Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

256. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, July 9/10, 1957—midnight

246. USDEL disarmament No. 393. Subject: US-USSR Bilateral, July 9, 1957, Lancaster House. Highlights:

1. Stassen and USDEL met with Zorin and advisors at Lancaster House from 5 p.m. until 7 p.m. today, primarily to discuss Soviet statement of July 8 in subcommittee² in response to Zorin request and with agreement of Western Four.

2. Zorin expressed surprise at Western dels reaction to statement because everything in statement was already in memo of June 7.³ Just as Stassen was placing in record positions which had been explained to SovDel on May 31, Soviet Union was placing in record positions contained in memo of June 7. In some respects, July 8 statement represented advance from June 7 position.

3. Zorin had impression that positions set forth in Four Power joint statement July 2⁴ aggravated situation in comparison to May 31 memo, leading him to believe that US had not succeeded in negotiations with other Western dels in securing approval of positive positions taken on May 31.

4. Stassen pointed out that in the July 8 statement Zorin had cast reflections on motivations of US. Zorin did not answer this point.

5. In response to Stassen question as to places where July 8 statement represented progress from June 7 position, Zorin made two points: (a) July 8 statement raised possibility of agreement on inspection provisions relating to tests before suspension of tests, thus making possible longer period than ten months for suspension (b) Zorin called attention to careful wording of his suggestions that at this juncture the powers should at least undertake to exert every effort to secure agreement on complete prohibition of atomic weapons, etc. (see verbatim July 8, page 11.⁵ ) This created basis for future negotiations.

6. Zorin believed that Four Powers statement represented step backwards from May 31 positions for two reasons: (a) In joint statement suspension of tests is now connected not only with cessation of production but also with reduction of armaments (b) Committee of Experts to study techniques of controls would delay progress.

7. Zorin stated that Soviets June 7 represented change in Soviet position in response to May 31 memo from US. No further advances could be expected until US response to Soviet June 7 memo.

8. Stassen stated US did not look on Four Power statement as step backward but rather as generalized statement of May 31 positions. Likewise, scientific experts would in fact accelerate agreement. Stassen asked whether Soviet Union would take positive attitude toward meeting of technicians if prior agreement could be reached on length of suspension.

9. Zorin suggested possibility that other Western dels in subcommittee were lagging behind US and USSR, and suggested possibility of further bilateral meetings between Soviets and other Western dels. Stassen stated US had no objections. He suggested best way to insure positive attitudes from other Western dels would be for Soviet to give positive reactions on positions advanced by US. Failure of Soviet Union to give such positive responses leads other Western dels to question whether Soviet Union might not raise further objections if Western dels agreed to US suggestions. During discussion of important specific issues, Stassen suggested that Soviet Union formulate new wording in connection with use of nuclear weapons. Stassen further asked whether US position on cutoff of production fissionable materials would meet with agreement.

10. In response to question from Zorin, Stassen expressed view that prospects for agreement were good if each of five governments were intelligent in its conclusions about its national interests. US proposals were sound. Zorin at end of meeting suggested that question of tests should be decided without connection with other questions but that parallel agreements could be made on other questions.

Memorandum of conversation being pouched.⁶

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/7–1057. Secret. Repeated to Paris for Embassy and USRO, Bonn, and Moscow.
2. See Supra.
3. See Document 231.
4. See footnote 2, Supra.
5. The verbatim record of the 132d meeting of the subcommittee, July 8, is not printed. (Department of State, IO Files: Lot 70 A 6871, DC/SC.1/PV.132)
6. Not found in Department of State files.