Also enclosed, for the information of the Council is a Financial
Appendix.4
[Enclosure]
STATEMENT OF U.S. POLICY ON PEACEFUL USES OF ATOMIC ENERGY
General Considerations
Scope of Policy
1. This policy statement is addressed primarily to peaceful uses of
atomic energy overseas, while recognizing that the success of the
overseas program will be dependent to a large extent on the
effectiveness of the domestic program.
Developments Since 1955
2. Since approval in March 1955 of U.S. policy on the peaceful uses
of atomic energy (NSC 5507/2), the
United States has developed a broad international program of
cooperation and assistance based on many new developments in the
United States and abroad. Revision of the existing policy is
necessary to reflect the broadening program and to provide
flexibility for future action. The most significant new developments
are:
- a.
- Conclusion by the United States of bilateral agreements
for cooperation6 with 43 Free World
countries.7
- b.
- Establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency
and the forthcoming ratification of the Euratom Community.
- c.
- Active interest in atomic energy matters by the
Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) in Europe, the
Organization of American States (OAS) in Latin America, and the Colombo Plan
nations in Asia.
- d.
- Initiation of lone-term nuclear power programs by the
United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and other
countries.
- e.
- Soviet entry into the field of peaceful application of
atomic energy on a scale which will offer an increasing
challenge to Western leadership in the field.
- f.
- Greater world-wide understanding of the economic and
social potentialities of peaceful applications of atomic
energy and of the technical problems which must be resolved
to achieve economic nuclear power.
- g.
- Expansion of activities abroad by U.S. industry in all
peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- h.
- Active competition of U.K. industry with U.S. industry in
the field of nuclear power.
- i.
- Growing interest among cooperating countries in applying
atomic energy in fields other than commercial power, e.g.,
medicine, agriculture, industry and research.
- j.
- Increased potential for nuclear weapons development and
radiation hazard, resulting from development of national and
regional programs abroad and the increasing availability of
nuclear material and atomic technology.
- k.
- The need for alternate sources of power in Western Europe
in view of the heavy and increasing dependence of that area
on Middle East oil—a dependence which was demonstrated by
the Suez crisis and which has been a strong motivating force
in the initiation of EURATOM.
Status of
Major Atomic Energy Programs for
Peaceful Uses
A. U.S. Domestic Programs
Power Program
3. The ultimate objective of the U.S. domestic program is the
attainment of economical nuclear power in this country. To attain
this objective, the United States has engaged in investigation of
many different technical approaches, rather than concentrating on
construction of a single type of large-scale power plant known to be
uneconomical in the United States in the present state of the art.
The U.S. domestic power reactor program is affected by four main
considerations:
- a.
- Economically competitive nuclear power in the United
States is not likely to be achieved prior to 1970, unless
accelerated by a breakthrough.
- b.
- No single type of reactor system will satisfy the variety
of our anticipated requirements.
- c.
- It is desirable to promote the peaceful uses of atomic
energy as a normal function of American business as soon as
possible.
- d.
- Because the U.S. domestic program must provide the
technical and material basis for implementing U.S. policy
concerning peaceful uses of atomic energy abroad,
considerable efforts are devoted in the United States to the
development of reactors of special interest abroad.
4. On the basis of the source of their financial support, existing
U.S. peaceful atomic power projects built or under contract may be
divided into three groups. In all three groups private industry
finances the conventional portion (including research and
development) of the prototype power project.
- a.
- The nuclear portion of the first group of projects is
almost entirely government-financed. These projects include
17 reactor experiments specifically aimed at evaluation of
the technical feasibility and
[Page 770]
economic promise of eight different
design concepts and include one large-scale prototype
reactor plant and one nuclear-powered merchant ship
plant.
- b.
- The nuclear portion of the second group of projects is
financed partly by the Government and partly by industry.
These projects consist of four large-scale prototype reactor
plants to evaluate cost and performance of the most
promising designs.
- c.
- The third group consists of two large-scale and one
small-scale prototype reactor plants financed wholly by
industry.
By 1962 these eight prototype reactor plants will produce
approximately 800,000 kilowatts, with two designed to generate
approximately 180,000 kilowatts each, five falling within the range
of 60,000 kilowatts to 130,000 kilowatts each, and the remaining one
generating 5,000 kilowatts.8
Research Programs
5. a. Extensive programs have been established for research in the
physical and biological sciences in both public and private
institutions, e.g., particle accelerators for research in high
energy nuclear physics; radiation effects upon both animate and
inanimate material; irradiation of food as a means of preserving it
for extended periods without refrigeration; and improved industrial,
agricultural, and medical application of isotopes.
b. Extensive research and development programs on controlled
thermonuclear reactions, fission reactor materials, chemical
processing of fuels, disposal of radioactive wastes, reactor safety
and related matters are being pursued in addition to specific
military and civilian reactor projects.
Other Programs9
6. Other domestic programs include:
- a.
- Extensive training in the United States to provide U.S.
manpower skilled in science and technology.
- b.
- Conferences, missions and foreign information
projects.
- c.
- Continuous declassification of all current information on
nuclear reactor design other than special military
applications.
- d.
- Construction and operation of a nuclear-powered merchant
ship by the United States.10
[Page 771]
B. U.S. Overseas Program
7. The essential components of the present U.S. program for the
peaceful uses of atomic energy overseas are:
- a.
- Development of agreements for cooperation in peaceful uses
of atomic energy with other nations or groups of
nations.
- b.
- Aggressive U.S. leadership in establishment and
implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
The United States has announced that it is considering
donation of a research reactor and laboratory to the Agency.
Pursuant to the President’s 1956 offer of 5,000 kilograms of
U–23511 plus an amount
equal to offers to the International Agency of U–235 through June 30, 1960 by
other members,12
the United States has already allocated for sale to the
International Agency:
- (1)
- 5,000 kilograms of U–235.
- (2)
- 50 kilograms of U–235 to match the USSR offer.
- (3)
- 20 kilograms of U–235 to match the U.K. offer.
- (4)
- 100,000 kilograms of natural uranium to match the
Portuguese offer.13
- c.
- Designation of amounts of U–235 available for nuclear reactors abroad;
reasonable assurances of U–235
supply for periods commensurate with the amortizable life of
foreign reactors; and the establishment of U–235 prices to foreign users,
which are based on the recovery of full costs (such U.S.
costs being apparently lower than the costs of other
producer nations).
- d.
- Provision of unclassified atomic energy information, and
development of procedures for prompt exchange of such
information.
- e.
- Support of training programs for foreign nationals in
nuclear science and technology in U.S. universities and
national laboratories, and encouragement and support of
expanded training of such nationals abroad.
- f.
- Modest financial assistance for research materials and
equipment, including grants up to $350,000 to any
cooperating country for research reactor projects.
- g.
- Measures designed to assist in the reduction of reactor
operating costs and in estimating the costs of nuclear
power: (1) availability of chemical reprocessing services in
the United States under longterm arrangements at specified
charges; (2) commitments to purchase plutonium produced in
foreign reactors fueled with material from the United
States; (3) leasing fuel required for research reactors; (4)
availability of Export-Import Bank loans, on criteria
similar to those for
[Page 772]
financing conventional plants, to finance fuel
inventories for nuclear power projects and to assist in
financing capital costs of research and power
reactors.
- h.
- Increasing fuel cycle research and development,
particularly (1) design and fabrication of fuel elements,
(2) improved techniques of chemical reprocessing, and (3)
development of a practical and economic method for recycling
plutonium, so as to reduce dependence upon U–235.
C. U.K. Program
8. a. The United Kingdom has adopted an expanded program designed to
produce 5,000,000–6,000,000 kilowatts of nuclear electrical capacity
by 1966 (about three times the goal set in 1955), at an approximate
cost of 980 million pounds ($2,740 million). The 6,000,000-kilowatt
capacity is expected to be installed in 16 to 19 stations, most
which will have about 300,000 kilowatts capacity each, but some of
which may have as high as 500,000 kilowatts capacity.
b. In addition, the United Kingdom now has two power reactors in
operation at Calder Hall, producing a net electrical output of about
70,000 kilowatts, and six more such reactors are scheduled for
completion in 1958. These reactors are optimized for the production
of plutonium for weapons, with electrical power as a byproduct. The
total output from the eight reactors is expected to be
280,000–290,000 kilowatts.
c. The United Kingdom also has under way an extensive research and
development program on five14 types of reactors
and is working on ship propulsion, research and materials testing
reactors, controlled thermonuclear reaction and particle
accelerators.
9. Since 1953, and especially since the passage of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, it has been possible to increase cooperation in the
non-weapons field between the United States and the United Kingdom.
In addition to technological cooperation, the United Kingdom works
jointly with the United States to obtain acceptance of a system of
safeguards in the International Atomic Energy Agency and in
bilateral atomic energy agreements. The British also are
collaborating with a number of other Free World countries.
D. The USSR Program
10. The USSR has an extensive atomic
energy program for peaceful purposes both at home and abroad. Its
power reactor program is substantial and diversified and its
over-all nuclear research is broadly
[Page 773]
based. The USSR is able to, and probably will, challenge
increasingly the leadership of the United States and the United
Kingdom in the field of nuclear power.
11. The USSR has two ministries
directing atomic energy development—one for military uses and one
for peaceful uses, the latter being the Main Administration for the
Utilization of Atomic Energy. The Soviet Program is in three main
fields:
- a.
- Nuclear power: The planned goal is
1,400,000 kilowatts generating capacity by 1960 (reduced
from the original goal of 2,500,000), through an
experimental program of small reactors of advanced design
and the construction of three very large power
stations.
- b.
- Nuclear Propulsion: The hull of a
nuclear-powered ice breaker has just been launched; the
reactor is scheduled to be installed and operational trials
to begin in 1958. Although there is no direct evidence,
there is reason to believe that work has begun on a nuclear
powered submarine, and a reactor could be available in late
1957. Numerous statements in open literature indicate that
the USSR is at least
planning and may have begun work on other nuclear-powered
ocean-going vessels. There is no evidence to indicate
whether the USSR is working
on a nuclear-powered aircraft. If the Soviets do undertake a
nuclear-powered aircraft program, it will probably be for
psychological and military rather than economic
advantages.
- c.
- Other: The USSR will continue to make extensive use of
radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture, industry and basic
research.
12. The Soviet program of atomic energy assistance to the satellites,
begun in 1955, consists primarily of the provision of research
reactors and training. Soviet-supplied 2000-kilowatt research
reactors are in operation in Rumania and Czechoslovakia and will
soon be in operation in East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria.
Communist China has received a 6,500–10,000 kilowatt reactor which
will soon be in operation. The USSR
has a large center near Moscow where satellite and other foreign
scientists are trained in all phases of nuclear energy. The Soviet
aid program is being expanded to include help in constructing
nuclear power stations in several satellites. The USSR is attempting to keep close
control over satellite atomic energy programs, thus reportedly
engendering some antagonism among satellite scientists, by requiring
(a) uniform package deals involving all phases of atomic energy
development; (b) provisions in the aid agreements assuring Soviet
receipt of key natural resources; and (c) satellite scientists to
train in the USSR rather than in
their own laboratories.
13. Soviet policy toward non-bloc countries is flexible, is designed
primarily to achieve political objectives, and is aimed largely
toward underdeveloped nations. The most active Soviet programs are
with Egypt and Yugoslavia and involve the construction of research
reactors. The USSR has offered a
number of other countries aid, mostly in the form of scholarships
for study in the USSR and of
radioisotopes for research. Only a few of these offers have become
realities, sometimes
[Page 774]
because the recipient country has refused the offer and sometimes
because of lack of Soviet follow-through. It is still too early to
judge the effectiveness of the Soviet program to non-bloc countries.
The appeal of the lack of political or safeguard strings on Soviet
offers to Egypt and Yugoslavia may be counter-balanced by Soviet
insistence on the presence of Soviet technicians, and slowness of
follow-through. However, by late 1959, when the first large-scale
Soviet nuclear power plant (210,000 electrical kilowatts) goes into
operation, the USSR will probably
increase its offers of aid in the construction of nuclear power
stations in non-bloc countries.
14. The Soviet Union appears now to be taking a direct interest in
the International Atomic Energy Agency, and, after original
opposition and procrastination, has cooperated in the work of the
Preparatory Commission.
E. Programs of Other
Countries
15. France has constructed five research reactors and has in
operation a gas-cooled plutonium-producing reactor, which also
yields 5,000 kilowatts of by-product electrical power, all of which
is used in the operation of the reactor. Three other full-scale
power-plutonium reactors are presently under construction. Funds
have been authorized for construction of a plant for production of
U–235, either through Euratom or as an independent French
national effort if necessary. Canada, Norway, and Sweden have built
research reactors and with only limited outside assistance are
planning to construct power reactors. Many other countries are
establishing or contemplating establishment of atomic energy
programs.
F. IAEA and Regional Programs
16. The International Atomic Energy Agency
Statute has been signed by more than 80 nations and ratification has
been completed by the United States, the USSR and some 55 others. The Statute permits the Agency
to engage in any aspect of the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
Present plans emphasize technical support of national and regional
programs. The Agency should have special importance in the
enforcement of safeguards against diversion of atomic energy
assistance to military purposes.
17. EURATOM. The Treaty to establish the European
Atomic Energy Community was signed on March 25, 1957, by Belgium,
France, the German Federal Republic, Italy, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands, and completion of ratifications is expected very early
in 1958. EURATOM, a Supra-national
organization, will have important operating responsibilities in
research and development, in coordination of members’ programs, and
in supply of nuclear fuel, though actual construction and operation
of nuclear power plants will be carried out
[Page 775]
on a national basis. A group of three experts
recommended that EURATOM adopt
as its target the installation of 15 million kilowatts of electric
generating equipment in the next ten years, as much as possible
being built by European industry.
18. The Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC) has a
membership of 17 Western European countries (including the EURATOM countries), with Canada and
the United States as associate members. It has a cooperative nuclear
energy program, much less closely knit than the EURATOM group. It will sponsor
certain joint projects (e.g., a chemical processing plant) and will
operate a joint safeguards and accountability system.
19. The Organization of American States has
established a consultative Atomic Energy Commission for technical
matters.
20. While the U.S. proposal for the establishment of an Asian Nuclear
Center in the Philippines was supported in principle by the Colombo
Plan nations at the Working Group meeting in Washington in July
1957,15 they
indicated that they were not prepared to accept commitments to carry
the operating costs of a center on the $20 million scale originally
proposed by the United States. In view of this position, the United
States does not propose to proceed with the center as originally
envisaged. However, in view of intensified Soviet scientific
activity and the need for training facilities in the area, the
United States is studying a plan for construction of a less costly
center, possibly to be associated with the Colombo Plan and the
IAEA.
Economics of Nuclear Power.
21. Economic nuclear power on a large scale is likely to develop
first in England and on the Continent of Europe, although other
areas of extensive power networks such as Japan and the USSR may follow closely. Because of
adequate supplies of relatively cheap fuel and the availability of
large, efficient and low-cost conventional plants, economically
competitive nuclear power is not likely to be achieved in the United
States at as early a date. Further details are shown in Figures
A, B and C,16
which project the costs of electrical power from conventional and
nuclear plants in the United Kingdom, EURATOM, and the United States.
22. The U.K. and Western European political and economic motivations
to avoid increased reliance upon conventional fuels from outside
sources of supply provide a further incentive, not present in the
United States, for the early initiation of nuclear power projects.
In both areas, for example, the dependence on Middle East oil and
the consequences
[Page 776]
of
interruption of this flow were highlighted by the Suez incident.
Figure D17 portrays the reductions in future imports of
conventional fuel expected to be achieved through the nuclear power
program recommended for EURATOM.
23. Figure E17 forecasts and compares anticipated nuclear
power programs of the United States, the United Kingdom and EURATOM. It should be particularly
noted that the forecast of the U.S. program assumes that reductions
in the costs of nuclear power will be achieved during the periods
1960–1965 and 1965–1970 through engineering and technological
advances resulting from the construction and operation of sufficient
numbers of first and second and perhaps later generation prototype
nuclear power plants in these respective periods. See Figure F.17
24. World opinion equates pre-eminence in power reactor technology
with leadership in the peaceful applications of atomic energy.
Accordingly, the development of measures to maintain U.S.
pre-eminence in power reactor technology is of continuing concern
and paramount importance.
Non-Technical Problems
25. Some of the more important non-technical problems related to U.S.
policy on peaceful uses of atomic energy are:
- a.
- So long as no effective disarmament agreement exists,
military needs remain paramount, and military and civilian
demands must be reconciled.
- b.
- As other countries develop atomic energy programs they
will at the same time develop increasing capabilities for
the independent production of nuclear weapons. Provision for
the development of a system of safeguards and controls is
made in the IAEA Statute,
and in U.S., U.K., and Canadian bilateral agreements. The
need for safeguards and controls assumes increasing
importance as a way of preventing nuclear materials and
equipment furnished for peaceful uses form being diverted to
military use. Such safeguards and controls might be more
acceptable politically on a multilateral than on a
unilateral basis. Atomic energy programs based on domestic
resources will be free from any external controls. If
substantial atomic energy assistance form the USSR, and possibly other
countries, becomes available without safeguards, it will be
difficult for the United States or the IAEA to obtain
safeguards.
- c.
- Widespread use of high-level radiation sources and the
need to dispose of radioactive wastes will increase the
potential hazard inherent in atomic energy activities and
create international health-safety problems and associated
legal and financial problems of insurance and
liability.
- d.
- In view of the emergence of bilateral, regional and IAEA channels for
international cooperation, it will be necessary in
undertaking new programs or in responding to foreign
overtures for assistance to
[Page 777]
determine which channel would best
serve the interests of the United States. These channels
need not be competitive but can supplement each other. The
United States has a special interest in supporting the
IAEA in view of U.S.
sponsorship of the IAEA and
the special contribution which it can make to acceptance and
enforcement of a worldwide system of safeguards.
Encouragement of regional groups, where appropriate and
politically desirable, as opposed to more costly national
efforts, would help develop interdependence in atomic energy
matters among military potential more development of
national atomic military potential more difficult.
Traditional or special relationships, such as those between
the United States and Canada and the United States and the
United Kingdom, will call for continuance of bilateral
arrangements. Such bilateral arrangements may also be
necessary to provide the legal framework for cooperation or
commercial arrangements not covered by regional
organizations or the IAEA.
Relation of U.S. Policy on Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy to National Security Objectives
26. The maintenance of U.S. supremacy in peaceful uses of atomic
energy overseas and in nuclear technology, both in fact and in the
eyes of the world, is an important element of U.S. national security
policy. As long as U.S. activities and capability in peaceful uses
of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology provide the
United States with continued recognition as the Number One country in the field, friendly
competition between the United States and other Free World countries
would not detract from U.S. pre-eminence and would contribute to
Free World leadership. U.S. pre-eminence and influence in peaceful
uses of atomic energy overseas and in nuclear technology will
enhance general acceptance of effective safeguards to minimize
diversion of nuclear material to weapons purposes. Loss of such U.S.
preeminence would gravely damage the prestige of the United
States.
27. Because of the present state of the technology and economics of
atomic energy, the highly industrialized countries (Western Europe
and Japan) which have scientific and technical capabilities and a
need for atomic energy will derive important benefits from atomic
energy over the next ten years. U.S. atomic energy cooperation with
these industrialized countries can materially assist them in meeting
their mounting energy needs. In contrast, over the same period,
atomic energy will not contribute significantly to the solution of
the economic problem of the underdeveloped areas. However, U.S.
assistance and cooperation in the atomic energy field with these
underdeveloped areas will be important as a part of the U.S. cold
war effort.
Objectives
28. To the extent consistent with “the common defense and security”
of the United States:
[Page 778]
- a.
- Pre-eminence by the United States and leadership by it and
other appropriate Free World countries in peaceful atomic
energy development and international cooperation,
particularly in the development and application of nuclear
power.
- b.
- Use of such pre-eminence and leadership to promote
cohesion within the Free World and to forestall successful
Soviet exploitation of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to
attract the allegiance of the uncommitted peoples of the
world.
- c.
- International development of atomic energy alone lines
which provide adequate protection for the health and safety
of the individual and the international community.
- d.
- The use only for peaceful purposes of source, special
nuclear or other nuclear materials and equipment, and
materials derived therefrom, except in the case of the
united States and selected allies; recognizing that the
achievement of this objective requires effective
implementation of safeguards under bilateral agreements and
under the IAEA, but that
national nuclear weapons programs can be controlled only
through safeguarded disarmament agreements.
Policy Guidance
29. Vigorously carry out U.S. domestic programs, including those
indicated below, in the development and application of all phases of
peaceful uses of atomic energy in order to maintain U.S.
pre-eminence and Free World leadership in this field.
30. Continue the U.S. program of assistance and cooperation with
other nations in the development and use of atomic energy for
peaceful purposes. To this end:
- a.
- Continue to enter into “agreements for cooperation” or
“international arrangements”, as appropriate, with other
nations or groups of nations indicating a desire to
cooperate in the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- b.
- Continue, as may be consistent with military requirements,
to request further Presidential determinations making
special nuclear material available for peaceful uses outside
the United States. Except as authorized by the Atomic Energy
Commission, enriched uranium distributed for peaceful uses
outside the United States shall not be of weapons
quality.
- c.
- Continue to assist cooperating nations or groups of
nations (such as OEEC and
OAS) in the development
and use of research and power reactors and in the
development and application of atomic energy in the physical
and biological sciences, medicine, agriculture, and
industry, with special attention to the utilization of
radio-isotopes; emphasizing the development of technically
and economically sound national programs according to the
capacities and needs of the cooperating party.
- d.
- Continue the training and education of eligible nationals
of other countries, both in the United States and abroad, in
the peaceful uses of atomic energy.
- e.
- Continue the dissemination to other countries of
information on peaceful uses of atomic energy to the maximum
extent authorized by law.
[Page 779]
Coordinate such U.S. programs of assistance, and any
other new U.S. assistance programs in this field which may hereafter
be approved, with other U.S. foreign assistance programs.
31. Continue aggressive research and development in the United States
of power reactors of appropriate design for export, including
associated fuel cycles.
32. Continue to encourage and facilitate the participation of U.S.
individuals, industries and private institutions in atomic
activities abroad, including the world market for nuclear equipment,
services, and materials.
33. In order to maintain U.S. leadership in the peaceful application
of atomic energy, develop additional measures necessary to
facilitate the use of U.S. reactor technology and full-scale
prototype power reactor plants abroad.
34. In view of the close relation between the early operation of
large-scale prototype nuclear power reactors in the United States
and leadership in the peaceful applications of atomic energy,
accelerate, wherever found feasible, the operational dates of
presently-planned nuclear power projects in the United States for
which funds have been approved.
35. Continue the peaceful nuclear propulsion program. During the
construction period of the first nuclear-propelled merchant ship (a)
inform interested Free World nations of both the technology and
economics of nuclear ship propulsion; (b) take steps through
diplomatic and other appropriate channels to assure that, upon
construction, the ship will be able to move freely in foreign waters
so that full psychological advantage and operational experience may
be gained.
36. Vigorously present a picture of U.S. policies and achievements,
stressing the beneficial potential of atomic energy, while making
clear the problems associated with the development and conduct of
atomic energy programs:
- a.
- Through convocation of and participation in appropriate
international conferences and symposia.
- b.
- Through participation in appropriate international
exhibitions and trade fairs, with increased attention to
exhibits.
- c.
- Through the U.S. information program.
37. Develop opportunities further to support and strengthen the
position of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Possibilities
include: relating to the Agency U.S. programs now underway; finding
ways of encouraging other governments to join the Agency and deal
with it; building up the effectiveness and prestige of the Agency;
and, to the extent feasible, encouraging Soviet support of the
Agency.
[Page 780]
38. Develop a plan for construction of a less costly Asian Nuclear
Center, possibly to be associated with the Colombo Plan and the
IAEA.
39. Develop an active association with EURATOM (when it comes into existence) which would:
- a.
- Furnish the framework for mutually beneficial action on
both the governmental and industrial levels.
- b.
- Provide a fruitful two-way exchange of experience and
technical development.
- c.
- Assist Euratom in
achieving economic nuclear power at an early date.
- d.
- Result in mutual advantage from the proving ground for
nuclear power offered by EURATOM.
- e.
- Give recognition and status to EURATOM, thus contributing to the political
cohesion and economic strength of its members.
40. Utilize opportunities for limited cooperation in unclassified
peaceful uses of atomic energy matters with the USSR and with satellite nations, when
such cooperation will serve U.S. national security interests.
41. Continue to press for an international safeguard system to
prevent the diversion of nuclear materials to other than peaceful
uses. To this end:
- a.
- Attempt to persuade other governments that they have a
self-interest in an effective system of safeguards and
controls.
- b.
- Attempt to reach agreement with other supplier nations
with respect to establishing systems of safeguards and
controls consistent with those of the United States and the
International Agency.
- c.
- Assist in the development of an effective system of
safeguards and controls within the International Agency with
the ultimate objective of administration by the Agency of
existing bilateral controls and safeguards.
- d.
- Implement the safeguard provisions of “agreements for
cooperation” by establishing a system of inspection and
control based on adequate material accountability and
physical security measures, including the stationing of
resident inspection teams at the larger and more complex
installations.
- e.
- Seek to minimize any adverse effects arising from
implementation of safeguard systems.
[Here follows a Financial Appendix.]
