Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

76. Telegram From the Mission at the United Nations to the Department of State¹

New York, September 28, 1955—1 p.m.

340. From USDEL Disarmament Subcommittee. Re: Summary Four-Power meeting² afternoon 27 September, Moch chairman.

Moch recounted highlights of personal conversation with Malik and Soviet Delegation who inquired if four Western powers had as yet discussed Bulganin letter.³Moch replied negatively. He further stated Soviets are anticipating early discussion of letter. Soviets inquired why Bulganin letter was released to press. Soviets further expressed concern three Western Foreign Ministers are meeting in New York and wondered why this could not be extended include Mr. Molotov. Moch’s reply was this would be premature at this time.

Moch asked Soviets specific questions with following answers: was aim of Bulganin letter to place discussions on bilateral basis? Soviet replied in negative and stated letter was distributed to French and British as well. Moch inquired about use of words “prohibition of use” of nuclear weapons rather than “elimination”. Did this indicate a change in Soviet position? Soviets startled, and asserted they did not attach so many shades of meaning to words and that their position remained specifically as May 10 proposal. It was Moch’s view that Soviet answer was sincere.

Soviets were asked if aerial inspection could be effective as a system of control. Reply was they stood on their May 10 proposal as best system of control which would be effective perhaps until introduction of guided missiles. Moch asked if letter indicated that agreement could now be reached on such subjects as levels of armed forces if discussion of methods of control of elimination of nuclear weapons were set aside. The answer was “no”, that entire problem must be discussed and agreed upon comprehensively.

Nutting (UK) observed that any establishment of force levels must be geared to requirement for support of retaliatory nuclear airpower.

Stassen stated that decision to publish Bulganin letter was agreed between Molotov and Secretary Dulles to avoid unfortunate conclusions that might arise as result of piecemeal release or leaks to press.

In reply to a question by Stassen, it was Moch’s view that Malik would not head up subcommittee delegation and Nutting added Malik had told him he contemplated one more month’s stay.

Regarding possibility earlier advanced by UK of private meeting of subcommittee to discuss Bulganin letter, it was UK belief upon reflection that it might be inappropriate at this time. Rather than ask Soviets blunt question of whether or not they have abandoned elimination of nuclear weapons, we should wait until such time as we have prepared a Western position on levels of arms to include retention of nuclear weapons and ask them for Soviet view.

Regarding continuance of subcommittee meetings, British view that continuance beyond 8 October would unnecessarily subject us to Soviet attempts to split Western position. This would place US in precarious position since many of our views remain unreconciled. Schedule proposed by Nutting would be: Adjourn subcommittee 8 October, subcommittee report to be available to Foreign Ministers at Geneva and to Disarmament Commission immediately afterwards. Interim report to contain proviso that a postscript would probably be added as result of Foreign Ministers meeting.

Stassen preferred not to submit subcommittee report to Disarmament Commission until after the Geneva meetings because of unfortunate de-valuing effect it would have on meeting of Foreign Ministers. Moch suggested as compromise that informal report be sent seven other delegates to Disarmament Commission, who could be studying it prior to final official report. Moch considered here important subcommittee meetings continue without recess because of possibility adverse public opinion might draw conclusion shutdown was result of either President’s illness or effect of Bulganin letter.

Essential we keep moving forward and maintain flexibility of position. Moch most anxious introduce his synthesis into subcommittee or GA. Would prefer Four-Power concurrence but is prepared go it alone. Nutting suggested continued consultations on part of four powers as substitute for subcommittee sessions to consolidate views already near agreement. Nutting observed British public opinion at present time is prepared to accept fact elimination of nuclear weapons is impossible. Stassen extended invitation to four Western powers for Air Force briefing on aerial photography. Discussion of Western power views of Italian approach to disarmament subject of separate telegram.⁴ For subcommittee meeting 28 September, Moch will review various aspects of prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons. Stassen saw no objection to Moch or Martin⁵ referring to Bulganin letter in subcommittee, but in view of President’s illness and consequent absence of specific Presidential comment thereon, he did not wish table it at present time.

Tentatively planned on subcommittee meeting Friday, September 30, as well.

Lodge

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9–2855. Secret; Priority.
2. Reference is to the four Western powers, the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and France, represented on the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. These four powers met on a regular basis during the meetings of the subcommittee to discuss developments in the subcommittee and try to develop agreement in advance on positions to be taken at future subcommittee meetings.
3. See Document 71.
4. Telegram 339 from New York, September 27, summarized the possibility of Italy having closer association with the subcommittee. Stassen raised and supported the idea. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/9–2755)
5. Paul Martin.