularly by outsiders would have to be handled most carefully and concluded that evidence of pressure from the outside would lead to the wrong answer in Malaya on SEATO. He explained that Australia is most anxious to have Malaya join SEATO but felt that it is necessary to recognize the political situation in Malaya.” (Memorandum of conversation by Parsons, TGA/MC/22; Department of State, Central Files, 110.11–DU/9–1857)↩