Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

122. United States Minutes of the ANZUS Council Meeting, Department of State, Washington, November 17, 1956, 9:30 a.m.–1 p.m.¹

MAC Memo 7

Washington, November 17, 1956, 9:30 a.m.–1 p.m.

[Here follows a list of persons present (20). Casey, Macdonald, and Hoover led their countries’ delegations.]

The Acting Secretary opened the meeting with greetings to the Representatives of Australia and New Zealand. He also conveyed greetings from the Secretary and said that the Secretary’s health was improving rapidly. Mr. Hoover emphasized the importance to the United States of our ANZUS relations, stating that we feel ANZUS is unique among our mutual defense arrangements and that in no other multilateral forum do we feel the same degree of informality and opportunity for frank discussions. He said that while we had agreed to an agenda, he trusted that this would in no way restrict a Council member from raising any subject he wished.

Mr. Casey and Mr. Macdonald were heartened to hear of the Secretary’s excellent recovery and asked that their best wishes be conveyed to him.

[Here follows discussion of the Suez Canal crisis.]

The Acting Secretary then referred to the struggle within the Kremlin between the proponents of the “hard” line and those who favor a softer public position. This struggle for dominance centered around Khrushchev against Molotov and Zhukov. The greatest danger probably lay in the possibility of a miscalculation by Soviet leaders as to what they could accomplish and what the Free World was prepared to do. German sources have told us that they believe we may underestimate the degree to which the Soviet Union is pinned down in the Satellite countries where they presently have some 60 divisions. However, Mr. Hoover pointed out that Western Europe did not at the moment have a good defensive posture, particularly since the French have half-a-million troops in North Africa and the British and French are both committed in Cyprus. The Acting Secretary stated that he would like to have the comments of Mr. Casey and Mr. Macdonald but would first ask Mr. Robertson to make a brief statement on the security situation in the Pacific area.

Mr. Robertson referred first to the Communist penetration in Asia through economic and technical assistance programs which are being used to get trained Communist agents into the area under the guise of technicians. He referred to 22-1/2 million dollars worth of aid which the Chinese Communists have promised to Cambodia and the $100 million which the Soviet Union has agreed to provide Indonesia. He pointed out that one-third of Burma’s total foreign trade would be encompassed in barter arrangements with Communist bloc countries. Although an offer of economic aid had been made to Laos, it had not as yet been accepted. Referring to the Communist cultural efforts through the use of movies, operas, and pamphlets, Mr. Robertson said he believed that this offensive had already been aimed at Australia and New Zealand and mentioned the visit of a Chinese Communist Opera Company.

Mr. Robertson said that Communist China continues to be the taproot of our problems in Asia. Citing recent broadcasts by the Peiping radio, he pointed out that the Peiping regime had slavishly followed the Soviet line with respect to developments in Eastern Europe. We do not have the slightest indication that there is any rift between Communist China and Moscow. There is a constant buildup of Chinese Communist military capabilities—new air fields are being built near the coast; naval ships are being built in Shanghai and a new military railroad will shortly be completed in the Amoy area. The Communists have violated the Korean Armistice, and have 450 modern airplanes, and some 300,000 troops in North Korea in addition to approximately the same number of North Korean troops. In view of these considerations we believe this is not the time to ease trade restrictions since the Chinese Communists need many things from the West to maintain their huge Army and to build up their military capabilities. He stated that we are seeking the cooperation of our friends in continuing trade restrictions.

Mr. Robertson said the Communists were working through the Pathet Lao to get a foothold in the Government and military forces of Laos. He felt that the present leadership in Laos was soft and weak but were somewhat encouraged by the attitude of the Crown Prince who was acutely aware of the threat and understood that the Pathet Lao were in fact a front for the Communists.

Speaking of Cambodia, Mr. Robertson expressed the belief that Prince Sihanouk was beginning to show some understanding of the danger of communism.

In Burma, Mr. Robertson said, the government elite was becoming increasingly aware of the Communist threat. The Burmese had been disturbed by the activities of the Russian and Chinese Communist Embassies in Rangoon in behalf of anti-government elements during the recent Burmese elections. They were shocked by the Chinese Communist violation of Burma’s borders and were further concerned by the manipulation of prices from 25 to 30 per cent disadvantageous in the recent barter agreements signed with the Communist bloc. It is believed that the Chinese Communists have attempted to repair the damage done by these developments during U Nu’s recent visit to Peiping.

Mr. Robertson referred to Indonesian President Sukarno’s visit to the United States which we thought had had a good response.² However, since Sukarno’s visit to the Soviet Union, the satellites and Communist China, it was obvious that he was all things to all men. All our reports indicate that Sukarno was greatly impressed by his visits to Communist China. He now advocates what he refers to as “controlled democracy”. The brightest point in the Indonesian picture was the vigorous criticism of Sukarno by every non-Communist newspaper in Djakarta for his activities in the Soviet Union and for his suggestion that political parties be abolished in Indonesia. Finally, Mr. Robertson said that we regretted we were unable to see any indication of improvement in Dutch-Indonesian relations.

Mr. Robertson referred to a continuing improvement and strengthening of the Government of Viet-Nam despite severe shortages of competent administrative personnel. He pointed out that the Vietnamese face serious and complex economic problems, and especially the problem of agrarian reforms including land for the resettlement of refugees.

Speaking of Taiwan, Mr. Robertson said that the present situation was heartening; that we thought considerable economic progress had been made; and that the problem of an aging army had been solved by recruiting young Taiwanese. The leaders of the GRC recognized that there is no present possibility of a successful attack on the Mainland and they know that we will not go to war to recover the Mainland for them. We have a written agreement that the GRC will not take offensive action against the Mainland without our consent and Chiang Kai-shek has never broken an agreement with us. It is our view that there is no immediate danger of war in the Taiwan Straits because the Chinese Communists know that they will be met with force. Mr. Robertson emphasized the importance of the GRC as the only alternative to Communist China for millions of Chinese on the Mainland as well as for the 12 million overseas Chinese in Asia. Recognition of Communist China and the elimination of the GRC would open up channels for infiltration and subversion among overseas Chinese in every country of Asia.

With respect to Thailand, Mr. Robertson said that despite some past agitation by forces favoring neutralism, the Government of Thailand was strongly attached to the Free World. In Thailand and elsewhere our talks with the Chinese Communists in Geneva had been referred to as evidence of a softening policy. However, these talks were devoted solely and exclusively to two points: 1) release of our prisoners and 2) renunciation of force. Mr. Robertson noted that the Indians had been working actively in Southeast Asia to try to bring the Governments in that area around to a neutralist position.

Mr. Casey, referring to the previous discussion on the Middle East, felt that the United States “held a great many cards” vis-à-vis Israel. He thought the recent modification of their policy might be due to U.S. influence. On the immediate situation, he believed that developments depended very largely on the success of the Hammarskjold mission to Cairo. The conditions under which the International Police Force would operate are of great importance. He wondered if Nasser would not be strengthened by a withdrawal of the British and French and putting in an International Police Force which in truth would not be a real fighting force. Mr. Casey suggested that possibly the best role for the Australians would be liaison between Great Britain and the United States. He viewed the mending of the gap between the United States and the UK as most urgent and thought that Australia might play a role in this.

Speaking of the Arab States, Mr. Casey thought a number were friendly to the West but many of their leaders were prisoners of their domestic policy. He said that Australian foreign policy with respect to Japan was designed to improve and strengthen relations. Australia was also making serious efforts to get on better terms with Indonesia. Mr. Casey said that he had taken particular care to develop cordial personal relations with Indonesian leaders. He referred to Colombo Plan aid, particularly the exchange program under which some 500 Indonesian students have studied in Australia. The most serious problem with respect to Indonesia, Mr. Casey said, was the question of New Guinea. He reported that he had implored the Indonesians to let the “wretched matter” remain dormant for at least a year. He had discussed it frankly with Indonesian Foreign Minister Abdulgani, but again Abdulgani was a prisoner of Indonesian domestic politics. Mr. Casey said he was fully aware of our position and while he would not publicly ask for our help, if we could in any way covertly aid in opposing inscription of the West New Guinea issue at the UN, Australia would be grateful. Referring to the recent naval and air exercise “Albatross” Mr. Casey said that he had personally ordered that no air exercises take place until the Albatross task force had passed beyond the Java Sea in order to avoid inadvertent air violation of Indonesian territory. He said that he had just learned that Admiral Stump thought that Indonesia would have to get used to the idea that the Java Sea was not an Indonesian lake. Mr. Casey agreed with Mr. Robertson’s assessment of the situation in Laos and hoped that U.S. aid would not be discontinued. Speaking briefly of Cambodia, Mr. Casey said that stability was not one of the strongest characteristics of Prince Sihanouk and suggested some thought be given to other potential leaders who might be strengthened. Agreeing with Mr. Robertson’s assessment of the situation in Viet-Nam, Mr. Casey indicated that President Diem has done better than they had originally expected. He referred to Australia’s aid to Viet-Nam through the Colombo Plan and cultural exchanges and hoped that the United States would help Viet-Nam in its modest desire for industrialization.

Mr. Casey then said that Australia would like to acquire Christmas Island (South of Sumatra) for three reasons: 1) its phosphate deposits, 2) in order to build an airfield, and 3) because it is directly in the path of their projected long-range rocket range. Mr. Casey said that the British have agreed to divorce Christmas Island from Singapore where it is presently administered and bring it directly under UK administration so that it will not be a part of any transfer of sovereignty to Singapore.

Speaking of Singapore and Malaya, Mr. Casey said Australia was pleased with Lim Yew-Hock³ and thought he had shown great determination in moving against left-wing trade unions and the Chinese schools. Mr. Casey also thought that things were going favorably in Malaya and suggested that the U.S. might help meet Malaya’s need for economic aid.

On Communist China, Mr. Casey said that the Australian position was largely influenced by U.S. policy. He was aware of our strong views and contemplated no change in Australian policy. There was, however, some non-strategic trade between Communist China and Australia and there might be more, particularly in wool and agricultural machinery.

Mr. Casey referred to the large and well-equipped Russian scientific station established in the Antarctic sector claimed by Australia. Their activities were devoted largely to oceanography and the data they were collecting could be most useful in establishing a submarine base. … He feared that the Russians might not retire gracefully from the Antarctic at the end of the International Geophysical Year in which case he anticipated some difficulty. The Russians might say that they did not recognize the Australian claim and neither did the United States.⁴

Mr. Casey said that he was disturbed by the request of the U.N. Trusteeship Council that attainment dates for self-government be set for Australian New Guinea and especially that the U.S. Representative on the Trusteeship Council had strongly supported this concept. Mr. Casey felt that the inhabitants of New Guinea were so primitive as to be very, very far from any serious thought of self-government.

Mr. Casey mentioned the presence of Professor Bailey,⁵ who wished to discuss the question of territorial limits and the law of the sea. Professor Bailey had already met with Mr. Phleger of the Department, and it was agreed that Mr. Phleger would be available for further discussions and would arrange for representatives of the Defense Department to participate in subsequent talks on the subject.

Mr. Casey expressed appreciation for U.S. support of the Colombo Plan and said that Australia places great stress on the training of Asian students; that they are now training some 650 and hope to increase this to 750 a year under Colombo Plan arrangements.

Mr. Casey pointed out that Australia had had no diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union since the Petrov incident. Recently the Russians have hinted on a number of occasions at the UN and elsewhere that it might be desirable to renew diplomatic relations, and he had intended to agree if the Russians would accept Australian conditions. However, since the developments in Eastern Europe during the last month Australia has no intention of pursuing the matter further.

Mr. Casey recalled that some years ago under a different Australian Government that the United States had had a “sour experience” in talking about Manus Island.⁶ He said that if at any time the United States wanted a base or depot on Australian soil, the present Government would give it sympathetic consideration. Referring to the Woomera rocket range in South Australia now jointly used by Australia and the UK, he said that if at any time the United States would like to make use of this range, he was sure it would be possible to make adequate arrangements. In addition he said “should the United States and/or New Zealand Defense authorities, at any time, wish to make any suggestions in regard to their requirements, in peace or war, for the use of existing Australian base facilities, these will be welcomed by the Australian Defense authorities, who will do all that is possible to meet them.” He added this was not an invitation but he wanted the disposition of his Government made clear.

Mr. Macdonald pointing out that the recent moves against the Communists in Hungary, Poland, and possibly Romania have come initially from students, stated that he felt it was interesting and possibly significant that the Soviet Union’s policy of taking the best of its youth and training them as engineers might backfire. This could be so since a good science student properly trained was apt to do a bit of independent thinking. He agreed with the Acting Secretary that the struggle for power within the Soviet Union could have catastrophic results. Mr. Macdonald hazarded a guess that the Israeli’s resounding military victory might be directed toward acquiring additional territory; he referred to the recent oil discoveries near the Gaza strip which might be an added inducement for Israel to demand an extension of its frontiers. He said that New Zealand’s recent offer to provide troops for the International Police Force was still open but had not been accepted. He noted that the Pakistani had also offered troops for the Police Force but had been given the cold shoulder. He was concerned that the Shell Company, which provided a large part of New Zealand petroleum needs, might be denied oil in Indonesia. He felt that the propaganda effects of the Communist cultural offensive in New Zealand were lost because of developments in Hungary. New Zealand labor leaders had urged the Government to break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. An invitation that a New Zealand parliamentary delegation visit Moscow had not been accepted. Mr. Macdonald said his Government was aware that the visit of the Chinese Opera Company to New Zealand was a straight Communist propaganda move; that it had no Government recognition, and that no member of the Cabinet or Government member of the House attended any of the functions held for the opera group. He believed this visit resulted in a financial loss of 60 thousand pounds and that the Chinese Communists did not get their money’s worth in propaganda.

Mr. Macdonald said that the Russians had asked for use of one of the Tokelau Islands to observe the 1958 eclipse of the sun. He understood that the U.S. might also desire to visit the Tokelaus for the same purpose. If the U.S. should use nearby Swain’s Island which is under U.S. control, it would probably help New Zealand to refuse the Russians.

Reverting to the Middle East, Ambassador Munro said he understood that the Secretary wanted the Anglo-French troops to withdraw from Egypt as soon as possible, but the Ambassador wondered if this would not build up Nasser and increase Russian influence in the area.

The Acting Secretary stated that the British-French-Egyptian-Israeli operation was now inextricably a part of the U.N. function and that it would be impossible to deal with it in any other way. He believed the ultimate result would depend in large part on U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold, whom we view as exceptionally able. While we agree completely that it is undesirable to strengthen Nasser, we do not believe that Suez is a good issue. After Nasser seized the Canal we had some talks at a high level with the heads of a number of Arab States who had told us they did not like Nasser and although they viewed him as a threat, the Canal seizure was not a good issue on which to try to defeat him in his attempt to become the leader of Arab-Egyptian unity. These heads of Arab States wished to eliminate Nasser but felt that it was necessary to find some other issue. The Acting Secretary said that we hoped to let the Suez issue cool off first.

The Acting Secretary pointed out that the Arabs can sell their oil only to the Free World. He said that any thought of occupying an Arab State for a long period of time to protect sources of oil would be undesirable and would be exploited by the Russians for propaganda purposes as has been the case with Anglo-French troops in Egypt.

On Mr. Casey’s statement about the Antarctic, the Acting Secretary said that we would “take a good look at our Antarctic policy”. He expressed appreciation for Mr. Casey’s offer of cooperation on possible U.S. use of the Woomera Rocket Range and other Australian facilities. On the training of technical personnel and exchanges of students, Mr. Hoover agreed to its importance and said that the United States will increase its efforts in this direction. In this connection, however, the Acting Secretary told Mr. Casey and Mr. Macdonald that in the light of Soviet behavior in Hungary we have cancelled all our exchange and cultural programs with the Soviet Union, including participation in trade fairs, except in cases where arrangements had developed to the point where cancellation is not feasible.

He added that the USIA plans an “all out campaign” on Hungary.

Mr. MacArthur, in referring to a query by Mr. Casey, said that we are studying the question of putting a SEATO label on some of our economic aid to SEATO countries. Although we were not favoring a major SEATO economic operation we believed that it might be possible to use the SEATO label on some of our aid without undercutting the Colombo Plan. Mr. Macdonald wondered if this might not have a bad effect on non-SEATO States in that they might turn to Communist aid. Mr. MacArthur thought not, explaining that we have already given increased aid to SEATO countries. Mr. Robertson thought there was a lack of appreciation of the fact that the United States was committed to help if any SEATO country were invaded whereas their non-SEATO neighbors had no such protection. He believed this needed emphasis, especially by others than the United States. Mr. Casey agreed and said he had done so in private.

Mr. Gordon Gray mentioned the alert status of our military forces. He also feared disintegration of the Baghdad Pact and was concerned with the orientation of Iraq. There had been numerous reports of overflights of Turkey, some of them unconfirmed. He reported that a Turkish request for high altitude radar and possibly fighter aircraft was under consideration. He referred to our problems in Korea, particularly the Communist build-up and the limitations on replacement and modernization of equipment. The question of providing weapons with atomic capabilities to our forces in Korea was unresolved, but we would probably go ahead with modernization of conventional weapons.

In answer to a query as to whether we thought the Communists might take advantage of the present situation to initiate further hostile activities, Mr. Robertson stated that we have every evidence of continued collaboration between China and the Soviet Union. As long as Communist China maintains her aggressive attitude we feel we must maintain rather than ease trade restrictions. We believe that it is essential to continue the strictest controls to weaken Communist China and slow down its military build-up. The United States is the principal obstacle to the extension of Communist power in Asia. In the case of overt Communist aggression we would have the principal responsibility for meeting it. In view of this responsibility we believe we have the right to ask our allies to cooperate with us in maintaining the strictest controls. In 1949 the Communist Government repudiated all its debts, seized all foreign assets in the country, and jailed our citizens without trial. In 1950 they invaded Korea and still stand indicted by the U.N. as aggressors. They are even now in military occupation of North Korea. To recognize and give international respectability to Communist China by admitting her to the U.N. would so increase Communist prestige as to greatly increase the chances of all Asia, including Japan being brought within the Communist orbit.

At the request of the Acting Secretary, Mr. MacArthur referred to the two reports of the ANZUS Military Planners. He suggested that the January Report of the Military Representatives meeting at Melbourne⁷ be approved and that the Pearl Harbor Report by the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives of March 1956⁸ be amended to eliminate the last sentence of conclusion 12–f on page B–7.⁹ Mr. MacArthur pointed out that security considerations and the unfortunate timing in view of the British and French action in the Middle East would make a discussion of this issue in the SEATO forum highly undesirable.

Mr. Casey suggested that the ANZUS Military Representatives might address themselves to this subject. It was agreed that this item should be eliminated from the March Report of the Staff Planners to the Military Representatives and that the ANZUS Military Representatives would explore the desirability of undertaking such a study within the ANZUS framework. The Amended March Report and also the January Report were approved by the Council.

Mr. MacArthur said that we were disturbed by the possibility that Pakistan might wish to inject the Middle East situation into a meeting of the SEATO Council Representatives. Because of this fear we had instructed our Council Representatives to confer privately with the Pakistani, Thai and Filipino Council Representatives, suggesting that the Middle East was not within the SEATO area and would not be a suitable subject for SEATO discussion. In these talks our Council Representatives also emphasized that developments in Eastern Europe demonstrated the need for such regional arrangements as SEATO.

Mr. MacArthur said that we had given preliminary consideration to the report of the SEATO Military Advisers¹⁰ which appeared to be satisfactory except for our concern with the reference to global planning. This problem had arisen in NATO and it was generally agreed that regional organizations could not properly become involved in global planning. The British had indicated strong opposition to any attempt to undertake global planning within the SEATO framework. Mr. MacArthur recommended that we meet this issue directly and not attempt to devise a formula of compromise language. He suggested that rather than refer this issue to the SEATO Council, it be taken up by the SEATO Military Advisers at the meeting which they would be expected to have at Canberra just prior to the March meeting of the SEATO Council.

Air Marshal McCauley agreed that this might be settled in the Military Advisers forum on the basis that the threat to Southeast Asia in the event of global war would not be greater than in the event of limited warfare and that as a result it would not be necessary to get into global planning. In addition it could be pointed out that SEATO should get on with its limited war planning in which there was much still to be done.

Mr. MacArthur suggested the desirability of arriving at a common policy in this respect in ANZUS and later reaching agreement on this policy with the British. It was agreed that the Military Advisers would undertake to have this aspect of the SEATO Military Advisers’ Report eliminated before it reached the SEATO Council.¹¹

Mr. MacArthur thought that it might be desirable to have a Secretary-General for SEATO, but a great deal depended on the individual and the terms of reference of such a position. It would be possible to provide for a Secretary-General who would in effect be merely a super-executive secretary, or to establish a much more powerful position. Before we agreed to anything Mr. MacArthur stated, we would want to be sure that the powers of the Secretary-General were very carefully worked out. It was agreed that anyone selected for the position must be an Asian and that he should be of the highest caliber. Mr. MacArthur said that this proposal had not been thoroughly explored by the Council Representatives and that we would wish to await developments prior to any decision. Unless it were pushed by the Asians, we would not wish to take the initiative.

A communiqué was agreed to.¹² (Attached)

Mr. Casey said that if there was no objection, he would like to inform the British of the general nature of the meeting. Since the matter involving the amendment of the ANZUS March Staff Planners Report was not known to the British, Mr. MacArthur thought there seemed to be no reason to inform them of the decision in this respect. Otherwise, of course, we understood that the British were to be kept informed of our general proceedings.

The Council rose at one o’clock.

1. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 806. Secret. Drafted by James D. Bell, Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, and distributed on November 29.
2. President Sukarno was in Washington May 16–18. For documentation on the trip, see vol. XXII, pp. 267–277.
3. Chief Minister of the Colony of Singapore from June 1956.
4. For documentation on U.S. policy regarding the international status of Antarctica, see vol. XI, pp. 607 ff.
5. K.H. Bailey, Solicitor General of Australia.
6. For documentation concerning the proposal for U.S. bases on Manus Island, see Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. VI, pp. 200 ff.
7. See footnote 6, Document 81.
8. Not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5n0–1556)
9. This is the sentence that reads: “Plans for intervention in Burma should be prepared under the aegis of SEATO.”
10. Apparent reference to the report of the meeting of SEATO Military Advisers held in September; not found in Department of State files.
11. In telegram 1929 to Bangkok, November 26, the Department informed the Embassy of this decision and instructed it to endeavor to persuade the Pakistanis not to introduce the question (of SEATO Military Advisers undertaking a study of the threat to the SEATO area under conditions of global warfare) at Council Representatives meetings. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/11–2155)
12. For text of the communiqué, issued November 17, see Department of State Bulletin, November 26, 1956, p. 839.