Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

153. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Mein) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson¹

Washington, April 23, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Sir Percy Spender’s 4:15 p.m., April 24th Call on You

We understand that Sir Percy intends to discuss in general terms Australia’s proposed defense mission to Washington. On April 4 Prime Minister Menzies announced a revision of Australia’s defense program which will include a closer tie-up with U.S. equipment. The three-year program includes provision for re-equipping the RAAF with 33 fighter aircraft equivalent to the Lockheed F 104 and 12 transport aircraft of the C 130 type. They have in mind in connection with this proposed purchase some sort of production tie-up with us that would utilize their aircraft industry in production or assembly of fighter aircraft as well as perhaps standardized production of other defense items some of which might be for offshore procurement by our Defense Department.

In line with the statement agreed with Menzies in March 1955² wherein we told the Australians we would be happy to consider ways and means of improving their equipment and supply position on the basis of an accurate assessment of their deficiencies, we instructed Embassy Canberra on April 5 to agree to the Australian suggestion of an exchange of a small technical mission to explore pertinent aspects of the foregoing. Subsequently, however, the Embassy informed us that the Australians planned to send almost immediately (in May) a negotiating mission headed by Defense Minister McBride to conduct discussions on these defense matters. After discussions in State and Defense, we instructed Embassy Canberra (Tab A)³ to tell the Australians that we believed any high-level visits at this stage would be premature, possibly giving rise to false hopes, hopes, excessive publicity and frustration and such a high-level visit was not in accord with our agreement to the exchange of a small technical mission. We also told the Embassy that we considered Australia’s decision to purchase U.S. military equipment was not necessarily based on any quid pro quo re tie-up with their production facilities and that normal channels appeared adequate for discussion of payment methods. We added that this did not mean, however, that we were unwilling to explore thoroughly through the exchange of a small working level technical mission what might be feasible re standardization and some sort of limited production tie-up relevant to Australia’s re-equipment plans. We told the Embassy that any limited steps we may be able to take could not be achieved at the pressurized pace implied in their messages because of other commitments, domestic considerations, limited appropriations, interagency negotiations, technical problems and other factors. We also told the Embassy for its information only of the special interagency group now studying the long-range pros and cons of developing Australia’s defense production base, adding that regardless of the outcome of this study we welcomed Australia’s apparent decision to purchase for its own use limited amounts of U.S. equipment.

Despite our instructions, however, the Embassy was apparently unable to move the Australians in their desire to have Defense Minister McBride come to the U.S. The Australians want him to discuss and examine all of Australia’s defense deficiencies in line with the agreed Menzies statement of March 1955 and have furnished our Embassy with an aide-mémoire (Tab B)⁴ outlining the purposes of McBride’s proposed mission. In general the aide-mémoire sets forth the Australian view that past consultations with our Defense Department and activity in SEATO and ANZUS have now placed them in a position to discuss with us their equipment problems on the basis of a realistic assessment of their requirements. In addition to Defense Minister McBride, the mission would include several senior officials and Service Officers familiar with procurement, supply, and production problems who would be prepared to stay on as long as necessary after McBride had set the stage. The terms of reference would be broadly as follows:

• “(A) To outline to the U.S. authorities in further detail the revised basis of Australian defence policy, and of the consequences of the 3 year defence programme;
• (B) To discuss the general question of coordination between Australian and U.S. forces in equipment policy in the SEATO area. In particular, to seek U.S. views on the type of fighter aircraft which should be produced in Australia from this point of view;
• (C) To provide an assessment of Australia’s estimated deficiencies in equipment and to ascertain whether and in what way Australia could be assisted by the U.S. in meeting them.”

They also wish to “explore the financial conditions governing supply or other assistance by the U.S., having in mind the possibility of making arrangements whereby U.S. supplies which cannot be financed from Australian resources might be made available under procedures similar to those applicable to other allies of the U.S. This would include the possibility of the Australian defence industries being assisted by off-shore purchases by the U.S. with the object of developing Australia as a support area in SEATO for U.S. type equipment.”

The aide-mémoire makes it clear (as previous messages didn’t) that the Australians appreciate these matters will require detailed study and discussions at the working level and that no immediate agreement can be expected. In telegraphing us this aide-mémoire, Embassy Canberra said they were told that Sir Percy was not authorized to enter into substantive negotiations in this matter since it was to be handled between External Affairs and our Embassy. We assume therefore that Sir Percy intends merely to acquaint you with the Australian thinking on the timing of the mission and its purpose.

Recommendation:

It seems the Australians have carried the matter so far and so fast there is no commendable alternative to receiving the high-level mission in the near future although we and Defense believed a more studied pace involving at first the exchange of small technical missions was preferable.

We recommend 1) that you tell Sir Percy we would prefer the mission to arrive as late as is possible within the period available to Defense Minister McBride (May 10-June 10);

2) that Sir Percy be told that while we welcome the opportunity to hear their assessments of their defense and equipment problems we shall during the course of the mission be able to give only the most preliminary reactions;

3) that we would hope in due course to evolve mutually satisfactory defense arrangements.

(A telegram to Canberra along the foregoing lines is in process of clearance.)

Mr. Kavanaugh and/or I will be on hand and suggest you may wish to ask Ambassador Sebald to sit in.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, FE/SPA Files: Lot 65 D 141, Australian–U.S. Defense Relations, Feb.–June 1957. Secret.
2. See the enclosure to Document 37.
3. Telegram 424 to Canberra, dated April 11, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 743.5/4–1057)
4. Telegram 553 from Canberra, dated April 19, attached to the source text but not printed, contains the text of this aide-mémoire, dated April 18. (Ibid., 743.5/4–1957)
5. According to Mein’s memorandum of the conversation held with Sir Percy on April 24, Robertson set forth the U.S. position along the lines recommended in this memorandum and Sir Percy agreed to communicate it to his government. (Ibid., 743.5811/4–2457)