Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

121. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for SEATO Affairs (Abbott) to the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur)¹

Washington, October 19, 1956.

SUBJECT

• SEATO Problems for Discussion with Mr. Charles Sullivan of Defense

You suggested this morning that there were several SEATO problems which it might be useful to discuss informally with Mr. Sullivan. The most important of these is CINCPACs message to the Secretary² regarding the proposal that SEATO Military Advisers undertake a study of the threat to the SEATO area under conditions of global warfare (see Mr. Gray’s letter to Mr. Robertson of October 15, copy attached). Apart from the considerations mentioned by CINCPAC there are a number of other reasons why I believe it would be unwise for planning of this type to be undertaken by SEATO. (1) Mr. Knight tells me that one of the reasons why similar studies in NATO have been avoided has been the strong reluctance of many members, particularly smaller powers, to get into anything which would involve or imply obligations outside of the NATO area. I believe the same might be true of some of the SEATO powers. (2) The security situation in SEATO is such that it would be dangerous to reveal our global planning concepts in a SEATO forum. (3) It is understood that the defense of Southeast Asia has a low priority in global planning. The revelation of this would not help the morale of the Asian members of SEATO.

The problems which arose in connection with “Operation Albatross” make it essential that some procedure be established whereby SEATO joint military exercises be examined for the political implications well in advance of the date of the exercise. There is attached a draft telegram to Bangkok which you might wish to show Mr. Sullivan.³ This has not yet been cleared with the Pentagon and Mr. Sullivan’s support would be extremely valuable.

You might also wish to mention the report of the ANZUS Military Planners which recommends that SEATO is the proper forum for a study of the measures to be taken if Burma should go Communist.⁴ … I strongly doubt if it would be wise for the SEATO Military Advisers to undertake such a study on Burma at this time, one reason being that Pakistan would very likely request that similar studies be prepared on Afghanistan and India.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5n0–1956. Secret.
2. Forwarded to the Department in Sullivan’s October 15 letter to Walter Robertson. The date of CINCPACs message is not given.
3. Not printed. Documents in Department of State, Central File 790.5 for October and November indicate that the Indonesian Government formally expressed its displeasure to the United States that SEATO naval exercise “Albatross”, held late in September, included maneuvers in waters adjacent to Indonesia, but that the United States viewed the Indonesian protest as a pro forma one and did not officially reply to it.
4. The report is not printed. (Ibid., 790.5/10–1556)
5. Although a marginal note indicates that MacArthur was to meet with Sullivan on October 24, no record of the conversation has been found in Department of State files.