Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

303. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Stassen) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, October 7, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Report and Recommendations

1. Now that the election in the Federal Republic of Germany has been concluded with a signal success for Chancellor Adenauer; the London disarmament negotiations have been reviewed; and the Soviet Union’s progress in missiles has been confirmed;² it is desirable that the situation with regard to the disarmament policy of the U.S. be reviewed and that necessary decisions be made.

2. During the pre-election period the representatives of the Federal Republic of Germany in the NATO Council were opposed to the conclusion of any feasible immediate agreement which included the inspection of the territory of Germany. Mr. Blankenhorn of the Federal Republic of Germany stated in the NATO Council meeting on June 6th³ that the initial disarmament measures should under no circumstances go beyond

. . . . . . .

On August 2nd, Mr. Blankenhorn said in the NATO Council that careful reconsideration should be given within the Council before …

3. General Norstad recommended to the NATO Council on June 23rd⁴ that it would be in the interest of NATO to establish an initial European inspection zone against surprise attack. …

. . . . . . .

6. During the London negotiations the U.S. continued to insist upon the requirement that an inspection system must be set up with inspection posts inside the Soviet Union and with appropriate scientific instruments in conjunction with any agreement for the suspension of nuclear tests. The Soviet Union persistently refused to agree to such inspection posts until the informal discussions on the 7th of June, and on that date the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. proposal in this respect.⁵ This acceptance was formally confirmed in the Subcommittee on the 14th of June,⁶ and was reaffirmed by Mr. Gromyko in his October 5th talk with the Secretary.⁷

7. The U.S. also insisted throughout the London negotiations that it would not agree to an indefinite suspension of tests nor to a permanent cessation of tests under present circumstances. On the 25th of May the President decided to authorize an initial one-year suspension of tests, with appropriate inspection posts to be installed, and linked to other provisions of a first step general agreement.⁸

8. On the 7th of June the Soviet Union accepted the U.S. position for an initial limited period of suspension of tests in a first step agreement but countered with an insistence that the initial period must be longer than the U.S. proposal and counter-proposed a period of two or three years.

9. On the 21st of August the U.S. proposed that the initial period of suspension of testing should be twenty-four months under certain conditions, and under effective inspection.⁹

10. Progress made at the London negotiations now brings within reach a first agreement which would be in the national interest of the U.S. Furthermore, such a first agreement would improve the prospect of additional agreements. It is recommended that this opportunity should now be moved upon affirmatively.

11. Specifically it is recommended that the U.S. should now propose an agreement as follows:

a. The immediate installation, after ratification, of approximately eight to twelve test monitoring inspection stations with appropriate scientific instruments, in the USSR, a like number in the U.S., and suitable numbers of such stations in the Pacific Ocean areas, and at other necessary locations, as agreed by competent scientists. (See attached map Annex A.¹⁰)

b. A twenty-four month suspension of nuclear testing beginning on September 1, 1958, subject to the satisfactory installation of the inspection stations, and subject to the right to end the test suspension before the expiration of the twenty-four month period upon notice of a violation of the agreement in any important particular.

c. The establishment of an Armaments Regulation Organization under the aegis of the Security Council of the United Nations to supervise the nuclear test suspension and to prepare to supervise further measures.

d. An undertaking by all signatory states to make a sustained effort, during the twenty-four months of test suspension, to reach agreement upon, and to begin to implement, additional steps of disarmament which would be sound and safeguarded and would improve the prospects of peace. These additional steps should include the U.S. proposal for prompt study of the means of assuring that future use of outer space would be for exclusively scientific and peaceful purposes, the methods and timing of the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and the remaining measures of the Four Power joint proposals of August 29, 1957.

e. If the approval of the Federal Republic of Germany and of the NATO Council can be obtained, the establishment of an initial inspection zone against surprise attack in Central Europe. (See Attached Map Annex B.¹¹)

f. If the approval of the U.S. Senators can be obtained, the establishment of an inspection zone of Western Siberia, the Arctic, Northwestern U.S., and Western Canada. (See attached map Annex B.)

12. The agreement for suspension of testing should take effect as soon as ratified by the USSR, UK and U.S., and should be open to the adherence of additional states. It is estimated that public opinion in the respective states, and careful analysis by their governments, will bring about adherence to this agreement of all leading states recognized by the U.S. Government within a relatively short space of time.

13. This agreement would retard and perhaps prevent the spread of nuclear weapons which otherwise will move irreversibly within approximately the next year through the production and testing of nuclear weapons by France and the Federal Republic of Germany individually or in combination. The U.S. intelligence estimate of October 5, 1957 states that France can test a prototype nuclear bomb the later part of 1958, and France and Germany can have a capability of 50 bombs in 1960.¹² Other states in growing numbers would be quite certain to follow a French and German decision with decisions on their part to produce and test weapons.

14. In view of the concessions which the USSR made to the U.S. in the informal bilateral negotiations in London from mid April to mid June, 1957, it appears probable that the USSR would agree to a U.S. proposal of inspection posts and the twenty-four months suspension of testing and the other clauses specified in paragraph 11 above.

15. It is estimated that the UK would accept such a provision, and in fact would prefer it to an initial agreement which cut off the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, (unless the latter was accompanied by a firm pledge, made with Congressional approval, for the transfer of a quantity of U.S. materials to the UK).

16. Since the German Bundestag on May 10, 1957 passed an Adenauer-sponsored resolution calling for the suspension of nuclear tests, it is believed that Chancellor Adenauer would agree to such a provision.

17. The establishment of the United Nations machinery for the regulation of armaments would in itself be significant and may well mark an historic turning point in the nuclear age for the better prospects of a durable peace.

18. The opening up to the necessary inspection posts in accordance with the study of the experts of the U.S. units now engaged in test detection, shown in the attached map (Annex A) would also make an important contribution to the evolution toward opening of the Soviet Union and to the lessening of the danger of war.

19. It is reemphasized that if the Federal Republic of Germany and the other NATO countries concerned will agree to an initial inspection zone then the two zones should be added to the U.S. proposal. One would be a reasonable balanced zone in Western Europe subject to the approval of General Norstad and the NATO Council. It is estimated that its dimensions would be from approximately 3° East Longitude to 28° East Longitude and from 45° North Latitude to the Arctic Circle.

20. The zone between the U.S. and the Soviet Union should take advantage of the counter-offer of the Soviet Union on April 30th. In other words it would include all of Siberia east of 108 degrees East Longitude (Lake Baikal to Bering Strait), and the additional Soviet Arctic territory thus including the Murmansk area. In exchange there should be offered the Arctic area of Norway, Greenland and Canada, Alaska, and in addition a sufficient portion of Northwestern U.S. and of Western Canada so as to approximate the same number of square miles as the Soviet territory and to include approximately the same percentage of the territory of the U.S. as the percentage of the territory of the Soviet Union.

21. These two zones would greatly improve the safeguards of the U.S. against surprise attack. U.S. intelligence studies indicate they would constitute an important advance for the security of the U.S. These zones, however, cannot be included in a first treaty unless the Federal Republic of Germany and the other NATO countries concerned are agreeable, and unless the U.S. Senators will concur.

22. It is urged that the opening of Poland, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary and the other satellites would improve the prospects of an evolution of these nations to independence and freedom.

23. It may be possible to add other features of the joint proposals in the initial agreement such as the study of means of future control of outer space developments, and the method and timing of a cut-off of nuclear production for weapons purposes. But the other proposals are not as suitable for prompt implementation.

24. Opposition to these recommendations has been expressed within the Administration. The opposing arguments have been taken into account in this net evaluation. It is recommended that these decisions be made in the national interest of the U.S. and that appropriate measures for their implementation be taken.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/10–757. Secret. Stassen addressed his memorandum to the Secretary of State for the President. The President’s consideration of this memorandum is noted in the memorandum of conversation, infra. A covering note from Stassen to Dulles, October 7, acknowldeges Dulles’ September 27 memorandum to Stassen, Document 298, and reads in part:

   “It would appear that I have not adequately conveyed the nature and significance to the recommendations which I make.

   “I have endeavored to make these recommendations more clear and specific in the enclosed supplemental memorandum with annexes.” (Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/10–757)

2. The Soviet announcement of the successful testing of an ICBM is reported in The New York Times, August 27, pp. 1 and 6.
3. Verbatim text of Blankenhorn’s June 6 statement to the NAC was transmitted in Polto 2946 from Paris, June 6. (Department of State, Central Files, 030.13/6–657)
4. No report of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.
5. A detailed report of this meeting is contained in telegram 6822 from London, June 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–857)
6. See the Soviet proposal introduced in the disarmament subcommittee on June 14 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/60), printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, p. 791.
7. See Supra.
8. The President’s decision is noted in the memorandum of conference, Document 206.
9. The President’s August 21 announcement on the suspension of nuclear testing is printed in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 627.
10. Annex A is not printed.
11. Annex B is not printed.
12. No October 5 national intelligence estimate has been found in Department of State files. Reference may be to NIE 100–6–57, “Nuclear Weapons Production in Fourth Countries—Likelihood and Consequences,”, June 18, which discussed, among other things, the prospects for French and West German production of nuclear weapons. (Department of State, INR–NIE Files)