111. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 2, 19561
SUBJECT
- Crown Prince Savang’s Reply to Secretary’s Message
PARTICIPANTS
- His Excellency Ourot Souvannavong, Lao Ambassador
- Mr. Walter S. Robertson, FE
- Mr. Eric Kocher, SEA
- Mr. Thomas J. Corcoran, SEA
The Lao Ambassador called to present the French text of Prince Savang’s reply2 to the Secretary’s June 9 message.
This text which the Lao Ambassador had received by mail, contained the statement that “despite the fact that Laos received a guarantee of protection decided on without its participation, it has confidence in the immediate intervention of SEATO in case of foreign aggression.”
Mr. Robertson reminded the Ambassador that Laos was included in the treaty area at the request of the Lao Government through its Embassy here, that SEATO contains appropriate clauses to afford protection to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam against overt aggression.
[Page 228]The Lao Ambassador said that the word “participation” had been used merely as a matter of form and did not affect the Lao Government’s understanding of the nature of the protection to be afforded by SEATO in the case of overt aggression against Laos.
Mr. Robertson remarked that this was more than a matter of form; SEATO could not offer any government military aid against overt aggression unless that government requested such aid. Mr. Robertson mentioned that Prince Sihanouk of Cambodia had made a somewhat similar statement which caused considerable confusion and misunderstanding. Mr. Robertson said that another note would be prepared setting the record straight on the fact that Laos had made representations prior to the Manila Conference concerning the possibility that SEATO might contain appropriate clauses to afford protection to Laos, Cambodia, and Viet Nam against overt aggression.3
Mr. Robertson said that we were concerned over the possibility that Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma’s projected visit to Peiping,4 especially if made before the internal Pathet Lao problem had been settled, would present dangers to the continuation of Lao independence. The Ambassador declared that he too was uneasy about the visit. He said that Laos wanted to be loyal to the U.S. but he feared that the Chinese Communists would make offers of assistance to the Prime Minister who would be unable to refuse them. This would be very dangerous. The entry of Chinese Communist technicians into Laos would be fatal. Mr. Robertson said it was not a question of loyalty to the U.S. but of the preservation of Lao independence and that Laos and not the U.S. would be the loser if the Chinese Communists succeeded in infiltrating and subverting the country. Any Chinese Communist technicians who entered Laos would be agents of the Chinese Communist Regime acting to subvert the Royal Government and introduce Communism. The Ambassador said he had already written his government and pointed out the dangers of Communist penetration and subversion which might result from the Peiping visit.
The Ambassador stated in conclusion that he would inform his government concerning our disagreement with the phraseology of Prince Savang’s qualification of SEATO protection as “decided without its participation.” He reiterated that he thought this particular phraseology was merely a matter of form and without substantive significance.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/7–256 Secret. Drafted by Corcoran.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 107.↩
- This note was transmitted to Vientiane in telegram 71, July 23, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/6–2756) Record of the note’s delivery to the Lao Government has not been found in Department of State files.↩
- The Prime Minister and his party left Vientiane for Peking on August 19 and returned August 29 after a stop in Hanoi. See Documents 373 ff.↩