Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

163. Despatch From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State¹

No. 58

Saigon, August 12, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Government of Viet Nam’s Attitudes toward SEATO

Summary

The basically favorable attitude of the Government of Viet Nam (GVN) toward SEATO, founded upon an appreciation of the inescapable necessity of outside military assistance in the event of invasion, has recently been modified by the fear that too close an association with the Treaty Organization might alienate India and create difficulties with the International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICC). Thus, though the GVN in 1956 expressed the desire to become a member of SEATO and continues to send observers to SEATO military exercises, in the early spring of 1957 it became obvious that the Government no longer thought in terms of membership in, or even of too close association with, SEATO. President Ngo Dinh Diem’s visit to Thailand from August 15 to 19² may possibly, though not probably, influence his thinking on this matter.

The change of the President’s attitude toward SEATO apparently stems from the visit of Ngo Dinh Nhu, the President’s brother and political adviser, to India in March 1957. Since then the improvement of Viet Nam’s relations with India seems to have become of greater importance to the Vietnamese Government. The President has been invited to visit India in November³ and, on that occasion, SEATO may be one of the topics of discussion. It has been rumored that Diem might agree to a joint statement in which he would disavow interest in SEATO membership and condemn nuclear experiments, and the Indians in turn would express support for South Viet Nam. Support from Prime Minister Nehru would be valuable in improving the GVN’s position vis-à-vis North Viet Nam, and specifically in enhancing President Diem’s reputation as the only truly independent nationalist leader for all Vietnamese.

Although the GVN is not a signatory to the Geneva Cease-Fire Agreement of June [July] 1954, and has always disclaimed the obligation to conform to any of its provisions, the Vietnamese have generally acted in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. In March 1956, however, it appeared that the GVN might be planning to push actively for membership in SEATO, despite Article 19 of the Cease-Fire Agreement forbidding signatories to join military pacts.

Foreign Secretary Vu Van Mau made the following comments concerning SEATO in a press conference on March 7, 1956: (Embtel 3638 of March 8, 1956⁴) “As the goals of SEATO are in accordance with Viet Nam’s policy which consists of defending the liberty of the Free World, Viet Nam approves the existence of such an organization. If you ask me, does Viet Nam wish to adhere to the pact, I can only reply that such is one of our wishes.”

The Times of Viet Nam, essentially a government paper, noted Mau’s comments in an article (Embassy Despatch 317, March 26, 1956⁵) on March 24, 1956 praising “the increased strength and development of SEATO,” emphasizing the benefits to Viet Nam of collective security and calling the support of Thailand and the Philippines for Viet Nam’s membership in SEATO a “heartening sign of a new era of collaboration between neighbors.” The article observed that: “It is not surprising, therefore, that our government has expressed the desire to become a member of the Treaty Organization.”

The GVN clarified its position in regard to SEATO two weeks later, in what amounted to a disavowal of Mau’s statement, by declaring that the GVN “… does not, moreover, see the necessity of joining any military alliance.” This statement was made in a letter to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs dated April 3 (Embassy Despatch No. 331, April 10, 1956⁶) written in answer to a letter of December 21, 1955 from the British Ambassador to Viet Nam expressing concern that, according to the Fourth Interim Report of the International Control Commission (ICC), certain clauses of the Geneva Agreement had not been satisfactorily carried out in Viet Nam. In effect, the GVN reaffirmed its intention to abide by the tenor of the Agreement while refusing to acknowledge any legal obligation to do so.

The GVN continued to show interest in SEATO, however, by sending observers to the US-Thailand “Operation Team-Work” in September 1956. In February 1957 Diem told Admiral Stump in Saigon that he was anxious to have Vietnamese officers participate in SEATO military planning or at least to attend meetings as observers (Deptel 2155, February 15, 1957.⁷) This was followed by Vietnamese requests to Thailand the UK and the US that Viet Nam be invited to send observers to the SEATO Council meeting in Canberra in March 1957. The Secretary General of the Department of Foreign Affairs of Viet Nam told an Embassy officer on March 2 that President Diem was keenly interested in this meeting. The day before, the Vietnamese Ambassador in Bangkok, Mai Van Ham, had also informed the US representative to the SEATO Council of his government’s interest and emphasized that eventual Vietnamese membership in SEATO was the urgent desire of his “President and Government.” (Bangkok Telegram 2571, March 1, 1957.⁸) On March 6, Diem announced that he would send Nguyen Dinh Thuan, Director of Cabinet for the Department of Defense and one of his most trusted and esteemed young officials, to the Council meeting. In Canberra, Thuan told Admiral Stump (Canberra Telegram 17, March 13, 1957⁹) that Diem, worried over a rumored shift in SEATO effort, wanted it known that he desired not only continuance of major emphasis on the military side but even a greater degree of military planning in the threatened area. Meanwhile, in Saigon, Viet Nam Presse, the Government’s news agency, ran Canberra news despatches alleging that the American Secretary of State intended to propose that the GVN be included in SEATO and the local Vietnamese press reprinted these stories. In April 1957, the GVN sent observers to the SEATO naval exercise “Astra” at Singapore.

In the expectation that President Diem might raise the question of Viet Nam’s closer collaboration with SEATO during his visit to the United States the following month, the Department in April began testing Canadian and SEATO members’ opinions concerning GVN participation in non-military aspects of SEATO activities. The Canadians and British doubted the wisdom of such participation, expressing the thesis that Viet Nam might jeopardize its relations with India, Burma and Cambodia and have no influence with neutralist and other countries in Southeast Asia if it became too closely tied to SEATO (Embtel 3305, April 30, 1957¹⁰).

A change in the GVN’s attitude toward SEATO became evident during May when, with Vietnamese officers attending the SEATO military exercise “Sealink” in the Philippines, Diem in Washington refused to be drawn into any discussion of SEATO. Perhaps most significant was Diem’s remark to me during the flight back to Viet Nam that he viewed the new emphasis given at Canberra to economic and non-military matters as a favorable development. This remark contradicted directly Thuan’s statement that Diem desired continued, and even greater, emphasis upon the military aspect of SEATO and was worried by the shift to economic and cultural matters. This “favorable development” statement could not be reconciled at first glance with the understanding of some Western observers, notably the UK and Canada, that Diem is interested solely in the military aspect of SEATO.

Diem probably now considers that full membership in SEATO would not give Viet Nam appreciably more protection against invasion than is at present offered by the Treaty’s Protocol. Furthermore, Viet Nam, alone no match for the numerically superior and well-equipped DRV army, may feel that it should not rely upon SEATO power alone, based as it is 6,000 miles away in the United States, but should also seek strength through greater political support from the free, though in most cases neutralist, countries in South and Southeast Asia.

The contacts which Ngo Dinh Nhu had with Nehru and Krishna Menon in New Delhi in March 1957 seem to have been the catalyst which caused Diem, at least for the present, to avoid further identification with SEATO. He may have been encouraged by Nehru and Menon to believe that India would be willing to abandon its uncommitted stand with respect to North and South Viet Nam in return for a closer alignment by the GVN with Indian foreign policies involving, specifically, GVN aloofness from SEATO. The GVN apparently believes that a show of Indian support would markedly strengthen its position both in Asia and vis-à-vis the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.

If Diem had been truly hoping for Indian support, however, he seems lately to have modified these hopes as a result of recent suggestions from top Indian ICC officials in Saigon that current disaffection in the North made the time propitious for North-South elections to unify Viet Nam (Embtel 173, July 24¹¹). On July 25 Diem described this proposal to me as an example of the unrealistic and mystic attitudes of the Indians who wish to play a big role in Asia (Embtel 191, July 26¹²). Neutralism itself, he said, has lost much of its appeal in Asia since the Bandung Conference. Despite these protestations against Indian lack of realism and suggestions that neutralism is waning, Diem has probably not completely abandoned the hope of gaining some benefit from India. He may still feel that in some way it might be helpful to bring about some adjustment of GVN foreign policy which might be welcomed by a nation so near and powerful as India.

A reversion to earlier expressed desires for membership in SEATO or a statement of willingness to participate in the SEATO Cultural Round Table in January 1958 or in the planned counter-subversion seminar at Baguio, however, is not improbable.¹³ If during his trip to Bangkok, Diem sees much advantage accruing to Thailand from membership in SEATO he may show renewed interest in SEATO activities. But probably of more influence on Diem’s thinking about SEATO will be the development of Viet Nam’s relations with India. His own trip to India will be balanced by Ho Chi Minh’s reported visit there in the spring of 1958. If, on conclusion of the two visits, Diem considers Ho has obtained more than he, Diem may then again seek closer association with SEATO.¹⁴ If, however, he believes he has gained a net advantage over his northern opponent, he may decide to play closer to India’s policy and avoid any dealings with the Treaty Organization. At the moment, however, he seems to be less enthusiastic about helpful results coming from closer relationships with India.

Elbridge Durbrow

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/8–1257. Confidential.
2. A report on Diem’s visit is in telegram 393 from Saigon, August 21, not printed. (Ibid., 790.5/8–2157)
3. See telegram 180 from Saigon, November 13, vol. I, p. 861.
4. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 951G.61/3–856)
5. Not printed. (Ibid., 790.5/3–2656)
6. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/4–1056) The ellipsis is in the source text.
7. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/2–1557)
8. See footnote 2, Document 134.
9. Document 147.
10. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/4–3057)
11. Not printed. (Ibid.,., 751G.00/7–2457)
12. Not printed. (Ibid., 751G.00/7–2657)
13. In telegram 945 from Saigon, November 2, the Embassy reported that Diem had decided in favor of participation in the cultural seminar, but that certain procedural problems remained to be worked out. (Ibid., 790.5/11–257)
14. In telegram 1122 from Saigon, November 25, Ambassador Durbrow reported that Diem had told him he had “been carrying anti-communist torch on various visits particularly in India where he also gave good plug for need for a defense aspect of SEATO.” For text, see vol. I, p. 865. In telegram 1118 from Saigon, also dated November 25, Durbrow stated that Diem’s attitude toward SEATO had “evidently warmed up” since May and that he therefore agreed with the Department that the United States should encourage Diem to send an unofficial observer to the March 1958 SEATO Council Meeting although he believed also that for tactical reasons the approach to Diem should not be made immediately. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/11–257)