101. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
1242. Department pass Defense and CINCPAC. During call with Kenneth Young on Crown Prince, Savang reverted at some length and with great emphasis to need for more solid assurance of military support to Laos (reference Embtel 1166 and 11912). He spoke again of his intention, now that new government installed, to ask French Government whether it is still able and willing to carry out its treaty obligations with Laos. He is confident reply will, in fact if not in form, be in negative. Laos will thereupon be obliged to ask from SEATO and US more explicit assurances. In absence concrete guarantees [Page 213] SEATO support in case of attack, Laos, despite its democratic pro-western convictions, would be obliged to incline toward neutralism.
For first time Prince also raised question of continuity and duration United States military aid. He said it is impossible create and maintain effective army if Lao Government never knows whether US aid on which army is entirely dependent will be continued beyond current year. He said Laos cannot be treated like child which is given cake when it is “good” and denied cake when it is “not good”. Lao Government must be assured US and Laos are working together toward common objectives on firm long-term basis.
We endeavored with partial success to reassure Prince, reiterating statements contained in Secretary’s recent message to him and emphasizing solidity and efficacy of SEATO shield. We recognized importance coordinating military plans, described our encouragement to Thais to proceed with bilateral conversations, and said that if this method of coordination proved inadequate another would be found. Re continuity of US support for Lao Armed Forces, we pointed out necessity of obtaining annual appropriation from Congress but emphasized determination US people and Congress to maintain strong world-wide military barrier against Communist expansion and fact that Congress had consistently during past nine years voted sufficient funds to maintain at necessary levels military establishments of countries threatened by such expansion.
Comment It may be expected these points will be increasingly pressed by Crown Prince and Lao Government during coming months. Almost total French withdrawal from Indochina, continued ChiCom-Viet intervention in north Laos, rising winds of neutralism in south Asia, and increased recognition their total dependence on US support to maintain their current foreign policy, all combine to stimulate insistence on more concrete assurance of US and SEATO support.
I strongly recommend Department and other interested US agencies give urgent study to means of conveying these assurances, recognizing that Laos will probably not feel free to join SEATO in immediate future. On one hand, while bilateral conversations with Thais should be pushed, we should also consider (1) whether US representatives should not participate directly in these conversations and (2) whether they can be tied more closely into SEATO framework without provoking French or British veto. On other hand, we should examine means of assuring Lao Government that our aid to Lao Armed Forces will continue as long as present critical threat exists and that Laos will not suddenly be left defenseless either because of shift in [Page 214] US policy or because it may not in some instances have behaved exactly as we would have wished.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.5/3–2756. Top Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Paris, Saigon, and Phnom Penh.↩
- Documents 96 and 99.↩