285. Report to the President From the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense (Wilson), and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (Strauss)1
On July 18, 1956, you directed the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, to make a study and recommendations thereon2 with respect to a letter addressed to you by Atomic Energy Commissioner Thomas E. Murray.…
. . . . . . .
Our recommendations have been postponed until the present.…
… the feasibility of developing very high yield weapons with the objective of determining the upper yield limit of a weapon which would be compatible as to size and weight with the B–52 aircraft… . A broad program of developing “clean” weapons fostered by the Atomic Energy Commission and the Department of Defense is in progress as a consequence of advancing technology in this field and in response to military requirements for applications in which reduced fall-out is essential. … A complementary or substitute “clean” weapon in the highest yield range corresponding with the delivery capability of the B–52 aircraft is not under development. From the military standpoint, there are two factors which make it desirable that the Strategic Air Command have the capability of delivering with [Page 702] certain of its aircraft a higher yield weapon than is now on hand. In the first place, such higher yield could be substantially more effective in destroying certain very hard Soviet military targets offering direct threat against the United States; … In the second place, the increasing complexity and cost of first line aircraft and the attrition which must be expected from Soviet offensive and defensive action make it necessary to base war plans on the arrival of reduced numbers of our aircraft over targets. This factor makes it necessary that our forces attain maximum unit effectiveness.
… On the other hand, military calculations show that if we substituted very high yield “clean” weapons … we could decrease the over-all intensity of fall-out in adjacent areas … employed, and by a factor of 30 with air bursts. There is, therefore, a sound military basis for the development of “clean” weapons of the highest yield deliverable by our aircraft… . This answer can be obtained with reasonable certainty if a research and developmental program were carried through the next Pacific test series. Decision may be made thereafter as to whether pre-production and production effort would be instituted; this decision based on the then applying climate of international relations, on the yield possible, and a later estimate of the strategic need for the potential weapon.
Should it become known that continued United States testing is directed in part towards development of a weapon … some unfavorable international and possibly national reaction might be expected. Certainly the Soviets could be expected to use this for any propaganda advantage which might be gained. Therefore, it is not believed necessary nor appropriate that the United States decide now to embark upon a program to develop and stockpile a … weapon …. Rather, we should proceed with our research and early developmental effort to a point where we know the characteristics of the weapon ….
… It is a moral responsibility of the United States to apply force, should the use of force become necessary, in such a manner as to minimize the effects on nonparticipating populations. The development program discussed herein has the objective of meeting that responsibility.
In view of the considerations outlined earlier it is recommended that:
- a.
- There be a test in the next Pacific test series of a device …. The planned gross yield of the test device should be as low as possible consistent with securing the required information… .
- b.
- If following completion of this test the Department of Defense considers it requires development of weapons on this or related pattern, we will submit to the President our recommendations as to the undertaking of a pre-production development program.
It shall be understood that the authorization recommended in the paragraphs above shall in no way be interpreted as establishing a requirement … nor for carrying on a pre-production developmental program for such weapon.
Approved:
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Sp. Asst. for Nat. Sec. Affairs Records. Top Secret. Regarding the preparation of the undated draft report, identical to the source text, see footnote 4, Document 281.↩
- Eisenhower’s directive on July 18, 1956, has not been found in the Eisenhower Library or Department of State files, but regarding Eisenhower’s reply to Murray stating that he had referred the matter to the NSC for review, see footnote 3, Document 144.↩