Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Volume XXI

110. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 2, 1956¹

Washington, July 2, 1956

SUBJECT

• Changes in Military Command Structure in the Pacific Area

PARTICIPANTS

• Reuben Robertson, Deputy Secretary of Defense
• Gordon Gray, Asst. Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
• Mr. Ross, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Public Affairs
• Mr. McGuire, Deputy Assistant Secy of Defense, Internat. Security Affairs
• General Lemnitzer, CINCUNC, CINCFE
• Admiral Truman Hedding, Special Asst. to Admiral Radford
• Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State, FE
• Allen Lightner, Deputy Assistant Secretary, P
• Mr. Parsons, NA²
• Mr. Bennett, G

The meeting was convened in Deputy Secretary Robertson’s office for discussion of problems arising from the Defense Department plan to effect world-wide changes in US command structures, with particular reference to implementation of the changes planned in the Far East.

General Lemnitzer opened the conference by stressing the importance of determining at an early date who commands what forces and where the forces are to be stationed and the command headquarters established. He said that it has already been firmly decided that CINCUNC will be moved physically to Seoul and that CINCFE will be absorbed by CINCPAC, with a subordinate command structure in Tokyo. General Lemnitzer emphasized the desirability of having one officer designated as the senior commander in Japan, in order to provide our central point for dealing with the Japanese. He indicated that it has not yet been determined which commanding officer will be designated governor of Ryuku Islands, with responsibility for Okinawa.

It was pointed out that, even though the change with respect to CINCUNC is not scheduled until July 1, 1957, and the matter has been handled on a need-to-know basis in both the State and Defense Departments, there is always the possibility of a leak of the plan to the press, particularly since it is part of world-wide changes taking place on different dates, some of which have already occurred. It was, therefore, agreed that an approach should be made to the Japanese at the earliest possible time to enable discussion of the changes with appropriate government officials before the issuance of a press release regarding the Far East command changes. General Lemnitzer proposed that he accompany Ambassador Allison³ in calling on the Prime Minister⁴ or the Foreign Minister⁵ to apprise them of US plans and that immediately thereafter he inform the Director General of the Defense Agency⁶ or some other official charged with decisions in the field of Japanese defense planning. General Lemnitzer would then proceed to Korea to accompany Ambassador Dowling⁷ in a call on President Rhee and the Defense Minister. In that connection, he indicated that President Rhee and Minister Cho have never yet violated a military confidence. These discussions would lay the groundwork for the public announcement.

General Lemnitzer was of the opinion that it would not be necessary to clear the actual wording of the statement with the Japanese or the Koreans but that they should be advised, say 48 hours in advance, that a statement would be issued. In other words, the two governments should have the feeling that the US has consulted with them rather than having presented them with a fait accompli. Mr. Murphy and Mr. Walter Robertson thought that 48 hours advance notice in Tokyo would very likely result in a leak to the press, but agreed that it was important to have the consultation even though there might be a leak. Mr. McGuire pointed out that some of the command changes, as in Europe, have already taken place and that there might easily be a leak from that side.

It was agreed to move ahead at full speed in getting agreement between the two Departments on the release to be made. Mr. Lightner and Mr. Parsons were asked by Mr. Murphy to represent the Department in going to work immediately with Defense representatives on the text of a release. The working group was requested to have something ready to meet General Lemnitzer’s scheduled return to Tokyo on July 4. It was agreed that the draft release would be sent to the Embassies at Tokyo and Seoul for their comments, and, in response to a suggestion of General Lemnitzer, that the release would be issued in all three capitals simultaneously as a Defense Department announcement.

There was discussion that the Japanese would immediately want information on 1) the future of the US logistic base in Japan and 2) the continuance of US interest in run-way extensions in Japan. In this connection, Mr. Murphy inquired regarding the number of American personnel to be withdrawn from Japan and on the extent of economic impact on that country. General Lemnitzer said with regard to run-ways that we shall certainly still want to extend them. This is in the Japanese interest as much as in our own, and he continues to hope for an increasing sense of responsibility on the part of the Japanese with respect to this problem. As to our logistic base and the number of Americans to leave Japan, that depends on how much of our organization we take out. There will not be much unless the air force should be removed; that is the big thing. Supply bases would continue in Japan until at some later date they are moved back to the West Coast or some other solution is found. He does not, therefore, expect any great impact on Japan at the present time, but looks for a gradual decrease over the coming years with respect to personnel and supplies. He pointed out in that connection that he is now responsible as CINCPAC for the employment of a quarter of a million Japanese laborers. He believes that the Japanese operation will shrink gradually over a period of years.

Mr. Murphy commented that the State Department was laboring under a general lack of knowledge as to the reasons for the command changes. He emphasized that it is important both for Japan and for the Asian mainland to know the reasons which lie behind the American decisions. Deputy Secretary Robertson explained that the JCS has been under pressure for a long time to simplify its world-wide command structure. He said there is a general feeling in the Pentagon that US operations in the Far East would be better coordinated under one command and mentioned the present overlap in air force commands between CINCPAC and CINCFE. The Japanese have made clear, during the Shigemitsu visit to Washington last year⁸ and elsewhere, that they desire a gradual phase-out of American troops from Japan.

After discussion of the pros and cons, it was agreed that the move of CINCUNC to Seoul would on balance be favorably received. General Lemnitzer concurred in this view but suggested that, while the ROKs would be happy at the outset, they would not continue in that frame of mind, if it should become apparent that CINCUNC were a subordinate command and no longer had direct access to 1) the JCS on military matters and 2) ICA for economic aid. General Lemnitzer expressed himself strongly in favor of keeping CINCUNC’s present relationship with ICA on the basis of his experience; as he put it, we simply cannot have two drivers for the one car on the Korean peninsula.

Mr. Robertson mentioned the strong opinion in the State Department that both MAAG and ICA relationships in Korea should be regularized, especially, ICA. General Lemnitzer indicated that he felt less strongly about his ICA role than about MAAG; he felt that the present MAAG relationship is vital to him in that it gives him operational control over the ROK forces and, by using his control, he has been able effectively to forestall trouble between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Mr. Robertson replied that the State recognizes fully that the military problem is the principal one in Korea and went on to stress that our economic program is carried on in its present magnitude entirely with the purpose of giving support to our military program.

There was further discussion of the effect of the command changes on public opinion in the Far East. Mr. Murphy and General Lemnitzer both stressed the importance of the way the matter is handled to avoid an impression throughout the Far East that it constitutes a US pull-back to Hawaii. Mr. McGuire expressed the opinion that the release should not be pitched on a tone of withdrawal but rather on the positive step of integrating all forces in the Far East and simplifying the command structure. There was general agreement with this but General Lemnitzer pointed out that the main focus of US power was around the Japanese sea. People there will be concerned at the implications of the changes and will ask questions. General Lemnitzer repeated that the main problem involved in Japan is the future of our air force. There are not many aircraft in Korea, but CINCUNC must command the air in Korea. He does not see how COMFEAF can fall back to Honolulu and operate effectively in the area around the Japanese sea. It was pointed out that the plan was to have the Fifth Air Force operate as a subordinate command headquartered in Japan.

General Lemnitzer stressed the further opinion that it is very important that we allow time for the Japanese and the Koreans to adjust to and “flow into” our changes. While we should have a timetable, we should be able to slow it down as necessary to enable them to move into the gaps we will be leaving. He suggested that July 1, 1957, should be the target date for the command change but that we should not be forced to carry it out then if the Japanese are not ready. Deputy Secretary Robertson agreed with General Lemnitzer; Mr. Gray also expressed agreement but expressed the view that the decision on the change of command must be regarded as a firm one and there must be no foot dragging in carrying it out.

POLAD for CINCPAC

Mr. Murphy remarked that it seemed appropriate at this time to bring up the question of a political adviser for CINCPAC. He pointed out that the absorption of CINCFE by CINCPAC, with headquarters at Hawaii, would remove the opportunity for the close political-military liaison which now exists between CINCFE and the Embassy at Tokyo. Since CINCPAC’s area of responsibility will be greatly enlarged, and in view of the growing attention being paid to SEATO and other mutual defense arrangements involving relations with independent nations in the Far East, the Department sees a real need for the appointment of a diplomatic officer at Honolulu to provide political information to CINCPAC and to be able to advise on the political aspects of military activities in the Pacific.

General Lemnitzer remarked that, indeed, he did not see how CINCPAC could get along without a political adviser. Deputy Secretary Robertson said that everyone is agreed on the desirability of a political adviser for CINCPAC. He said that Admiral Stump had expressed a desire for one in recent discussions with the Pentagon. Mr. Robertson indicated that there is no problem on this matter.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 102.2/7–256. Secret. Drafted by W. Tapley Bennett, Murphy’s Special Assistant.
2. Howard L. Parsons, Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs.
3. John M. Allison, Ambassador to Japan.
4. Ichiro Hatoyama.
5. Mamoru Shigemitsu.
6. Funada Naka.
7. Walter C. Dowling, Ambassador to Korea.
8. Shigemitsu visited the United States, August 29–September 1. Documentation on his visit is in volume XXIII.