Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy, Volume XX

245. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State¹

London, June 20, 1957—7 p.m.

7147. For the Secretary from Stassen.

I. Dinner invitation at No. 10, June 19th (Embtel 6989, para 4 and Embtel 7111²) developed into three-hour discussion of the U.S. position on disarmament in which Selwyn Lloyd participated, and at the conclusion it appeared:

(1) The Prime Minister will recommend to the Cabinet at noon on June 24th that the new U.S. position be generally supported and decision of the Cabinet may be taken on Tuesday, June 25th.

(2) The need of the U.K. for “a little bit” of fissionable material before any cut-off, and some “defense know-how” information, is of very great concern and your message to the Prime Minister on June 19th³ will be studied for a few days before reply.

(3) British public and Commons opinion very worrisome to the Prime Minister.

(4) The U.K. agrees on the importance of safeguarding against the spreading of nuclear weapons into multiple hands in the interests of peace.

(5) Since the foregoing conclusions appeared to develop at least in part during the evening, presumably they may be modified by further reflection of the PM between now and Monday or Tuesday.

II. Upon arrival at No. 10 at 8:15 was ushered into the Cabinet room where the PM and the Foreign Minister were seated with various papers in front: of them. I suggested at once that I would wait outside until they were finished and then join them for dinner. The PM said no, they wished to begin talking with me and their first question was with regard to the Reuters ticker on the President’s press conference,⁴ and whether it meant that the U.S. had changed its position from what the U.K. had been advised in the consultations during the past three weeks. I responded that I felt confident that if there had been any change I would have been advised prior to the press conference; that I believed the full text of the press conference would make it clear the temporary suspension of testing was interrelated to other matters; and that I would advise them further tomorrow.

(1) The Prime Minister then referred to his visit that noon with Anthony Eden and proceeded to speak for 10 or 15 minutes in an apparently depressed mood of the burdens and cares of public office, of the problems of the U.K., of the incessant questioning in Commons, of Ernest Bevin’s death in office,⁵ of Cripps breaking in office,⁶ and of the necessity of at least three more months of recuperation before Sir Anthony would have sufficient vitality to do any work, but concluded that Sir Anthony was relaxed and that while he did not expect to live long, the PM had endeavored to cheer him up in that he might now live a long time.

(2) I endeavored to make some counter balancing contribution to this part of the conversation on a more cheerful perspective for the U.K., for free countries generally, and for men in public office.

(3) The PM then turned specifically to the disarmament subject, referred in passing to the fact that Selwyn Lloyd had seen Zorin for two and a half hours that afternoon, and then said that the PM would never sign an agreement which would permanently relegate the U.K. to a third rate stature as a power without nuclear weapons; his successor might do so, but he would not.

(4) I responded that U.S. policy contemplated no such situation and neither did any other proposal in the subcomite from any Govt. He rejoined that if nuclear testing were stopped tonight and if no outside source of fissionable material for the U.K. was found, he would stop the U.K. nuclear weapons program because it would not be sufficiently substantial to be worth the expense.

(5) I responded that the U.S. policy had at no time contemplated that nuclear testing would be stopped tonight; that a temporary suspension would only begin upon the ratification of a treaty with other important related matters and such negotiation and ratification of the treaty could not possibly take place sooner than one year; that any cutoff of fissionable material would be at least two years off; that it was my understanding that they had very successful nuclear tests; that they were highly competent in the nuclear weapons field; that they already had substantial quantities of fissionable material, that their production was going up rapidly; that the U.S. had always contemplated there would be three nuclear powers, and this was clearly verified by the fact that from the beginning the U.S. discussion of the problem of spreading nuclear weapons had been labelled by the U.S. as the “fourth country problem” which was self-evident in relationship to the U.K. as the third nuclear weapons power.

(6) Lloyd confirmed that the U.S. had always spoken of “fourth country problem” and that it had always been evident that the U.K. was contemplated to be the third nuclear weapons power. The PM then reiterated that he had just looked at the production figures that day and if testing and production stopped tonight he would stop the U.K. weapons program as not being substantial enough to justify the expense. I explained again that immediate cut-off was not now nor had it ever been contemplated; that the negotiation and ratification of a treaty would be at least a year and the installation of inspection at least a year after that. The PM asked if I was sure that the President’s press conference did not indicate a forthwith temporary suspension of testing, as if this was the U.S. position, he could not hold the House of Commons for the essential kiloton tests this autumn for the U.K. I stated again that I was confident that the full text of the President’s press conference would show that U.S. policy had not been changed.

(7) The PM then said that the McMahon Act⁷ which had cut off the U.K. from the U.S. in the nuclear weapons field had been an act which deeply split the U.S. and the U.K. in a manner harmful to both countries and to the Free World. He spoke at length on this subject and seemed to be reflecting his talk with Sir Anthony Eden that day. He said a U.S. sergeant sits in the U.K. with a small box and the U.K. must spend millions of pounds to learn independently what is in the box.

(8) I stated that I had no authority to take up with him the questions of fissionable material or of know-how, and that I was aware that he had a letter from the Secretary of State that day on this subject. He said he would take a few days’ time to study the letter and to review the situation before he replied to the letter, and he acknowledged recognition that I did not have negotiating power on this subject.

(9) He then asked what position the U.K. would be in if the USSR accepted a cut-off, if the President recommended some fissionable material but if Congress turned it down. I stated that he should have confidence in the entire matter in the President and Secretary Dulles, that he would find that in vital matters, Congress would follow the leadership of the President and the Secretary of State when the President and Secretary concluded the manner and time of acting in an important situation. I told him for example of the reports in the British newspapers that the Senate would defeat the President on the IAEA status, whereas I was confident the Senate would ratify the treaty with more than a two to one vote.⁸

(10) The PM then asked a series of questions on the manner in which the new U.S. policy would work if the Soviet accepted it and began to exact affirmative reactions to the importance of opening up the Soviet; to increasing safeguards against surprise attack; to avoiding miscalculations or incidents which expanded into war. He asked a series of elementary questions which I carefully answered in accordance with US policy.

(11) He then asked Lloyd for the drafts of the Four Power answer to the Soviet (Embtel 7065, USDEL No. 309⁹) and it soon became apparent that the PM and the Foreign Secretary had personally worked over these drafts at some length. The PM commented that he thought it was a good paper, that they would have a few clauses they would like changed in slight degree, but that he believed he would recommend it to Cabinet on Monday.

(12) He then commented that perhaps he could delay the commons questions by asking their reference to the new Canadian Govt and providing time for that govt to review disarmament policy. Lloyd concurred but interjected on the importance of not delaying the USSR too long or not delaying too long for their own U.K. public opinion.

(13) The PM agreed in response to my comment that NATO should be advised before the Four Power paper is tabled, and Lloyd interjected that individual NATO nations should not be given a veto over the Four Power work in the subcomite.

(14) It was then after 11 o’clock and with the PM repeating reluctance to conclude the discussion, and accompanying me to the door expressing appreciation of the thorough discussion and a conclusion that our two countries should stand together on this very important policy of this age. The talk ended.

Comment: I am not certain whether his extreme statements about the weak and poor condition of the U.K. were for purposes of exciting my sympathy in reporting to my govt, or whether they reflected his own worry and uncertainty. I also am not certain whether his constructive conclusions in fact were developed during the three hours, or whether they had been previously reached and were simply reviewed through this discussion process. If it is the former, presumably subsequent reflections of the PM or discussion with other Cabinet members may change his tentative conclusions.

Whitney

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–2057. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution, A copy of this telegram is initialed “DE” in the President’s handwriting. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series)
2. Telegrams 6989, June 20, and 7111, June 19, are not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–1557 and 101/6–1957, respectively)
3. Supra.
4. For the President’s remarks on disarmament at his news conference on June 19, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, pp. 470, 472, and 476–479.
5. Ernest Bevin, British Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951.
6. Sir Stafford Cripps, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1947–1950.
7. Atomic Energy Act of 1946.
8. Regarding Senate consent to the IAEA treaty, see Document 243.
9. The Western draft working paper on the suspension of nuclear tests is contained in telegram 7065 from London, June 18. (Department of State, Central Files, 330.13/6–1857) This working paper, introduced after minor stylistic changes in the Subcommittee of the U.N. Disarmament Commission on July 2 (U.N. doc. DC/SC.1/59), is printed in Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959, vol. II, pp. 802–803.