154. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand1
3683. SEATO. British Embassy representative furnished preliminary Foreign Office comments on proposals for limited Vietnam participation SEATO.2 British do not favor PWG study of question. While favoring in principle closer association Vietnam in SEATO British see certain problems which counterbalance advantages. Feel real interest Vietnam is in military activities particularly military planning invitation join in “innocuous” civil activities would not satisfy them and would be followed by pressure expand participation into military field. Also worried over reaction in Cambodia, India and other “non-committed” countries, with which Vietnam has recently [Page 343] improved relations. Important factor would be attitude of Canadians in ICC and consequently British feel proposed consultation with Canadians should not be delayed. In conclusion British representative expressed opinion his Government would go along with steps we are proposing as first stage namely invitation to Vietnamese to participate in cultural roundtable and countersubversion seminar and send observers next meeting Economic and Information Committees (CEE and ICEL). He anticipates further instructions shortly. French Embassy has not yet received reply to its request to Paris for instructions but says their Embassy Saigon has reported conversation with high official Vietnam Foreign Office indicating latter aware conflicting opinions among SEATO members over extent Vietnam participation. Vietnam would not agree to limited participation and would prefer wait for full membership in meantime contenting themselves with observer status. Comment: This confusing report will presumably be clarified by talks with Ngo Dinh Diem later this week.3
Subsequent to conversation with British, Canadian representative briefed on developments.4 He indicated his Government already aware Bangkok discussions. Canada anticipates charges in ICC of violation Geneva Agreement following even “innocuous” first steps proposed by US. Canada’s ability defend Vietnam against these charges would depend largely on method implementation and amount and type publicity originating with SEATO and/or Vietnam. Also worried over repercussions in “uncommitted” Asian countries. To sum up Canada would regret any steps which might upset what they regard as favorable trend in Vietnam relations with ICC and neighboring neutrals.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/5–757. Secret. Also sent to Ottawa, London, and Saigon and repeated to Paris, Karachi, Manila, Wellington, Canberra, and CINCPAC in Honolulu.↩
- Abbott’s memorandum of his conversation held May 2 with A.J. de la Mare, Counselor of the British Embassy, is not printed. (Ibid., 790.5/5–257)↩
- In telegram 3774 to Bangkok, dated May 17,
sent also to Ottawa and Paris and repeated to Saigon, London,
Karachi, Canberra, Wellington, and Manila, the Department stated in
part that the question of Vietnamese participation in certain SEATO civilian activities had not
been raised either by Diem
or by U.S. officials during the former’s stay in Washington (May
8–12). (Ibid., 790.5/5–1757) In telegram 3504
from Saigon, dated May 23, Ambassador Elbridge Durbrow, who had accompanied Diem on the return trip to
Vietnam, stated that he had indirectly tried to raise the subject
with Diem several times
during the flight. “In view his silence this matter during entire US
trip and his failure pick up leads during return flight, I question
whether at this time it would be advisable press other SEATO members agree GVN observers attend committee
meetings.” (Ibid., 790.5/5–2357)
For documentation on Diem’s visit to the United States, see vol. i, pp. 762 ff.
↩ - The memorandum of Abbott’s conversation held May 3 with J.R. Maybee, First Secretary of the Canadian Embassy, is not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/5–357)↩