Office of the Historian

271. Telegram From the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United Nations Disarmament Commission to the Department of State1

London, August 1, 1957—11 a.m.

Secto 15. USDel Disarmament No. 463. Secretary–Zorin talk July 31, 1957, 1:15 p.m. At Luncheon today for Secretary and subcomite principals at Ambassador Whitney’s residence, Secretary had informal conversation with Sov Rep Zorin.

1.
Zorin indicated interest as to US proposal on zones and its timing.
2.
Secretary broadly outlined zones as indicated in Dep Secto nine2 and stated US proposal would be presented in subcomite in day or two.
3.
Zorin expressed concern about rebirth of militarily strong Germany and desire of Soviet Union for East-West collective security system in Europe, such as Eden plan for thinned out zone. Stated Adenauer’s policy might involve the US in conflict with Soviet Union.
4.
Secretary stated all Soviet proposals to this effect presented so far perpetuated partition of Germany and unacceptable. Suggested Soviet Union study thoroughly Western proposals at 1955 Foreign Ministers conference in Geneva,3 especially in view of Molotov’s dismissal.4 Expressed doubt Khrushchev and Bulganin had been thoroughly informed by Molotov in 1955 as to exact Western position. Stated source of danger not Adenauer’s personality but rather perpetuation of partition of such important country as Germany. Expressed firm belief Adenauer is man of peace and opposed to violence.
5.
To Zorin’s remark that reunification was problem to be settled between two Germanys, Secretary pointed out responsibility of Four Powers for reunification had been stated in Potsdam and reaffirmed at summit meeting in Geneva.
6.
Zorin replied conditions had changed since then and Adenauer and Grotewohl5 were realities that had to be taken into account.
7.
Zorin probed separability of suspension of tests and cessation of manufacture in US position. Queried whether US willing accept unconditional suspension of tests and reiterated previous Soviet positions on test suspension and cessation of manufacture.
8.
Secretary said US position unchanged since suspension of tests alone would not reduce danger of war and prevent spreading of nuclear weapons into irresponsible hands. Stated if tests were suspended without cessation of manufacture weapons could not be improved and this would be detrimental to our deterrent.
9.
Zorin inquired whether Secretary’s coming to London was indication that subcomite was to be raised to Foreign Ministers level.
10.
Secretary denied but said Foreign Ministers meeting possible in future if results in subcomite warranted. Said main purpose for coming was to consult with USDel.
11.
Secretary emphasized importance of control to prevent surprise attack and unlikelihood of formula being devised for reduction and balance of armed forces.
12.
Zorin agreed control important yet collateral problem. Most important was to bring about conventional reductions and “take measures against nuclear weapons.”
13.
Secretary reiterated his position and supported it with historical examples.
14.
Zorin stated subcomite working under UNGA resolution and instructed to develop system of reductions rather than of supervision.

Detailed memorandum of conversation follows by pouch.6

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/8–157. Secret. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.↩
  2. Dated July 31, not printed. (Ibid., 330.13/7–3157)↩
  3. For documentation on the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Geneva, October 27–November 16, 1955, see vol. V, pp. 632 ff.↩
  4. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party dismissed Molotov from the Party’s Presidium and Central Committee on July 3 as part of a general shake-up of the Soviet leadership.↩
  5. Otto Grotewohl, Prime Minister of the German Democratic Republic.↩
  6. Not found in Department of State files.↩