125. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1195. Re Bangkok 2132 to Department, Vientiane 369.2 In my opinion point has not been reached where advantage to SEATO partners of formal consultation overbalances risks of its effect on Lao. Would agree consultation desirable (1) if security situation deteriorates alarmingly during period of implementation of an RLG–PL accord or as result of rupture of negotiations or (2) we had preview what Rak hoped accomplish by it and agreed with him. Realize move to consult would be difficult resist if coalition accepted but as viewed from here would be preferable consult in light of what ensues thereafter.
[Page 278]Do not concur in any US initiative at all in meanwhile, even within confidential framework, not only because of danger of leak back to Lao but also because, until our reappraisal finished, there can hardly be any significant change in US policy to report to SEATO partners.
In any case consider it particularly important not rock boat at this critical juncture, with Lao already hypersensitive on subject Western pressure as result our own and UK activity over past month. Even if US had no part in initiative within SEATO we bound get lion’s share any blame. I need hardly remind Department of tempest raised in July 1955 when Laos was discussed in SEATO without its knowledge and Lao Prime Minister felt impelled publish outraged statement re SEATO interference. And this was during tenure of pro-American Katay. SEATO at this juncture not effective means for putting pressure on Lao to do what we hope they will do.