155. National Security Council Report1
NSC 5713
Washington, May 14,
1957.
NOTE BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL ON DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSE PRODUCTION BASE IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW
ZEALAND
The enclosed draft recommendations on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board at the direction of the
President on the suggestion of the Secretary of State, are transmitted
herewith for consideration by the National Security Council at its
meeting on Thursday, May 23, 1957.
A Staff Study on the subject will be circulated at a later date as an
Annex to NSC 5713.2
It is recommended that, if the Council adopts the enclosed
recommendations, they be submitted to the President with the
recommendation that he approve them, direct their implementation by all
appropriate Executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government,
and designate the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating
agency.
[Enclosure]
DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT OF A DEFENSE PRODUCTION BASE
IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND
1. Post-War Rehabilitation Base. The United
States should not provide assistance to any foreign country
(including Australia and New Zealand) for the purpose of developing
a base for rehabilitation of the Free World after massive nuclear
destruction of the United States.4
2. Logistic and Production Base. The United
States should not at this time extend to Australia or New Zealand,
to create in those countries a logistic or limited defense
production base for U.S. or free Asian needs.
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| Majority
Proposal |
State
Proposal |
| mutual security assistance, because: |
significant financial assistance on a grant basis,
because: |
- a.
- Economically, Australia and New Zealand have limited
manpower; have shortages of developed raw material resources
and of power; are dependent on imports for capital goods;
and have generally high costs.
- b.
- Militarily, Australia and New Zealand are farther from
most of the likely theatres of limited conflict in the Far
East than is Japan and therefore are of less value as a
logistic and production base for such conflict. In the event
of general nuclear war, neither Japan nor the Australian-New
Zealand area is likely to be of great value as a logistic
and production base.
- c.
- Politically, establishment of a logistic and limited
production base in Australia and New Zealand might create
the impression that we are abandoning our present
forward-base concept, thus weakening the security and
resolve of friendly nations on the periphery of the
Communist bloc. The repercussions of such an impression
might be especially unfortunate in Japan.
Nevertheless, Australia has many basic raw
materials, especially coal and iron, which, if properly exploited,
could contribute to the development of Japan and other free Asian
countries.
3. Offshore Procurement
| Majority
Proposal |
State
Proposal |
| The United States should The United States should not
initiate in Australia or New Zealand an offshore
procurements program (OSP) |
The United States should carefully consider
arrangements and principles which Australia or New
Zealand may advance (especially if either is prepared to
underwrite some of the cost) |
for maintenance and resupply of current or older
model U.S.-type equipment for non-U.S. forces in the Pacific,
| particularly in view of |
but should take fully into account |
the high cost structure of Australia and New Zealand
and the cutbacks which have taken place in some U.S. military
production and in world-wide OSP
programs.
4. Purchase, Production and Maintenance of U.S.
Military Equipment. Nonetheless, the security and
cooperation of Australia and New Zealand are in the U.S. interest,
and sympathetic consideration should be given to any proposals by
those countries for purchasing U.S. military
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equipment in the United States, and, subject
to the considerations in paragraph 3 above, for producing and
maintaining U.S.-type military equipment for their own forces.
