287. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State1

1162. USDel Disarmament No. 506. Paris for Embassy and USRO. Subject: US–USSR bilateral August 14, 1957, 11:00 a.m., 44 Grosvenor Square, London.

Highlights:

1. With agreement of Western Allies (Embtel 1114, USDel No. 5042) USDel met with Sov Del for purpose of further defining Western position on reductions in armed forces beyond 2.5 million and 750 thousand men and of ascertaining whether Soviets prepared answer August 2 inspection zone proposals. Zorin stated USSR had not completed its consideration of August 2 paper and did not know when study would be finished. Zorin also said would like answer to Soviet aide-mémoire of June 7.3

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Details:

2. Stassen opened by asking for explanation of significance of Zorin’s statement in subcomite meeting of previous day (147th meeting, 13th August), noting that questions had been raised on matter of force level figures on which agreement apparently had been reached. Stassen inquired whether Zorin’s attitude reflected a change in the attitude of the Soviet Government towards reaching an agreement on partial measures of disarmament. Zorin replied that his remarks had not been directed at USDel affirmative attitude towards disarmament agreement but at what Sov Del felt was suggestion US–USSR on eve of reaching agreement. Zorin said attitude of other countries in subcomite showed there was no basis for thinking agreement about to be reached; this was why Sov Del used example of force levels. Zorin continued that USSR would not enter agreement which provided for reductions only to 2.5 million force levels or which required further negotiations and political preconditions before proceeding to further reductions in force levels. Stassen explained US policy was that parties to agreement would take into account progress being made towards settlement of political issues. US Del thought it obvious and natural that neither US nor USSR would ignore political situation when considering reductions in force levels. Stassen remarked that it would not be in interest of either side to be against settlement political issues.

3. Stassen made point that West had taken account of USSR aide-mémoire of June 7 in subcomite negotiations. Thus the August 2 proposal on inspection zones provided an answer to the way in which inspection should begin. Taking into account another aspect of the June 7 aide-mémoire, the US is also willing to consider a test suspension somewhat longer than the proposed ten months period. Replying to another question in the June 7 aide-mémoire, Stassen stated US desire was to reduce force levels below 2.5 million men under proper conditions. Finally, the US was leaving the way open for the deferral of certain measures which might be unacceptable at the very beginning of a disarmament agreement; this too was being done in light of the June 7 paper.

4. Regarding nuclear testing, Zorin said Sov Del would be prepared to discuss length and effective date of suspension if US had proposal to make; so far US position had been 10 months and nothing more. The most important question was the link between a suspension of testing and other parts of a disarmament agreement. The USSR thought that a suspension of testing would be the first step in halting the nuclear arms race and preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. If the suspension of testing were tied to other complex issues there might never be a suspension.

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5. Preliminary reaction of Sov Del to August 2 zone proposals was that inspection zones could not be accepted without agreement on other measures of nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament. USSR however was still studying August 2 paper and so Sov Del’s views confined to preliminary reaction.

6. Stassen said that most effective way of proceeding in negotiations on suspension of nuclear testing would be for Sov Del to state what suspension period less than 2 years would be acceptable to USSR. In view of US a number of measures would have to be agreed in order to prevent spread of nuclear weapons. In this connection it would be useful to discuss timing and circumstances under which the USSR would be willing to have a cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

7. Zorin repeated his opposition to any requirement for separate negotiations preceding further reductions in force levels and reaffirmed Soviet position that agreement on suspension of testing could be separated from other problems. Zorin stated that progress towards agreement would depend on how the US would move beyond its position of last May. Sov Del considered next move was up to US since no reply had yet been received to Sov June 7 aide-mémoire. Stassen observed that points which Sov Del had put into subcomite had been answered by West.

8. Zorin remarked it would be impossible to continue discussion all points at this meeting and it was agreed to consider continuing the discussion at the Soviet Embassy on Friday, August 16.

Discussion ended at 1:15 p.m.

Barbour4
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–1557. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.
  2. Dated August 13/14, midnight, not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/8–1357)
  3. Regarding the Soviet aide-mémoire, see Document 231.
  4. Walworth Barbour became Minister-Counselor of Embassy on February 23, 1956.